651G.93/8–1250: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State
783. Eyes only for Secretary from Bruce. We are confronted with possible development in regard to French attitude towards Chinese Communist Government which I wish to bring directly to your personal and secret attention.
Parodi sent for me yesterday and told me that the French Government is extremely concerned, following Pignon’s report, at the prospect of a large-scale Viet Minh offensive in Indochina as soon as the rainy season ends in mid-September. They are convinced that this attack will be launched, that it will be heavily supported directly or indirectly by the Chinese Communists. They have very definite information of preparations across the Chinese border of intensive training and supplying of Viet Minh forces including tanks and aircraft. The French take this information with the greatest seriousness, and fear the possibility of open warfare between the French Union and China.
[Page 852]Against this background Parodi told me that the French Government is anxious to neglect no opportunity by diplomatic or other methods to forestall or at least postpone, this eventuality. They are, therefore, coming to believe that they must make some effort to get in touch with Mao Tse-tung in order at least to ascertain whether a possibility exists of an arrangement which would bind the Chinese, even on paper, to refrain from involvement in Indochina. They recognize the flimsy value of any such commitment but are not in a mood to neglect even a hundred-to-one shot which might inhibit or delay active Chinese involvement in Indochina.
Parodi told me that they are, therefore, considering the possibility of informal approach to the British to ask their Chargé d’Affaires in Peking to get in touch with the Chinese Communist Government in order to ascertain what possibility, if any, there may be of an arrangement of the type described above. They anticipate the first Chinese reactions would be to request a change in the French attitude concerning the seating of their representative in the Security Council1 and if in return Mao Tse-tung was prepared to make some engagement of non-interference in Indochinese affairs, the French Government would, I am convinced, give very serious considerations to some such bargain.
I, of course, pointed out to Parodi the obvious arguments from the point of view of UN, appearance of yielding to blackmail, relationship to Korean aggression and the strain it might impose on our relations with France at this critical juncture.
The French have agreed that they will take no step whatsoever in this matter vis-à-vis the British or anyone else until they have your views on the subject. I am, therefore, bringing this to your attention personally so that you can send me anything you Would wish to have me transmit to the French Government which I would do both to the Foreign Office and I would recommend also to Pleven.2 The question is still in a formative stage and I believe we can strongly influence its development but I do not feel that we should underestimate the real French concern both in government circles and in the public generally at the prospect of Chinese involvement in the near future and, secondly, their willingness to try almost anything which might conceivably have a chance to avert it. They are torn between this deep-seated desire and the recognition of the obligations which this might involve in relation to UN action in Korea.
If you could let me have your views early next week I will take it up immediately with the government, leading members of which [Page 853] in view of the Assumption holiday will not be back until Tuesday night.3
- For documentation on the issue of Chinese representation in the United Nations, see vol. ii, pp. 186 ff.↩
- On July 11, René Pleven was appointed Premier of France, succeeding Georges Bidault.↩
- August 15.↩