751G.00/8–15–50: Telegram
The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State
220. With Blum called on Khac-ve, acting President of Council, to present draft text of economic aid agreement.1 During conversation I inquired whether Khac-ve bad any information on date of Bao Dai’s return. Khac-ve replied that while not officially informed he was certain that His Majesty would not return unless he obtained from French valid assurance of real internal sovereignty and independence for Vietnam. I asked what were specific powers that His Majesty felt would be needed to achieve that situation. Khac-ve replied after some hestitation, cessation of French intervention in internal political affairs, entire Vietnamese control of finances and money, accelerated training and building up of Vietnamese army and finally and generally that Vietnam within the French Union should enjoy the same status and independence the dominions enjoyed in the British Commonwealth.
I inquired whether in this period of civil war and deficits the Vietnamese were really desirous and ready to take over finances and money and give up the support now received from the French Treasury. Khac-ve hastily assured me to the contrary, admitting there must be an interm period of continuing French participation and support: His Majesty was very realistic and intelligent and appreciated there must be such a transitional period. I asked whether the French could build up a Vietnamese national army and train and discipline a sure officers corps more rapidly than they were doing at present. He replied that he did not know.
Khac-ve then went on to say that while in the north the people were against VM in south Vietnam there was a general feeling that VM was really the protagonist of national independence against the French. People in the south and he very clearly indicated, the Vietnamese Government, had no confidence in French intentions. I asked if there was not also some lack of confidence in intentions of the Vietnamese on the part of the French. He said there was and the only recourse was to have the US act as arbitrator. I replied that that was an ungrateful role and that arbitration was not always the best method of settling such differences, I hoped that both sides would deal [Page 854] with each other in frankness and good will. It was my impression from talks in Paris that in high French Government levels there was willingness and comprehension that Vietnam would proceed onwards to self-government within the frame of the French Union. Mr. Schumann had said to me that the French Government realized in Saigon there were hold-overs from the old French colonial service who looked back to the old days reluctantly [sic]. Schumann seemed however to speak with entire conviction that these refractory elements were known to the central government would not be allowed to affect the course of French policy towards IC. I remarked that in my initial contacts with the local French I had found none who really believed that IC could or should return to colonial status, although I had encountered individuals who believed in France maintaining a considerable degree of control. With the present threat of international Communism and the fact of civil war, the degree of independence desired by Vietnamese could hardly be obtained overnight. Khac-ve reluctantly agreed and stated that of course it would be catastrophic if the French troops were withdrawn from IC in view of the threat from VM and China.
Sent Department 220 repeated information Paris 93.
- The draft under reference has not been specifically identified.↩