751G.00/10–3050
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Lacy)
Mr. Lacy began the conversation, in Mr. Rusk’s absence, by expressing pleasure that Mr. Keskar1 desired to continue conversations about Indochina commenced the previous week. Mr. Keskar emphasized that his Government considered that an understanding between the Indian and the United States Governments on the matter of Indochina was essential to the position of both Governments in Asia; that failure to do so would seriously damage the Government of India and seriously inconvenience the Government of the United States. Lacy agreed.
At Mr. Keskar’s invitation Lacy undertook to describe the United States position in respect of Indochina, with particular emphasis on the following elements of the agreed Departmental position: (a) The United States wishes to make its fullest practical contribution to the development and maintenance in power of a strong autonomous [Page 911] anti-Communist state in Indochina, enjoying a decisive measure of popular support. (b) Such a state can be developed only if attempts on the part of world communism to subvert an independent nationalist Indochinese state are frustrated. (c) As a practical matter, Communist designs, military and political, on Indochina can be frustrated at the present time only with the assistance of the forces of the French Union. (The composition of the armies of the French Union was emphasized.) (d) To the end that Bao Dai, the Chief of the legally constituted Government of Vietnam, as well as the Kings of Laos and Cambodia be possessed of the most important attributes of sovereignty, (i.e. army) the United States is now supplying and will continue to supply military equipment to the Indochinese National Armies; that the French are agreeable to the formation and equipment of these armies and that Bao Dai is prepared to assume the command thereof. (e) That the extent and character of French concessions to the demands of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia has been misunderstood, not only in Asia but in the United States. Lacy then adumbrated the powers already turned over to the autonomous states of Indochina including the French agreement not only to permit but to assist in the formation and equipment of the National Armies. The part to be played now and in the future in a National Army project by the various para-military groups also was discussed. (f) That Ho Chi Minh is a Communist whose activities are in phase with those of Peiping and in some serious but undetermined degree, the Kremlin. (g) That because of the Indochinese need for French assistance on a voluntary basis Indochina should remain within the French Union.
Mr. Keskar responded that he believed his Government would agree to the validity of all the above points except (f) in respect of which he said that he feared Ho Chi Minh was now a disciplined Communist but might have been otherwise had he received different treatment at the hands of the French in 1947. Lacy allowed this might be so but that the present and not the past is with us. Keskar then went on to make the following points: (a) That no Asian state including India, placed any trust in the bona fides of the French in Indochina or any place else in Asia. In this connection he emphatically mentioned the differences separating India and France in Pondicherry. (b) That the French should at once announce their ultimate intentions in Indochina including their intention to withdraw their armies when the threat of communism had been overcome, if indeed that was their intention. (c) That Asians would believe such a statement only if it received the imprimatur of the United States at the least, as well as India at the most. (d) That the Indian Government had been in contact secretly with representatives of Bao Dai who had more or less convinced Indian officials that Bao Dai was not the puppet but rather the prisoner of the French. (e) That the Indian Government would [Page 912] most certainly be moved by Bao Dai’s command of a national army; that it would doubtless be completely satisfied only if Bao Dai were in command of all the forces in Indochina, including those of the French Union. (Lacy said he thought this was impossible, Keskar goodnaturedly agreed.) (f) That Bao Dai’s representatives in India, had several times mentioned the desirability of bringing the Indochina case to the United Nations. (g) That India would be happiest if the French army would withdraw immediately from Indochina to be replaced by the United States military [Lacy pointed out emphatically that the United States was not concerned to increase its military commitments in Asia or any place else and that it wished to avoid any appearance of imperialism. Lacy then asked Keskar if the Indians would be prepared to dispatch military contingents to assume the burden now borne by the forces of the French Union. Keskar seemed to make affirmative murmers].2
Keskar at this point said that his Government was concerned lest the United States, in its praiseworthy struggle against communism, would make the mistake of believing that the French could constitute a permanent bulwark against Communists in Indochina. Lacy assured him that United States Government fully realized that the responsibility for guarding Indochina against communism lay in the final analysis with the Indochinese people as our interest in the National Armies and the faithful execution of the March 8 Agreements attested.
After further discussion of the areas of agreement and disagreement apparent in the foregoing Keskar re-emphasized his view that the formation of National Armies and a public statement on the part of the French of their ultimate intentions in Indochina were the most important developments to the Indian Government. Keskar asked if the United States was not “putting the screws” on the French to achieve these objectives. Lacy replied that the United States did not “put the screws” on its allies as he hoped the Indian Government would appreciate, but that we had made our views clear to the French Government as well as to Bao Dai. When Keskar asked if military assistance to the forces of the French Union was not conditioned on French performance in respect of these two points, Lacy replied that it had been understood between the United States and the French Governments that the equipment of the national armies would be achieved out of the military assistance the United States extended to Indochina, that this assistance would be extended both directly and indirectly.
It was noteworthy that Keskar complained again and again of the French performance in Pondicherry.
[Page 913]It was agreed that after a final conversation with Mr. Rusk on Monday3 of next week Mr. Keskar would take these views to Nehru. Lacy, on his part, agreed to supply Ambassador Henderson with documentation which would enable him to participate in the discussions at Keskar’s invitation.4