751G.5 MAP/8–950: Telegram
The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State
secret
Saigon, August 9,
1950—11 a. m.
183. Tomap. We believe survey Mission’s recommendations for increased scale of assistance to French forces as presented in Legtel 170, August 7, are very sound and Legation desires add its emphasis of [Page 850] importance urgent implementation. We will comment on specific recommendations after study of group’s final report. While we agree with these conclusions, we have following comments and reservations to make on several aspects of introductory argumentation in Legtel 170.
- 1.
- Re stalemate after five years of warfare. In Legation and Attachés opinion this ignores progress French have made and are continuing to make in expanding their areas of control and penning Viet Minh organized units (as opposed to individual Viet Minh terrorists) into increasingly well-defined enclaves. Moreover, it is not realistic to date beginning of fighting here from 1945 when French force was nonexistent. The real base line date should be December 19, 1946, when Ho attacked by surprise and brought to end all efforts to negotiate with him.
- First French efforts with limited forces were in the nature of raids and punitive expeditions. It was only relatively late in campaigning season of 1949 that policy of clearing deltas began to be applied, largely as result of local initiative on part of General Alessandri and Pignon as opposed to the cautious counsels of Paris. Furthermore, the campaigning part of each year during which major deployments are undertaken is only from October to June. (It is possible, however, that with specialized equipment, more could be undertaken during rainy season. Unless one has campaigned in this country it is probably difficult to be certain on this point.) In any event test of capabilities will come when fall offensive opened, and any assumption of failure is considered premature.
- 2.
- Re statement that French forces appear to have lost considerable amount offensive spirit. We naturally would defer to General Erskine’s appraisal of any matter subject to professional military judgment. Our first hand observations of several months leads us to believe that morale among junior commanders and troops is high. As regards High Command we doubt whether sufficient weight has been given in report to factor of pitifully small and obsolescent supplies hitherto available to French general staff, to difficulties if not impossibility of replacing casualties, to need of husbanding men and material against Chinese Communist threat which French until most recent past could only contemplate having to meet alone. There are only 21 batteries of field artillery in the country and not 1 90 mm anti-aircraft piece. There are no tanks.
- We do not deny that a certain “command caution” has been apparent at the high echelons. Pignon has at times told us that he thought Carpentier was too attentive to the War Ministry which is said to take cautious view of overextension in a conflict as far from Paris as Korea from parts of the US. This command caution is possible responsible for limited number of night patrols. Yet General Alessandri called his shot on delta campaign and beat his own estimates by two months. He now says he could end effective Viet Minh resistance here in 18 months. So far as spirit of troops is concerned it must be recalled that this is war of men and not material; it has been marked by hand to hand, kill or be killed combats by individual GI’s for three and half years of murderous jungle war. Problem in future will be of course transition from relative command caution in period of [Page 851] straitened supplies to vigorous offense when adequate logistic support available. We think French areas eager as ourselves to destroy Viet Minh.
- 3.
- Re political concessions by French and US or UN backed “definite plans for eventual independence”. We agree, of course, that no military solution is possible in political and economic vacuum. We believe that it would be at least premature to write off our present policy or to recommend at this time the political démarche of the kind envisaged in survey mission’s preliminary reports (see Legtel 171, August 7).
- 4.
- It might be noted that interim report contained in reftel makes no reference to amounts and kind equipment for native troops. French initial requests were for equipment of twelve Cambodian, Laotian and Vietnamese battalions which will actually arrive within few days. Yet during mission’s stay Viets asked for equipment for 20 battalions plus certain additional supplies and other states had occasion to present statements more recent than those on which original French requests based.
- Nor does reftel go into amount and ratio of distribution of arms among home guard, various stateguards and other auxiliaries. These are questions with which Legation and MAAG will be continually concerned.
Above comments based on initial scrutiny of survey group report1 received just prior group’s departure.
Sent Department 183, repeated info Paris 85, Singapore for survey mission unnumbered.
Heath