Lot 54 D 423
Mr. John Foster Dulles, the Consultant to the Secretary, to the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (MacArthur)
My Dear General: We arrived home on Monday the 26th from our trip to the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand and I am anxious to tell you of our activities there and of the outcome.
In the Philippines we talked at length with the President, the Acting Foreign Minister and with most of the members of both houses of the Legislature. Reparations seemed to occupy the mind of everyone to the exclusion of almost everything else—including a Pacific Island Pact. The President agreed with me that the safety of his country would be seriously jeopardized were Japan to come under the influence of Soviet Russia and Communist China, but his primary and immediate concern in the matter of security was the question of Formosa. He expressed great fear lest that island come under Communist control [Page 901] and he made a strong plea that the Philippines be given a voice in the final disposition of Formosa.
The greater part of my conversation with the President, and virtually all of our discussions with others, dealt with the problem of reparations. The Philippines claim some eight billion dollars for damage caused by the Japanese during the occupation. The President seemed to realize the impossibility of extracting such a sum from Japan and suggested, therefore, that the reparations bill be guaranteed by the United States!
No one knows better than you the sufferings the Filipinos have endured and the justice of their claims for some recompense for the damage the country has sustained. Their attitude towards the problem, moreover, is colored by the embarrassed financial condition of the country, the precarious position of the Government and a feeling of jealousy caused by the large grants of U.S. economic aid made to Japan. In explaining the point of view of the United States, I emphasized that we recognized and sympathized with the justice of reparation claims of the Philippines but that past experience with Germany and the most exhaustive examination of every possible procedure had led us to the inevitable conclusion that the extraction of reparations from a naturally poor country like Japan was impossible except at the expense of the American taxpayer, or at the expense of such low living standards as would bring in communism.
It appeared to us that most of those with whom we talked recognized the force of our arguments, but there remains the problem of overcoming the emotional prejudices of the people and explaining to them why the relief to which they have looked forward for so long cannot be had. The present Government has neither the political stability nor the courage to undertake such a task. The only constructive suggestion put forward by any Filipino was that a group of representative and responsible men from the Philippines go to Japan, talk to you, your staff and members of the Japanese Government and then report to the people at home on the results of their investigation. It was suggested that while the people of the Philippines would never accept a renunciation of reparations simply on the say-so of the United States, they might take more kindly to the idea if it were advanced by a group of their own backed by a strong explanatory statement from you. I would appreciate your views on this suggestion.
In Canberra I had a talk with the Prime Minister, a meeting with the Cabinet, and numerous joint conferences over a period of four days with Spender, the Minister for External Affairs, and Doidge, the Minister for External Affairs of New Zealand. Our initial talks dealt entirely with the question of a Pacific Island Security Pact since it was obvious that the willingness of Australia and New Zealand to accept the United States version of a Japanese Peace Treaty would [Page 902] be conditioned by the degree to which the United States would formalize its security relations to them.
[Here follows discussion of the talks held in Canberra regarding a security treaty. It is printed on page 176.]
In the discussions on the Japanese Peace Treaty, which followed the completion of the talks on the Pacific Island Pact, both Foreign Ministers expressed more or less perfunctory objections to the waiving of reparations and indicated that they would prefer certain restrictions on Japan’s war-making capacity even with a Pacific Security Pact. They also objected to Japan’s being given a voice in the commutation of sentences awarded War Criminals imprisoned in Japan and expressed considerable concern over Japan’s “excess” shipbuilding capacity and the lack of restrictions in the proposed treaty on Japan’s “unfair trade practices.” They realized that the United States would not consent to the inclusion of any restrictions in the treaty but expressed a desire for Japan to make a voluntary statement in regard to armaments and accepted trade practices and agree voluntarily to dismantle such of her ship yards as she could not use for “normal peace time requirements.” I believe that the above comments were largely “for the record” and that if a satisfactory agreement is reached in regard to a Pacific Security Pact, we will succeed in getting the adherence of the Australian and New Zealand governments to the kind of Peace Treaty we want.
In New Zealand I talked with the Prime Minister, the leader of the Opposition, Mr. Walter Nash, and had a conference with the Cabinet. There I found evidence of a bi-partisan approach to Foreign Policy and I believe that the problem of educating public opinion to accept what will be an unpopular Peace Settlement will be easier than will be the case in Australia.
In Australia the political position of the Government is not strong and I detected a lack of political courage in facing up to popular demand for a restrictive type of treaty. Evatt1 is making a major political issue of the treaty and I believe that we must push ahead vigorously and try to provide the present Australian Government with help in this matter if we are to get the assent of the Australian nation to the type of treaty we desire.
I was somewhat disturbed to see in a recent Reuters report that I was quoted as having said that the Peace Treaty would be considered by the Far Eastern Commission. Nothing, of course, is farther from my thoughts. I have repeatedly said that the United States was discussing the treaty through diplomatic channels with the nations represented on the Far Eastern Commission and I have indicated that we would continue to do so as well as consult with other interested [Page 903] governments. It is apparent that my remarks have been misinterpreted (perhaps deliberately) by a News Agency which has never been particularly friendly to the United States in the Far East.
Ambassador Sebald is working in close touch with me while he is here2 and I know that when he reports back to you he will bring you up to date on our activities. I propose to keep in touch with you by letter and, I hope, through occasional visits by members of my staff. I hope that you will not hesitate to let me know your views on any matters connected with our mutual problem which may come up from time to time.
I want again to express my deep appreciation of your help and counsel and of all that you have done to make it perhaps possible to arrive at a just and lasting peace with Japan. I took occasion at a meeting of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to pay tribute to your contribution, and I did so in the radio report to the country which I made last night.3
With my best personal regards and good wishes to your wife, I am
Faithfully yours,
- Herbert V. Evatt of the Labor Party, formerly Minister of External Affairs and External Territories.↩
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Ambassador Sebald left Tokyo for consultations in Washington during February and returned to Tokyo on March 27.
On March 2, Mr. Sebald gave to the Under Secretary’s Meeting an oral evaluation of the situation in Japan. A summary of his remarks is included in document UM M–312 in Lot 53 D 250: The Under Secretary’s Meeting.
↩ - See footnote 2, p. 872.↩