751G.5/7–2551: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation at Saigon

secret

127. Fr Amb called on Secy July 23 to discuss defense of IC with particular reference to possible effects on defense IC and SEA of truce in Korea. Amb stated his Govt eager to determine, as far in advance as possible what steps cld be taken in event of large-scale Chi intervention by US, UK and Fr in concert successfully defend IC. He suggested on behalf his Govt two courses of action either or both of which might provide a basis for satisfactorily anticipating requisite action and forestalling Chi intervention:

(a)
A convocation of reps of US, UK, Fr FonOffs to discuss implementation of recommendations made at mil conf Singapore. In this connection Fr Amb remarked on evidence Chi build-up on Tonkin border and on agreement at Singapore that defense of Tonkin was key to defense of SEA.
(b)
Discussion by “interested parties” of guarantees against Chi aggression against parts of Asia other than Korea; Amb said his Govt understood such matters cld not be incorporated in present mil truce discussions and thought they shld take place fol conclusion of truce. In reply to Secy’s question Amb replied that it was inevitable that such discussions wld include Chi Commies, as such undertaking on such broad matters by North Koreans alone wld be useless. Further efforts [Page 462] on part Secy to determine when and between whom such discussions shld take place proved unavailing. Secy took this opportunity to suggest desirability Schuman’s personally participating Jap Treaty ceremony San Francisco1 fol which Secy implied he wld discuss this matter with Schuman. Fr Amb at first agreed desirability Schuman attending San Francisco ceremony but later pointed out that he thought latter wld be unable to attend if the Assoc States IC were excluded from list of signatories. He engaged however to pass suggestion on to Schuman at appropriate time.

Secy assured Fr Amb that Dept seriously considering manner in which Singapore recommendations shld be carried out and had given most earnest consideration to manner in which security of Asian countries other than Korea, particularly IC might be assured in connection with, or in consequence of Korean truce. He told Fr Amb that we were doing our best to find some formula which wld satisfactorily deal with problem inclusion Assoc States as signatories Jap Treaty in face of opposition other Asian states. Bonnet suggested possibly announcing at commencement Treaty ceremonies that signature to Treaty did not imply change in relations between signatories, i.e., India by signing together with Assoc States does not imply recognition latter by former (this had previously been suggested to Fr Amb by Mr. Dulles2 as possibility for consideration).

Fr Amb stated his Govt realized proposal (b) difficult to pursue; hoped proposal (a) might be dealt with relatively soon.

Sent to AmLegation Saigon 127; rptd info AmEmbassy Paris by pouch, AmEmbassy London by pouch.

Acheson
  1. For documentation on the Japanese Peace Treaty, see pp. 777 ff.
  2. John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State.