795.00/11–2050
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)
| Participants: | Dr. John M. Chang, Korean Ambassador |
| Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary, FE | |
| Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, 3rd, Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs, NA |
The Korean Ambassador, Dr. John M. Chang, called on Mr. Rusk by appointment at four o’clock this afternoon. Dr. Chang stated that he had just come down from New York and wished to pay his respects to Mr. Rusk and to discuss the latest developments in Korea.
Mr. Rusk asked Dr. Chang what the views of his Government were toward Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. The Ambassador stated that he personally was somewhat out of contact with the situation, although he had recently received the impression from Seoul that his Government did not believe the Chinese were necessarily acting as free agents in intervening in Korea, that the Soviet Union was undoubtedly influencing them to do so and that his Government did not believe that the Chinese would go all out in a war against the West on the Korean question. He thought that intervention by the Chinese Communists more probably represented an effort on their part to test the resolve and determination of the UN in carrying out its objectives in Korea, and that the proper approach by the UN should be one [Page 1199] of stiff and unwavering action against them as long as the Chinese Communists remained on Korean soil. Mr. Rusk remarked that Chinese intentions in Korea might become clearer during the next few days with the progress of military operations.
Mr. Rusk then asked the Ambassador’s opinion as to whether control over the Supong dam on the Yalu River might have influenced the Chinese to intervene. The Ambassador thought that this might be a possible factor. He went on to add, however, that his Government would insist that all of the power generated at the dam was Korean by virtue of the fact that the generating stations were on Korean soil, that the dam had been built by Korean labor under the Japanese and that, as former Japanese property, it now belonged to the Koreans. The Ambassador mentioned the possibility that some of the power generated might be reaching Russian installations and that this might be an influence in Sino-Soviet relations in connection with Korea.
The Ambassador then mentioned the fact that he was greatly preoccupied over his treatment at the hands of American correspondents who were consistently bedeviling him in an effort to obtain opinions on any and every subject related to Korea and frequently attempted to trip him up. He added that his Government was greatly disturbed over what he called a “smear campaign” against it in the press and stated that the correspondents who interviewed him were very sharp individuals against whom he had constantly to be on his guard. Mr. Rusk remarked that these tactics were common practice with certain elements of the press in an effort to probe for answers which would make news and that the State Department also was faced with the same problem.
The Ambassador referred to a proposal for a so-called buffer state or zone along the Sino-Korean frontier and asked Mr. Rusk where this idea had originated. Mr. Rusk replied that it appeared first to have been broached, at least in the press, in England and that undoubtedly in trying to analyze the various motives that might be impelling the Chinese Communists to intervene, perhaps the objective of a buffer zone might have been considered as a possible motive and had thus become the subject of discussion. The Ambassador was insistent that insofar as his Government was concerned it would be unwilling to accept the principle of a buffer zone at the expense of Korean territory, adding that since the Chinese were the aggressors in this instance, it should not be Korean interests that should be sacrificed. He reiterated that the UN should be uncompromising in its attitude toward the various Communist elements in Korea and should drive them from Korean soil without any thought of concessions.
Mr. Rusk asked the Ambassador if he had been in touch with the Indian Delegation in New York, to which the Ambassador replied that [Page 1200] in the past he had had several fairly lengthy conversations with Sir Benegal Rau. He said that Ran had given him to understand that the Indians were in sympathy with the ROK, but had indicated to him that one of the considerations in the Indian attitude towards the conflict in Korea was that further destruction and bloodshed should be avoided, citing the instance of Burma; the Burmese had been left to their own resources in rebuilding what had been destroyed. The Ambassador added that he had told Rau that even if his home were destroyed he, as a Korean, would still have favored an all-out attack against the North Koreans since no one could live with the Communists. He said that Rau did not appear particularly impressed by this argument and that he had seen very little of him since that conversation. The Ambassador commented that he was keeping in close touch with the American Delegation at the UN, particularly with Mr. Allison and Senator Dulles, and that it had been very helpful to have Ambassador Muccio here recently. The Ambassador added that he had received a letter from President Rhee praising Ambassador Muccio’s efforts on behalf of Korea in the highest terms and that this was rather unusual since President Rhee was generally reserved in such comment.
Mr. Rusk then asked for the Ambassador’s views on the problem of guerrilla activities in Korea. Dr. Chang replied that the ROK recognized the guerrilla problem as a serious one and agreed with Mr. Rusk’s comment that action against the guerrillas would probably have to be conducted largely by the Koreans themselves since they were best suited to this type of operation. The Ambassador raised the question of the six-power resolution on Korea now under consideration in the GA and said that it was his feeling that the resolution was not strong enough in view of the fact that it did not threaten the Chinese Communists with reprisals if they did not withdraw from Korea. He felt that a paragraph should be added to the present resolution which would provide a threat of reprisals in case of non-compliance by the Chinese Communists. Mr. Rusk pointed out that if such a paragraph were added the necessary votes in support of the resolution would probably not be forthcoming in the GA, and suggested that the Chinese were already getting retaliation right now in North Korea through the active military action which was proceeding against them.
The Ambassador expressed the hope that the ROK would be given a voice hi any peace treaty which might be concluded with Japan. (At this point Mr. Rusk, who had an appointment with the Secretary, excused himself and left and the conversation continued with Mr. Emmons.)
The Ambassador again reverted to his difficulties with the press and pointed out that he was frequently misquoted or that his remarks [Page 1201] were twisted to put himself or his Government in a bad light publicly and hoped that the Department realized his difficulties. Mr. Emmons assured him that the Department knew of his sincerity and that it also appreciated the problem with which he found himself faced. The Ambassador requested that any news articles or other published statements which might be attributed to him and which could be considered embarrassing be called to his attention because he was endeavoring, in every way, to avoid such embarrassment either to his Government or to the United States.
Dr. Chang stated that he had received word from Seoul that the arrival of badly needed civilian relief supplies, such as clothing and blankets, was being delayed and that many civilians were beginning to suffer extremely as a result of the onset of winter conditions. He hoped that the Department would do everything possible to expedite the arrival of these badly-needed relief supplies.
As the Ambassador was leaving, he again reiterated the concern of his Government over any possibility that a buffer zone might be established along the Sino-Korean frontier and hoped that the Department was not considering supporting such an idea, to which his Government was unalterably opposed. Mr. Emmons replied that the Department appreciated his frank statement of the position of his Government in this regard and that as far as he knew no commitment had been made along these lines, although he pointed out that naturally the Department must give consideration to every aspect of the numerous and complex problems which had come up as a result of the UN action in Korea.