Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

651G.93/8–1250: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

top secret   niact

Washington, August 15, 1950—11 p. m.

805. For Bruce from Secretary. Dept views possible course action Fr re Chi Commie Govt outlined ur topsec 783 Aug 12 with concern.

We have of course been considering possibility Chi Commie invasion Indochina in light Korean developments and approaching end rainy season and had been inclined to consider likelihood more rather than less remote since invasion ROK. Consensus of intelligence info available indicates that Chi troop movements have been northward rather than to southern provinces. This, other factors, have pointed to emphasis on any and all of the following: 1) preparation for Formosa invasion; 2) precautionary defense dispositions in Manchuria and; 3) possible assistance to North Korea rather than preparation for mass intervention in Indochina.

We are also cognizant of signs of increasing Vietminh Commie mil liaison and without eliminating possibility this step in preparation for eventual Commie invasion more inclined to view it as further indication overall plan for intensification present practice using Vietminh as puppets to further common goals. In this regard we are not overlooking often cited Vietnamese antipathy for Chinese. Moreover, until receipt ref and other recent tels indications were that Fr had situation well enough in hand to permit planning overall fall offensive to eliminate Vietminh as organized fighting force (Saigon’s topsec 471, Jun 17).¹

Notwithstanding, if Fr now view situation with such alarm that they are willing consider approach to Peking regime you shld make fol as Depts views known to Parodi and Pleven without delay:

1) Any “arrangement” with Peking regime wld be useless in itself for they cld not be expected to abide by its terms;

2) If Peking agreed to commitment, which we consider unlikely, it wld undoubtedly involve as sine qua non Fr support for seat in SC;

3) Any such move wld destroy present unified position Western World as manifested in SC since Korean invasion and USSR reentry. It wld among other things be yielding to very blackmail on seating Chi Commie member which we have resisted with such resolution and which is one of strongest arguments in present SC debate. We feel Chi representation question shld be dealt with on its merits at a later date but we wld most strongly oppose any Fr move which affected position in SC at present stage of Korean crisis;

4) It wld have very serious effect US public opinion now strongly behind MAP and other manifestations western solidarity but still unsettled as regards Indochina. A Commie invasion of Indochina without any prior Fr approach to Peking wld bring the whole weight US opinion behind Fr and Assoc States while same development fol such approach wld not and might have opposite effect. It is not difficult foresee sections US public opinion and press in latter eventuality leaning toward stand that Fr shld have made earlier concessions to Vietnamese nationalism rather than to Chi Communism;

5) Wld Fr expect Peking to withdraw recognition Ho Chi Minh? We cannot believe such request wld be seriously considered;

6) Finally, Dept inclined think any approach to Peking wld not influence plans for either increased aid Vietminh or actual Commie invasion one way or other and cld only serve to weaken Fr position and, indirectly, that of western powers.

In contemplating such action Fr Govt has surely considered what steps they wld take in SC fol Commie invasion or overt aid Vietminh? Is it their impression that prior effort approach Peking wld improve their position in such circumstance?

In outlining its preliminary views Dept does not seek to minimize seriousness present and prospective threat to Fr and Assoc States from both Chi Commies and strengthened Vietminh. As you know, matter receiving our full attention within bounds other urgent and related problems. US Govt is giving daily evidence of its increasing determination to assist the democratic powers, including Fr and Assoc States, within limits our present commitments and capabilities. As regards Far East our present actions in Korea within UN framework speak for themselves. With this action the Fr will be intimately associated as witnessed most recently by their tentative offer supply ground troops UN forces Korea (Embtel 649, Aug 4).²

Indochina is among those areas in Far East at top of priority list for US assistance as stated by President in Jun 27 declaration. Efforts increase military aid are being made Dept conjunction other agencies. These will not be relaxed.

In sum you shld, therefore, discourage contemplated Fr move to fullest extent possible using reasons outlined above. At same time you may assure Fr of our continued determination to increase scope of mil aid to them and Assoc States.

Acheson

1. Not printed.
2. Not printed. For documentation on United States interest in the composition of United Nations forces in Korea, see volume vii .