795.00/11–2050
Memorandum by the Planning Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Emmerson), to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Subject: Soviet and Chinese Communist Political Objectives.
On the assumption that the Chinese intervention in Korea has a limited objective, at least for the present, we must be prepared for a combined Soviet-Chinese political barrage intended to shift the issue in Korea to the questions of Chinese Communist admission to the United Nations and of Chinese Communist control of Formosa.
While it is quite likely that until recently the USSR may actually have not wanted the Peiping government in the UN, the Soviets’ objective now, again assuming they do not want general war, is probably to get the Chinese into the UN as partial political salvage of their Korean adventure. The prestige of the Communist world would be considerably repaired by UN acceptance of Communist China and the prospect of Communist control of Formosa.
That the campaign has already started on the basis of the bargaining position attained by the Chinese “volunteers”, is clear from the Chinese “peace proposals” leaked by the Polish UN delegate,1 by the Soviet resolution of the Lie memorandum2 and by Vyshinsky’s most recent speech.3 We may expect the arrival of the Communist delegation on November 24 to step up this political campaign.
There is reason to suspect that the Soviets and Chinese may win considerable support for the concessions they will demand. Not only the UN members, such as the UK and India, who have recognized Communist China, but many others who view with alarm the dangers of a Korean operation involving hostilities with China, would welcome a cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a buffer zone at what they would consider the comparatively cheap price of [Page 1198] deserting the Chinese Nationalist regime. The Soviets and Chinese Communists may be expected to exploit differences between our friends and ourselves and to keep up military resistance and guerrilla operations on a sufficient scale to give them continued bargaining power.
At some point we may face a decision between continuing an expensive operation in Korea with dwindling UN support or trying to achieve some semblance of a termination of hostilities by tacitly permitting Chinese Communist entry into the UN. The implications of such a decision, apart from domestic political ones, extend to our whole position in Asia and obviously and particularly to the disposition of Formosa.
It would seem, therefore, that, in addition to considering other alternatives of policy in Korea, we should as a matter of urgency analyze for ourselves the factors which must be considered in any political settlement of the type explored above and must attempt to discover what course would best serve the interests of the United States.
- Reports had recently appeared in the press that the Chinese Communists might be willing to withdraw from Korea in return for creation of a buffer zone controlled by North Korea south of the Manchurian border, withdrawal of the U.S. Seventh Fleet from the Formosa Straits, withdrawal of U.S. recognition from the Republic of China, and a declaration by the United States that no more aid would be extended to the Chinese Nationalists. (See Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International Affairs, 1949–1950, p. 514.)↩
- Reference is to a Soviet draft resolution pertaining to Mr. Lie’s 20-year Peace Program proposed during debate in the U.N. General Assembly. The Soviet resolution, which called for Chinese Communist representation on the Security Council, was defeated. For related documentation, see vol. ii, pp. 186 ff.↩
- Reference is to Mr. Vyshinsky’s statement before the General Assembly on November 18 in debate on Mr. Lie’s 20-Year Peace Program; see U.N. document A/PV.309.↩