894.501/2–1551
The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)1
My Dear Mr. Secretary: Very careful consideration has been given to your letter of February 15, 1951, transmitting a memorandum of February 9, 1951,2 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff presenting certain recommendations on the Japanese National Police Reserve in Japan.
The Department of State fully shares your concern over the security of Japan and desire that it be strengthened as rapidly as possible. However, in determining the specific steps that should be taken, it will, as suggested in your letter, be desirable at each stage to give full consideration to the international political implications. The present recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff relate very directly to the relationship of the United States to the Far Eastern Commission, and the present negotiations looking toward an early peace treaty with Japan.
Decisions of the Far Eastern Commission are very explicit with regard to armament permitted to Japanese. Those decisions, which are in effect international obligations of the United States, were in a large part proposed and strongly supported by the United States Government at the time of their adoption.
At the time of the discussions between our two Departments looking toward the present mission of Mr. Dulles, it was recognized that the most practicable means of removing those restrictions on Japanese ability to contribute to their own defense was the conclusion of a peace treaty. One of the principal purposes of Mr. Dulles’ recent mission was to obtain as a great a degree as possible of international support for the type of treaty which the United States desires to see concluded with Japan, particularly the support of the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand which had evidenced much concern over Japanese rearmament. If the Japanese are provided heavy armament prior to a successful conclusion of the present treaty negotiations, it could well seriously jeopardize the international support which could otherwise be obtained for the type treaty which the United States is seeking.
A unilateral decision by the United States fully to arm four Japanese [Page 899] divisions prior to a treaty of peace in direct violation of the decisions of the Far Eastern Commission could also well lead to a break-up of the Commission with prejudice to our relations with even our best friends and largely isolate the United States in its policy toward Japan. This possibility could only partially be minimized if the United States were in a position to persuade a few of the countries most likely to be receptive that the danger of Soviet invasion of Japan is so great as to justify extraordinary measures prior to such time as Japan can be rearmed in accordance with orderly international decisions.
It was also recognized that probably only by a treaty of the type desired by the United States would it be possible to obtain from the Japanese people their maximum identification with the cause of the free world and willingness to accept increased responsibility for contributing to their own defense. Unless presented in the context of such an immediate and extreme emergency as to admit of no choice (with the repercussions that would flow therefrom), it would appear that all elements in Japan opposed to the type treaty desired by the United States would be able to foment opposition to the treaty on the grounds that the furnishing of heavy equipment to the National Police Reserve constituted rearmament of the country, in contradiction to the principles accepted by them at the time of their surrender and, until recently, inculcated by the occupation authorities, at the unilateral decision of the United States and without their being given an opportunity to participate in the decision. This would also give Communist propaganda a base upon which to build an intensified campaign of propaganda and intimidation of increased effectiveness in Japan.
Therefore, if the Soviets should, for any reason, initiate a localized attack on Japan on the pretext of violations by ourselves and the Japanese of the disarmament decisions of the Far Eastern Commission, they would be in a position effectively to exploit differences of opinion between ourselves and our allies on the subject, and we would probably encounter great difficulty in obtaining support in much of Europe and Asia for counter-action against the USSR. Thus, if the Soviet purpose is to attack Japan, the furnishing of Japanese divisions with heavy equipment prior to our obtaining some understanding with friendly countries on the subject of Japanese rearmament might enable the Soviets to carry out the attack under conditions which would make it very difficult for the United States to obtain support from its allies.
It must also be mentioned that if, as now appears possible, the Council of Foreign Ministers3 is in session at the time the receipt of [Page 900] this equipment by the Japanese becomes known it would probably result in very adverse effects on the possibility of any degree of success being achieved at those sessions.
Therefore, while the Department of State entirely concurs with the recommendation that heavy armament for four divisions be shipped to the Far East Command so as to be immediately available for any emergency, and that the Department of Defense undertake planning and budgeting for FY 1952 for equipment for an additional six divisions, it believes that the timing of the placing of any such equipment in the hands of Japanese should be carefully considered so as, if possible, not to jeopardize the achievement of the long-range objectives of United States policy toward Japan.
In concurring with the shipment of this equipment to Japan and the planning and budgeting by the Department of Defense for an additional six divisions for FY 1952 it is the understanding of the Department of State that none of the equipment will be placed in the hands of the Japanese without the specific prior agreement of the Department of State. It would be appreciated if the Department of Defense would confirm this understanding.
With the return of Mr. Dulles from his recent trip it will be necessary during the next few months for the Departments of State and Defense to give full consideration to all of the questions that will arise with regard to a possible early peace settlement with Japan. It is suggested that the question of the timing of the turnover of heavy armament to the Japanese is one of the questions which should be considered during that period by both Departments.
Sincerely yours,