641.61/12–551
Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department of State (Bohlen)1
Memorandum
The difference in approach between the UK and US to the problem of the Soviet Union is compounded by a great variety of factors. Unquestionably, an important, if not the chief factor, is the different geographic location of the two countries. By this fact alone the UK must be more concerned at the prospect of war with the Soviet Union than is the United States. Although we, of course, share a common desire to avoid such a war if possible, nevertheless, the immediate consequences of a war with the Soviet Union could be so much more catastrophic for the UK than for the US that a greater degree of caution and even, in our eyes, timidity is to be found in the British position and they are understandably less prepared to take risks than is the case with the US Government. In addition, British traditions of patience, muddling through and willingness to live with situations rather than seek solutions as against our tendency to want quick, automatic answers to most questions of foreign affairs play their part in the difference of approach. The internal political situation of the two countries adds another factor. In Great Britain, although Labor is no longer in power, the balance is so close that the Conservative Government has to pay special attention to its views. The Left Wing of the Labor Party, which appears to be in the ascendancy, for ideological and other reasons is more conditioned to regard a settlement with the Soviet Union as an alternative to present dependence on the United States. To these factors must be added the one of Churchill’s personality and his known views on foreign affairs.
It is, of course, not possible to weigh with any degree of accuracy the influence of the above elements in the determination of British attitude towards the USSR (nor are they exhaustive), but the sum total results in a tendency to play down the extent of the Soviet menace and an accompanying tendency, its natural corollary, to play up the possibilities of settlements through diplomatic means. [Page 992] British officials have always tended to equate the problem of the Soviet Union with that of Czarist Russia rather than the complex mixture of Russian ambition, totalitarian state and center of the world revolutionary movement which, in fact, it is. This difference has been visible in almost every conference we have had with the Soviet Union and, aside from the special features of Mr. Churchill’s personality, will not be substantially modified by the Conservative victory. In fact, the Conservative victory, with certain variations, will undoubtedly increase the desire of the British Government to make an attempt at a high level to reach diplomatic settlements about which the British have been more optimistic than the US. In other words, Churchill’s accession to power will add an impetus to deal more with method, i.e., a meeting at the higher level rather than any fundamental political change.
As to the difference in substance, it would appear that stemming from the different concepts of the Soviet Union, the British are not reluctant to contemplate a settlement with the Soviet Union along the lines of spheres of influence. This form of settlement has certain special attractions to Churchill as his wartime efforts with the Soviet Union, especially in his 1944 visit, disclose. There has not been in the British attitude and certainly not in Mr. Churchill any moral recoil from this method of settling big-power differences. The British, furthermore, are less sensitive to the charge of “appeasement” since their public opinion through generations of experience is more conditioned to expediency and power realism in their foreign relations.
Insofar as this Government is concerned, most of these factors operate in the other direction: (1) Due to our geographic position we have been able to be more objective about the nature of the Soviet phenomenon (although with a tendency perhaps to go over on the other side); (2) With less experience, our public opinion is apt to denounce as appeasement any diplomatic flexibility; and (3) For moral reasons sphere of influence arrangements are quite unacceptable to the American people. In addition, however, on a realistic basis, we do not consider that spheres of influence, quite aside from moral considerations, are a workable arrangement with the Soviet Government primarily because of Kremlin control over Communist parties which can operate in complete violation of such agreements without involving the Soviet Government officially.
To sum up, for the considerations advanced above, the British generally take the line that it is not only possible but desirable to make arrangements with the Soviet bloc as it stands, of course including Communist China, and that some reasonable durable basis for such a settlement could be found, whereas we don’t believe that this is an acceptable assumption both for moral reasons and for [Page 993] practical reasons emanating from the nature of the Soviet state and its control and direction of Communist parties in other countries. It would not appear that there is much that could be done to bring into closer alignment the difference in attitudes towards the USSR since they stem from factors which are not susceptible to change.
(1) We should lose no opportunity to endeavor to bring the British to an acceptance of a more realistic estimate of the nature of Soviet power by sharing with them the fruits of our research and study. (So far as we are aware, the British have lagged way behind us in intensive study and specialization in Soviet affairs.)
(2) We should not be afraid to meet with the Russians in a four-power meeting provided we have a real identity of aims and tactics agreed on beforehand with the British and French.
(3) We should not, however, allow our appreciation and sympathy for Britain’s difficulties and fears to become a determinant factor in a joint policy towards the USSR.
- Attached to the source text was a memorandum of transmission to Parsons, the Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, dated December 6, which indicated that Bohlen’s memorandum was a response to a request by Parsons on behalf of Matthews, the Deputy Under Secretary of State.↩