Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

S/ISA files, lot 52–40, box 119, NAT Council Preparations

Working Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings¹

top secret

[Washington,] August 28, 1951.

Greece and Turkey and North Atlantic Treaty Organization

problem

To induce the British and French to give unqualified support to inclusion of Turkey and Greece in NATO, including cooperation in obtaining the agreement of other NATO members to inclusion.

us objective

To obtain the agreement of the North Atlantic Council, at the Ottawa meeting, to the inclusion of Turkey and Greece in NATO.

british position

1) Decision should be taken at Ottawa to recommend that Turkey and Greece be invited to adhere to Treaty.

2) Immediately after Ottawa, three Powers should hold discussions with Turkey as NATO “member elect” to give Turkey full information on proposed Middle East Command with immediate object of securing its agreement to an approach to Egypt.

3) Announcement of Middle East Command under British leadership should be made at same time as announcement of SACLANT (US).

french position

While other arrangements would have been preferred, admittance to NATO will not be opposed but following desiderata should be satisfied:

1) Standing Group’s authority should extend over area covered by proposed Middle East theatre.

2) There should be an integrated staff for Middle East theatre in which French officers would be represented at all levels.

3) Turkish forces should be under NATO rather than Middle East Command control.

4) A French admiral should exercise principal interallied responsibilities in Western Mediterranean under whatever overall NATO Mediterranean Command is established.

position to be presented—Summary (more detailed background attached)

1. The most practicable means of assuring association of Greece and Turkey with Western defense is their admittance into NATO as full members.

2. Turkey’s admittance into NATO should not be made conditional on its prior agreement to accept the role assigned to it in the proposed Middle East Command.

3. U.S. believes Turkey’s inclusion compatible with Preamble and Article 2 of Treaty.

4. U.S. keenly aware of necessity of giving new impetus to concept of North Atlantic community and demonstrating by action as well as words that U.S. retains long-term interest in NATO and its broad objectives.

5. Turkey’s ever increasing alignment and cooperation with Western democracies should be encouraged.

6. U.S. public opinion and Congressional sentiment highly favorable to Greeks and Turks at present with strong feeling that they should be included in Western defense system. Negative NAT decision may hence have serious repercussions on Mutual Security Program.

7. Fear that USSR might consider inclusion Turkey and Greece in NATO provocative believed of little significance.

8. NATO membership for Turkey and Greece not expected significantly change either magnitude and timing of efforts required of all NATO countries or amount, scope and planning of U.S. aid to meet their defense and economic programs.

discussion

The following argumentation has been presented by the U.S. in the Council of Deputies:

1. The most practicable means of assuring association of Greece and Turkey with Western defense is their admittance into NATO as full members.

a. Standing Group and Political Committee reports emphasize the importance of Turkey and Greece to Western defense and the necessity of assuring, in the event of an aggression against the West, that they respond as NAT countries. Inclusion of Turkey and Greece in NATO will enhance US-UK-French lines of communication and the possibility of obtaining future post strike bases for U.S. strategic ail offensive.

b. Any proposals made Turkey regarding its relationship with Western Powers in which full partnership and equality not implicit will be bitterly resented, will make acceptance most difficult, and may contribute to the development of neutralism.

c. Participation in a Mediterranean Pact closely linked to NATO but concerned only with military cooperation would be considered by Turkey as the equivalent of second-class membership in NATO and an indication of the West’s unwillingness to accept Turkey as a partner in other than military fields.

d. Inclusion in a Mediterranean Pact would not automatically commit Turkey and Greece to take action in the event of an aggression against a NATO nation unless such a commitment were specifically established. It is most unlikely that the Turks and Greeks would agree to such a commitment unless it were reciprocal.

e. There is strong Congressional support for admittance of Turkey and Greece into NATO. Such support would probably be extended to a Mediterranean Pact, but there would be greater insistance on the inclusion of Spain.

f. Creating a new organization, even though less complex than NATO, would involve inevitable delay. Further delay in concluding satisfactory security arrangements with Turkey will only intensify Turkish doubts of the willingness of the West to accept Turkey as a full partner.

