Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

396.1–PA/6–451: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup), at Paris¹

secret
priority

Washington, June 4, 1951—8 p. m.

6570. For Jessup. Urtels 7473 and 7479.² We have had preliminary discussion with Sec based on text Sov reply³ and ur account of mtg.

We believe that if we are to avoid interminable continuation of Deps mtgs reply to Sovs shld be written, not oral, even though we recognize problem of coordination between Govts. In view of apparent Fr feeling that decision wld have to be taken by Cabinet which will not meet until Thursday, it may not be possible for us to reply to Gromyko on Wednesday although the sooner the better. If Western position not coordinated by Wednesday, Deps shld adjourn without discussion pending receipt of their Govts views.

We do not like the idea of referring to alternate reps of three Govts who might be reconvened if Sovs have new proposal.

Fol are preliminary views on main lines which we believe reply shld take:

1. We regret very much that Sov Govt did not see fit to accept the invitation which Western Govts extended on May 31.⁴ Our alternative proposals included or took into account the many points of agreement reached after many weeks of discussion. If Sovs sincerely want mtg, a broad and generous avenue has been prepared.

2. Sov Govt now states question of “American bases” and Atlantic Pact constitute chief cause of worsening of relations between USSR and Three Powers. It is difficult to reconcile this statement with original proposal made by Sovs Nov 3 when they took position that mtg shld be on German demilitarization alone. Furthermore, in course of Paris mtgs Sov rep on different occasions Expressed view that reduction of armed forces of Four Powers was crucial. On other occasions Sov rep stressed essentiality of discussing Trieste. Finally, as late as May 4 Sov rep expressed willingness to accept an agenda in which NATO and the “American bases” were not mentioned in any way and his one condition had to do with wording of armaments item.

3. These facts raise question in our minds what will be next pretext of Sov Govt for avoiding mtg of Foreign Ministers by prolonging Deps mtg and confirm our view that Sov Govt’s enthusiasm for mtg of Foreign Ministers is less than they seek to imply.

4. In view of foregoing facts and nature of Sov reply of June 4, US Govt considers that Deps have reached limit of contribution which they can make. Needless to say, the invitation extended by the US Govt in its communication of May 31 stands and it again expresses the hope that the Foreign Ministers can meet on July 23 in Washington.

Acheson

1. This telegram was drafted by Bonbright; cleared in substance with Secretary Acheson, Perkins, Matthews, Ferguson, Laukhuff, Leverich, and Reinhardt; and repeated to London, Moscow, and Frankfurt.
2. Telegram 7479 is not printed; it indicated that the main difficulty in formulating a reply to the Soviet note would be the coming French elections (396.1–PA/6–451).
3. Translation in telegram 7473, supra.
4. Ante, p. 1148.