795.00/11–2050
Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Secretary of State
United States Courses of Action With Respect to Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea
Points for Consideration With Secretary Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
the problem
1. To determine whether the present mission assigned to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, in Korea should be amended in view of the changed situation which results from Chinese Communist intervention and probable Chinese Communist intentions in Korea.
analysis
U.S. Objectives in Korea
2. Establishment of a unified and independent Korea. While the objective of the United States and of the United Nations remains the establishment of the unity and independence of Korea, the achievement [Page 1194] of this objective does not necessarily require the military occupation of all of Korea to its northernmost boundaries. The practical elimination of “North Korea” as a defined territory north of the 38th parallel under an organized government, and the present situation in which at least ninety percent of the Korean population is in territory under the control of the UN forces, makes it possible to proceed now with the activities of the new UN Commission for the political and economic consolidation of existing gains. If an area in the North remains not wholly pacified and contains hostile elements of North Korean and Chinese forces, from a political point of view such an area can be regarded as being no different from those more restricted and scattered areas both north and south of the 38th parallel in which guerrilla activity still presents a military problem of pacification.
3. Localization of the Korean conflict. It is in the interest of the United States to avoid action which might entail major military involvement with Communist China or which might lead to general war.
Chinese Communist Intentions
4. The Estimate of Chinese Communist intentions contained in the CIA Memorandum for the President of November 8, 1950, reads in part as follows:
“… Although the possibility cannot be excluded that the Chinese Communists, under Soviet direction, are committing themselves to full-scale intervention in Korea, their main motivation at present appears to be to establish a limited ‘cordon sanitaire’ south of the Yalu River …”
5. The CIA Memorandum of November 8 further states: “The Chinese Communists probably genuinely fear an invasion of Manchuria despite the clear-cut definition of UN objectives.”
6. Intervention in Korea by the Chinese Communists, which we must assume to be at Soviet direction or with Soviet connivance, means the acceptance by the Kremlin and Peiping of risks of a spread of hostilities and of general war. While assuming such risks, the Moscow-Peiping Axis would prefer and probably aims to create a situation which portrays U.S. and UN actions as aggression against China, which commits U.S. forces in indecisive and prolonged warfare, and which still leaves the USSR uncommitted.
7. Actions taken by the United States and by the UN forces must be directed toward thwarting the Kremlin aim of creating the situation described above. If the foregoing analysis of Chinese Communist intentions is correct, it would further our policy if we could win a military success without taking action across the northern frontier of Korea and if we could maintain UN support and Korean cooperation [Page 1195] and bring about a political settlement. It is impossible to predict with certainty the effect upon the Chinese of further military advances. If we accept the estimates referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 it would seem logical to couple these advances with some type of political negotiations which would meet the assumed Chinese Communist fears. Naturally, such negotiations should be conducted in such a way as not to suggest weakness since weakness would make the Chinese Communists less willing to accept a negotiated solution. The principle of negotiation from strength applies.
Military Action
8. In the present situation there seem to be three courses of military action, each with variations of degree and character, which should be considered:
- a.
- pursue the offensive with the intention of occupying Korea to the northern boundary from the mouth of the Yalu to the Siberian frontier;
- b.
- establish a limit of advance short of the frontier;
- c.
- withdraw to a defensive line established south of the presently held positions.
9. Under either course b) or c) above, the CINCUNC should not be precluded from taking such offensive military action in Korea against enemy units north of the limit of advance or line established, as in his judgment would be militarily desirable or necessary. As a political matter, however, the CINCUNC should be in possession of the clearest indication of the mission with which he is charged. As stated in paragraph 2, this mission is not to be considered as concentrating upon the principle of the occupation of territory.
10. It is not believed that total withdrawal from Korea should be considered a practical alternative at this juncture.
11. If course a) above can be accomplished speedily with the UN forces now available in Korea and without the necessity for military action across the northern frontier of Korea, it would have the advantage of removing any remnants of a Communist regime from Korea and of restoring the rightful boundaries of the country. In order to determine the political implications of such military action, it would be useful to have answers to the following questions:
- i.
- Except for the area near the mouth of the Yalu, would it be a practical military possibility to hold the entire line of the Korean frontier against Communist penetration and infiltration?
- ii.
- Would the holding of some other line at a distance from the frontier be equally or more advantageous from a military point of view?
- iii.
- Would the holding of such a line be more feasible logistically?
- iv.
- If it is attempted to hold the line at the frontier itself, would there be an increased risk of defeating the objective of localizing the conflict?
- v.
- If an attempt is made to hold the line at the frontier in force and if this should result in the full commitment of Chinese capabilities, is it correct, as indicated in the CIA Estimate of November 8, that the Chinese Communists would have the capability of denying the UN forces the successful maintenance of this position?
12. Course b), unless accompanied by the establishment of a demilitarized zone in the area north of the limit of advance, would tacitly accept Communist control of the northern areas of Korea and the continued existence of a North Korean Communist regime. On the other hand, it might provide the basis for a termination of hostilities and permit the ultimate withdrawal of UN troops and the development of adequate Korean defenses to deter repeated Communist aggression.
13. Course c) might envisage the line across the neck or a line still further south. This course would presumably be necessary should Chinese forces be increased in such numbers that it became militarily infeasible to hold a defensive line at the present positions.
Political Action
14. The military and political actions taken by the United States are mutually dependent and must be correlated. Political steps should be modified if necessary, in order to obtain maximum support in the UN. Among the alternative actions which might be taken are the following:
- a.
- press for the adoption of the resolution now before the Security Council; when vetoed, press for similar action in the General Assembly;
- b.
- support in the UN the UK proposal for the establishment of a “demilitarized zone” or “security zone” in the area north of the Chongju-Hamhung line with a UN Commission to assume responsibility for this zone and for the negotiation of border problems between the Koreans, the Chinese and the Russians;
- c.
- suggest a modification of the UK proposal to limit such a “demilitarized zone” or “security zone” to an area of from five to twenty-five miles in depth on the Korean side of the frontier, possibly including the whole Northeast province.
15. The methods by which the United States should undertake to determine Chinese Communist intentions and to carry out the political action suggested above, should include not only all facilities offered by the United Nations machinery but contacts with the Chinese Communist regime through friendly governments and private channels.