2. Turkey’s admittance into NATO should not be made conditional on its prior agreement to accept the role assigned to it in the proposed Middle East Command.

a. Only logical that Turks would expect to participate in discussions leading to the creation of a Middle East Command in which they would be expected to provide the bulk of ground forces.

b. U.S. believes in sincerity of Turkish Government’s statement that it considers defense of Middle East is indispensable to defense of Europe and that once admitted into NATO, it will be prepared to enter into negotiations with interested parties with view to playing its proper role in Middle East defense and taking adequate measures in common with them.

c. Turkey’s willingness to participate in the proposed Middle East Command depends upon prior unqualified acceptance of Turkey into NATO.

d. U.S. believes that the proposals agreed to by the Standing Group covering the relationship of Turkey to Middle East Command and of the Command to NATO² should be considered as tentative only. They cannot be finalized until after Turkey has been admitted to NATO and has been given an opportunity to present its views on them and to accept them. Pending such action, no announcement regarding the creation of a Middle East Command should be made.

e. Assuming that the tentative proposals for a Middle East Command which have been agreed to by the Standing Group are acceptable to the U.S., UK, and French Governments, the U.S. will use its best efforts to obtain Turkey’s acceptance of those proposals after its admission into NATO. However, changes in these proposals resulting from discussions with Turkey would in no way justify reconsideration of Council action, either formally or informally, in position taken by Executive Branch of Governments in seeking ratification to Turkey’s admission.

f. As for the other NATO members, while their commitments will be extended if Greece and Turkey are included in NATO, inclusion of Turkey as NATO member in the Middle East Command will not extend commitments of NATO members beyond extension that would result from the creation of a Command including only the U.S., UK, and France.

g. Proposal that French admiral exercise principal interallied responsibilities in Western Mediterranean should not be linked to question of inclusion Turkey and Greece in NATO as it is problem to be solved irrespective of their inclusion.

3. U.S. believes Turkey’s inclusion compatible with Preamble and Article 2 of Treaty.

a. Turkey actively associated with NATO members in international and regional organizations concerned with long-range political, economic and cultural cooperation, viz, UN, Council of Europe, OEEC, PCC, etc.

b. Turkey subscribes fully to principles democracy, individual liberty, rule of law as known and practiced by most Western Powers. Tradition observance such principles less well established and of more recent origin but progress steady and gap rapidly closing.

c. Present-day Turkey considers Western civilization is likewise its heritage.

4. U.S. keenly aware of necessity of giving new impetus to concept of North Atlantic community and demonstrating by action as well as words that U.S. retains long-term interest in NATO and its broad objectives. (Suggested action is outlined in separate paper.)

5. Turkey’s ever increasing alignment and cooperation with Western democracies should be encouraged.

a. Turkey is becoming increasingly important factor in world affairs.

b. Turkey provides a valuable medium through which Western ideas and methods can be transmitted and made understandable to those countries whose link with West is more tenuous.

c. Denying full membership in NATO to Turkey would be viewed as Western rebuff to country which has westernization as keystone its policy.

d. Admission to NATO would enable West, with fullest Turkish cooperation, to advance free world objectives in vital Middle East.

6. U.S. public opinion and Congressional sentiment highly favorable to Greeks and Turks at present with strong feeling that they should be included in Western defense system. Negative NAT decision may hence have serious repercussions on Mutual Security Program.

7. Fear that USSR might consider inclusion Turkey and Greece in NATO provocative believed of little significance.

a. UK and France already linked to Turkey by Treaty of Mutual Assistance.

b. U.S. interest in Turkish security amply evident since 1947 in military and economic aid programs and in statements of highest government officials.

c. Turkey and Greece already formally associated with NATO for certain phases of planning for Mediterranean defense. Full membership merely logical extension this association.

d. USSR undoubtedly appreciates that attack on either country could be expected to lead to global war, regardless of their inclusion in NATO.

