611.51G/7–2751
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the Assistant Secretary (Rusk)
My compressed impression of the issues involved in the recent Heath and Blum telegrams regarding American policy in Indochina is as follows:
(1) Heath believes that our sole present interest in Indochina is “real estate”. By this he means the prevention of Communist control and exploitation of the human and material resources of Indochina. From this he reasons that only the French Union Army (preponderantly French) can prevent the physical capture of the country by Ho Chi-minh with Chinese Communist direct or indirect support. [Page 463] Heath then reasons that the French Republic is willing to make the necessary sacrifices in money, matériel and men, only on the basis of the French Union concept under which Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia would enjoy independence within the Union, and not complete and unqualified independence. From these premises it follows that we must loyally support the French in their concept of the French Union. I do not believe by any means that Heath excludes exertion of pressure on the French by us to modify what we might consider to be an unreasonable interpretation or extension of the French concept.
(2) Heath considers that ECA–Washington, Bob Blum and the STEM Mission in Indochina understand our policy to be bifurcated—military aid to the French Union forces (i.e., the French) with some assistance for native armies which do not exist and economic support for the three native governments, the latter designed to strenghten their prestige and thereby increase possible support for them.
(3) He apparently further believes that many on the STEM staff through insufficient indoctrination and absence of political training, or in the case of their information people, an excess of zeal coupled with professional competence, have neglected STEM’s relations with the French and lent themselves to Vietnamese intrigues against the French. I suspect there is a good deal to Heath’s fears. For one thing, it is hard for me to believe that ECA or anyone else could persuade a doctor or an engineer, or a technical expert in almost any field to go to Indochina under present conditions unless he possessed a strong humanitarian motivation, which almost by definition would place his sympathies on the side of the native people and against their colonial ex-masters. Nevertheless, Heath must bear a large share of the blame for this since he makes clear that the situation is not a new one. The responsibility for making sure that all Americans with official status in Indochina are well briefed on American policies and local political pitfalls rests squarely on the Minister.
(4) The above analysis, to my mind, obscures the underlying in-articulate issue. This issue is, how best do we assure the preservation of Indochina from Communism? A course which supports the French Union Army yet so alienates the local people as to produce mass defections to Ho Chi-minh can lose the country to the Communists just about as easily as a military victory over De Lattre by an invading Chinese Communist army. At the other extreme, a course of action which collapses the will of the French to continue to make an effort in Indochina will just as rapidly result in the fall of French Indochina to the enemy.
(5) The clue to the proper conclusion, I am convinced, is the nature and sincerity of French intentions. To reduce the problem to personalities, [Page 464] it seems to me reasonable under the circumstances that the question becomes one of clearly analyzing the intentions of General De Lattre.
(6) I am left with the impression that De Lattre has completely captured Heath’s confidence. I believe further that it is a fair inference that the flamboyance, vigor and Napoleonic character and personality of De Lattre have simultaneously excited the hopes of the French in Indochina who deplored the granting of independence, and the fears of those Viets who all along thought it was too good to be true. It is easy therefore to see why the last few months have revealed a rift between Heath’s and Blum’s interpretation of American policy, which probably existed virtually undiscovered all along.
(7) I feel strongly that our responsibility here in Washington is to iron out any divergencies in policy or its interpretation which may exist between us and ECA and not deepen the controversy in Indochina by transferring to the field aspects of the problem unresolved here.
(8) I also believe that we should attempt to defer any final conclusions until De Lattre and Heath are here. The former’s visit should enable us collectively to assess De Lattre and his intentions. The result may be to reinforce or to modify the impressions Heath has formed in Indochina.
(9) I think both Heath and Blum are right and the division between them is not as great as appears from the cables. Of course we must uphold the French hand but only in support of French policies and attitudes which in our judgment are directed toward the development politically of the three states along lines which strengthen their will to resist Communism. I approve the fact that our military aid is being channelled in increasing amount to the National Army and I believe that the prompt creation of an effective National Army is our best if not our only hope in Indochina. I believe that the economic aid should be designed and given in such fashion as to strengthen the native regimes and not the French. I believe that the French should be freely consulted and fully informed. Apparently this has not been done in the past, as I understood it had. This should be rectified. Although I lack adequate evidence, I strongly suspect that much ECA publicity in Indochina has been inept, excessive and needlessly offensive to the French. This I believe ECA has already cured by directives from Washington. I suppose, in a word, I would summarize my feeling by saying that whereas the answer to the problem is to a considerable extent military, for the obvious reason that a full-scale war is being conducted, nevertheless the political is the more important component.