At the direction of the President you have been designated as a special
group of the Senior NSC Staff to
consider the attached memorandum on the subject from the Director of
Central Intelligence, and to prepare for the Council’s consideration
appropriate recommendations with respect thereto.
In performing this function it is anticipated that you will work in close
collaboration with your respective principals in order to reflect their
views during the staff work, and with the designated representatives of
your respective departments and agencies under NSC 10/22
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in order to realize the advantages of their
knowledge and experience in this field.
After allowing time for your study of the attached memorandum, a meeting
will be scheduled within the next week or so.
Attachment
Washington, May 8, 1951.
Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Smith) to the National Security
Council4
SUBJECT
- Scope and Pace of Covert Operations
The Problem
1. To obtain more specific guidance from the National Security
Council in order to define the projected scope and pace of covert
operations in aid of current overt cold-war and of military
preparations to meet overt global war, and to insure timely and
effective support for such operations.
Pertinent Facts
2. The following facts highlight the need for this guidance and
support:
- a.
- To meet its responsibilities for covert operations, the
Central Intelligence Agency has already had to increase its
personnel and expenditures to an extent believed to exceed
the scope contemplated by the National Security Council when
it authorized covert operations in the summer of
1948.
- b.
- Even more considerable increases will be required in the
near future if this agency is to discharge the missions
already specifically
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proposed to it by the Departments of State and Defense
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff or undertaken on the
initiative of CIA with the
approval of such Departments. Still greater increases would
be required to accomplish the missions which are apparently
envisioned under the NSC 68
series (and of which segments are found in various other
NSC papers; e.g., NSC 58/2, NSC 59, NSC 103/1, and NSC 104).5 These increases are beyond CIA’s present administrative
support capabilities.
- c.
- High level policy decisions are required not only on the
issue of these increases in themselves, but on the direction
and nature of covert operations. For example, to what extent
will the United States support counter-revolution in the
slave states? A Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum to the
Director of Central Intelligence, 28 March 1951,6 raises a related
issue: The view of the JCS
that CIA give maximum
emphasis to preparations for the retardation of Soviet
advances in Europe beginning on D Day. In view of CIA’s presently limited
facilities this request raises the issue of the priorities
as between covert-cold-war activities and covert activities
to support the military in the event of a general
war.
Discussion
3. Pursuant to the provisions of NSC
10/2, CIA has been actively engaged
for over two years in the planning and conduct of covert operations
in the general fields of activity specifically provided for therein,
viz:
- a.
- propaganda
- b.
- economic warfare
- c.
- preventive direct action, including—
- (1)
- sabotage
- (2)
- anti-sabotage
- (3)
- demolition
- (4)
- evacuation
- d.
- subversion against hostile states, including—
- (1)
- assistance to underground resistance
movements
- (2)
- assistance to guerrillas
- (3)
- assistance to refugee liberation groups
- (4)
- support of anti-Communist elements in threatened
countries
- e.
- Planning and preparation, in conjunction with the JCS, for the conduct of covert
operations in wartime.
[Page 144]
4. Subsequent to NSC 10/2, the NSC 68 series called for an
intensification of covert operations in the fields of economic,
political and psychological warfare with the purpose of rolling back
the perimeter of Soviet power and the ultimate frustration of the
Kremlin design. As a result, the covert
activities of CIA have been stepped
up considerably, even though the policies established by NSC 68 have never been spelled out in
terms of a specific covert program directive to CIA.
5. Specifically, the currently stepped-up covert projects of CIA (see more detailed listing at Tab
“A”) are being prosecuted in five areas of the world as follows [1 line not declassified]:
Western Europe [dollar amount not
declassified]
Emphasis on: psychological and labor operations especially [less than 1 line not declassified],
organization of stay-behind and resistance groups in all Western
Europe [less than 1 line not declassified],
political action [less than 1 line not
declassified] and a pilot economic warfare operation [less than 1 line not declassified].
Eastern Europe [dollar amount not
declassified]
Emphasis on: psychological warfare [less than 1
line not declassified]; extensive special political
operations [less than 1 line not
declassified]; organization of resistance groups in Eastern
Europe and the Baltic; and expansion of the [less
than 1 line not declassified] underground.
Near East [dollar amount not
declassified]
Emphasis on: preliminary exploratory activities [less than 1 line not declassified]; denial of [less than 1 line not declassified] oil
fields; psychological and labor operations throughout the Near
East.
Far East [dollar amount not
declassified]
Emphasis on: guerrilla warfare and escape and evasion in [less than 1 line not declassified];
stay-behind preparations [less than 1 line not
declassified]; psychological and labor activities
throughout the Far East; preclusive buying; [2
lines not declassified].
Latin America [dollar amount not
declassified]
Emphasis on: preliminary exploratory activities, propaganda, and the
establishment of a mechanism for these and other activities on an
expanded scale.