8. NATO membership for Turkey and Greece not expected significantly change either magnitude and timing of efforts required of all NATO countries or amount, scope and planning of U.S. aid to meet their defense and economic programs.

Appendix 1

Working Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings

top secret

[Washington, August 28, 1951.]

Atlantic and Mediterranean Command

The term, Mediterranean Command, is now a misnomer since the findings of the NATO Standing Group have focused attention on the structure of a Middle East Command and have used the word Mediterranean to refer to two subsidiary naval commands, one in the Eastern Mediterranean under the Supreme Allied Commander, Middle East, and one in the Western Mediterranean under the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. The British want to pair the announcement of a British Supreme Allied Commander, Middle East (SACME) with the announcement of an American as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT). The timing of these announcements is still at issue and we are anxious to activate the Atlantic Command under Admiral McCormick.

The Standing Group are however willing to defer announcement of SACLANT if this is necessary to defer Middle East Command announcement. They attach more importance to necessity of proper approach to Turkey and Egypt before announcement of Middle East Command than they do to early announcement of SACLANT.

Appendix 2

Working Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings

top secret

[Washington, August 28, 1951.]

Summary or Report by the International Planning Team to the Standing Group on Command in the Mediterranean and Middle East

(SG 80/4, August 22)

The NATO Standing Group recommends that there must be unified higher strategic direction for the Middle East area as a whole and that there must be coordination between the European and Middle East Commands as well as unity in the higher strategic direction given to them.

The Standing Group proposal provides for a Middle East Chiefs of Staff Committee, similar to the NATO Military Committee, with initial representation consisting of US, UK, French, Turkish and Commonwealth officers. This Committee should be served by a Middle East Standing Group consisting of the UK, US and French representatives of the NATO Standing Group who would serve in a dual capacity in order to provide the coordination and unity of higher strategic direction. The Middle East Standing Group would provide higher military direction for SACME. Assisting this Standing Group should be a Middle East Military Representatives Committee composed of representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of those countries who are members of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Those aspects of the higher military direction for the Allied Middle East Command which relate to the defense of North Atlantic Treaty area of which Turkey is a part will be the primary concern of NATO. Other aspects will be the primary concern of the Middle East organization. The NATO Standing Group Middle East Standing Group will determine whether any given problem should be handled by NATO or the Middle East organization, or by both.

The Standing Group also recommended that at the time an Allied Middle East Command under the British was established there should be some form of organization (tentatively called the Middle East Defense Board) which would act to secure the cooperation of the Middle Eastern states, which will not initially want to participate in the Command.

Specifically, the Standing Group believes that a Supreme Allied Commander and Headquarters should be established to command an Allied Middle East Theatre, that the Supreme Allied Commander should be British, and that the Allied Middle East Headquarters should have initially the same representation as indicated above for the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

The Allied Middle East Command should be divided in two parts as follows:

(1) A Northern or Turkish sector under Turkish Command.

(2) A Southern sector under British Command.

There should be two principal Allied Naval Commands in the Mediterranean, one subordinate to SACEUR and the other subordinate to SACME, each primarily responsible for the support of his respective Supreme Commander. Within these two major Naval Commands and subordinate to them, other Commands should be established; one of the most important of these will be the one in the Western part of the Mediterranean. Detailed division of responsibilities should be worked out by the two principal Allied Naval Commanders referred to above in consultation with the appropriate National Naval Commanders and with each other. Their recommendations should be submitted to the Standing Group through the two Supreme Commanders concerned.

1. This document was approved on August 29 and was designated WFM T–3c on September 7. For further information on the preparation of this and similar documents pertaining to the Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings of September 10–14, see editorial note, p. 1195.
2. Appendix 2, p. 573.