751G.5/7–3051: Telegram
The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State
258. Re Legtel 253, rptd Paris 94.1 Mobilization measures described in reftel may be regarded as key De Lattre’s policy since declarations Vinh Yen.2 His efforts enlist participation all non-Commie Viets in categorical material and spiritual mobilization against Viet Minh have been carefully spaced for cumulative effect and were marked by Vinh Yen appeal, the mammoth Tonkin parade on July 14 and Bao Dai’s call arms. I believe De Lattre expects he can rally somewhat indecisive Viets behind firm leadership by confronting them each week with new and positive measures and counting on their divided councils, lack of organization and desire for security forestall dissidence. He apparently has wholehearted cooperation Huu Govt. All this is logical development Fr line of policy here in last two years but is now pushed with energy and decisiveness of De Lattre. It is, of course, not without considerable risk, especially since De Lattre is prepared break many eggs to make omelette.
Effect decrees for some time to come will probably bear chiefly on morale and foreign opinion rather than on military situation. Principal Viets military instrument will still be natl army now being forged by voluntary recruitment and transfers from auxiliary and Fr Union Forces of new call of technicians shld immed supply limited number specialists; for example 13 doctors have been called up (they include doctor Tran Van Do, possibly leading and most respected fence-sitter in south). Perhaps most striking of measures is provision of call up of 60,000 young men for mil instruction. Leg finds that auths expect no difficulty in securing this number trainees from relatively loyal or pacified areas, especially if recruitment is accompanied by material advantages such as pay and clothing. This and other mobilization measures however will only slightly ameliorate principal need of army which is for officer combat cadres, still being supplied at slow-motion rate from officers training echelons. (Incidentially [Page 466] … first graduating class at Dalat show unwelcome preference for assignment to matériel and quartermaster jobs.)
It must be recognized however that call up is bold and positive step which either shld have been taken long time ago or which marks new increase in confidence on part of govt. In addition to its long range effect on military posture of Vietnam it furnishes the govt an opportunity indoctrinate its elite and numerous young men. If it succeeds, it opens way for bigger things.
There are indications that Viet Minh intends regard mobilization as tests strength and it is conducting violent radio campaign against mild census.
Leg will report progress execution these decrees.
Sent Dept 258, rptd info Paris 96, Hanoi unnumbered.
- Telegram 253 from Saigon, July 30, is not printed.↩
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On July 15, Bao Dai issued a mobilization ordinance which assigned responsibility to Prime Minister Huu for the total mobilization of national resources to restore peace and order. The Huu Government approved certain implementing decrees on July 27, including ordinances providing for the calling up of doctors and technicians, the drafting of 60,000 men for military training, and the conducting of a national census.
Translations of the mobilization ordinance and the governmental implementing orders were transmitted to the Department of State as enclosures to despatch No. 78 from Saigon, August 9 not printed. (751G.5/8–951)
Regarding the Vinh Yen declarations, see footnote 2, p. 416.
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