Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

71. Memorandum of a Meeting of the Senior Staff of the National Security Council¹

Washington, May 28, 1951.

SUBJECT

• General Smith’s memorandum to the NSC of May 8 on the “Scope and Pace of Covert Operations”²

Action

It was agreed that CIA–OPC would prepare a written and oral presentation of two projects³—Guerrillas in China, and Resistance in Eastern Europe—by which the Senior Staff could become more familiar with the details and therefore the problems involved in such projects, including such issues as:

a. Personnel and logistic support in short supply and possibly in conflict with other projects;

b. Possible conflicts on objectives of the project, particularly as between the cold war and preparation for hot war;

c. Alternative methods such as covert, semi-covert, and paramilitary;

d. Potentialities, including an analysis of the political and military risks involved in the fulfillment of the project.

Discussion

The discussion touched on the following points:

1. Personnel. OPC is experiencing serious difficulty in obtaining the necessary personnel to carry out its operations, and notably headquarters personnel, most of whom would come from the Military Establishment—either regular officers or special call-up of reserves. One estimate of their needs called for 50 officers per year, of special qualifications in various areas and military specialties.

2. Supplies and Stock Piling. There was no disagreement in the responsibility of CIA to budget for its own supplies, but to procure them through the facilities of the Military.

3. Funds. CIA pointed out that to date funds were not a limitation upon their effectiveness in carrying out planned projects, but rather the limitations were in personnel and logistics.

4. Priorities. It was pointed out that there were three types of projects, the allocation of resources to which represented the basic priority difficulty, namely: (a) political and psychological targets, purely for the cold war; (b) guerrilla operations which could be activated now or in the event of hot war; and (c) development of resistance in preparation for hot war. In this connection it was pointed out that any cold-war activity would be helpful toward the preparation for hot war, but at the same time preoccupation with (b) and (c) above could not help but hurt the effective prosecution of (a).

5. Potentialities and Risks. Considerable concern was felt that the fulfillment of many of the projects under way might materially increase the risk of general war. Obviously the more successful we are in reaching our cold-war objectives of containment through strengthening of free-world forces, the more we are risking a general war. On the other hand the OPC projects may inherently be more provocative than the general factors of success because they are designed positively to weaken the potential enemy, and in some cases to cause clashes.

6. Psychological Strategy Board. It was generally felt that the OPC, when it becomes operative, will be in a position to coordinate the direction given to OPC projects. Two important matters in this connection were pointed out:

a. The PSB charter may have to be expanded if it is to be effective in insuring the support as distinct from guidance for OPC from the various agencies.

b. Initiative in presenting the issues involved in projects must rest heavily upon CIA, which should identify the various issues and conflicting priorities—whether of matériel or objectives—for presentation to the PSB and, where appropriate, the NSC.

7. Scope and Organization. There was no disagreement that CIA must continue to increase the scope of its activities to fulfill the enlarged mission given to it. It was apparent that with possibly minor exceptions CIA should continue to have full responsibility for all of this type of work.

In this connection it was pointed out that General Smith’s memorandum was indicative of the growth and success of the OPC operations because it raised such problems as conflicting priorities and the effects of successful operations which heretofore have not been necessary to raise since all of the effort was going into a build-up. At the same time the memorandum indicated the need for CIA to put forward full analysis of the issues involved in projects in which some decision is necessary and the need for the development of such a facility as PSB for the resolution of such problems. These problems could not any longer be decided on a blanket and over-all basis but would require the specific analysis of the issues in individual projects.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Historical Files: Lot 58 D 776, OPC. Top Secret. Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. The first page bears the initials “PA”, indicating that this copy was intended for W. Park Armstrong, Jr. The drafting officer and those present at the meeting have not been identified.
2. Attachment to Document 68.
3. Frank G. Wisner forwarded these studies to the NSC senior staff under cover of a memorandum dated June 8. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Operations, Job 79–01228A, Box 6)