Special Projects [dollar amount not
declassified]
Emphasis on: National Committee for Free Europe and its agency, Radio
Free Europe; training foreign agents in the United States; support
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of international
anti-Communist labor and youth organizations; and the development of
outlets for propaganda against foreign targets.
Research and Development [dollar
amount not declassified]
Overhead [dollar amount not
declassified]
6. [1 paragraph (4 lines) not
declassified]
7. [7 paragraphs (26 lines) not
declassified]
8. The above missions, current and proposed, representing a very
considerable number of covert cold-war projects, constitute in
themselves a rather extensive preparation to conduct covert
operations in support of the military effort in the event of the
outbreak of a general war. Nevertheless, they do not comprise the
comprehensive cold-war program clearly contemplated by NSC 68. In the absence of a specific
detailed plan for conducting a comprehensive cold-war program, it is
not possible to make an accurate estimate of manpower, matériel, and
money required. Nor, in the absence of detailed overt war plans is
it possible to make an accurate estimate of the requirements of
full-scale covert operational support of an all-out military effort.
Nevertheless, it is possible, on the basis of the requirements of
the programs already under way or in the planning stage, to make an
informed guess of the general order of magnitude of a covert
apparatus capable of supporting either an effort to prevent overt
war or an all-out military effort in the event of such war. [1½ line not declassified] (These estimates
exclude additional requirements for military personnel and for funds
to stockpile and resupply certain standard military items for
guerrillas and resistance groups. For further detail see Tab
“B”.)
9. Thus, the Central Intelligence Agency is faced with the fact that
its covert operations are outstripping its present administrative
capabilities. Even an apparatus of the magnitude required to
discharge the relatively limited cold war and military support
programs, outlined by paragraphs 5 and 7 above, calls for an
administrative organization of considerably greater strength than
now present in CIA to solve
effectively the complex planning and logistical problems involved.
Specifically, there would be required a staff comparable to that of
a Major Command, procurement and production machinery for those
items not properly assignable to the Department of Defense, and
additional facilities for: training, security clearances,
communications, headquarters office space, and other requisite
administrative and logistical services. Without such augmentation
the growing magnitude of covert operations will tend to divert an
ever increasing share of the time and attention of CIA key personnel from the basic
intelligence mission of the Agency, with the attendant risk that
such mission will not be adequately accomplished.
[Page 146]
10. Although the cumulation of missions already undertaken by CIA, to say nothing of those now
proposed to CIA, may transcend the
original intentions of NSC 10/2, the
NSC 68 series leaves little
doubt that it is our national policy to conduct covert operations on
a very large scale. It is the view of CIA that all of these things can and should be done.
But before launching CIA into such
large activities, a number of high level policy decisions and
certain vital assurances are required from the National Security
Council. The following paragraphs deal with the qualitative nature
of the required guidance.
11. It appears that the Office of Policy Coordination was originally
created to be primarily an agency to execute covert support to cold
war activities (with planning and preparation for covert support in
the event of hot war as an additional responsibility). However, the
increasing scope and pace of hot war preparation is tending to
overshadow this original purpose. The cold war program (though
essentially political in conception) is heavily weighted with
military considerations; equally, the hot war preparations (though
essentially military in conception) are heavily weighted with
political considerations. Because CIA’s present responsibilities cover both current cold
war covert operations and certain covert aspects of preparations for
hot war, it has perhaps been more immediately aware than other
interested agencies of the need for delineation of policies and
priorities as between these programs and of the need for more
definitive machinery to give both programs politico-military
guidance on a continuing basis. The machinery established under
NSC 10/2, i.e., the designated
representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, has
consisted of individuals of the most exceptional qualifications, who
have been of the greatest assistance in developing projects. The
efforts of these representatives have been augmented by those of an
equally well qualified and helpful representative of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. However, this machinery was not designed to develop
strategic guidance of the order required by the far-reaching policy
determination of NSC 68 and other
post-NSC 10/2 policy papers.
12. An illustration of the need for such strategic guidance is the
problem raised by the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as
expressed in its memorandum of 28 March 1951, that the Central
Intelligence Agency should give top priority to preparations for the
retardation of a Soviet military advance across Europe. The
responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence under
NSC 10/2 are such that he cannot
accept this view as controlling without assurance that this military
policy will also be consistent with the foreign policy of the United
States. Only a National Security Council decision can give this
assurance in a matter of such moment. Such a decision will require a
determination of relative priorities and of the extent to which the
United States is willing to support and follow up on
counter-revolution in the slave states. Political
[Page 147]
and matériel support on a national
scale is required to back up and capitalize on any
counter-revolution which may be engendered. Only the National
Security Council can insure such support.
13. It is true that the covert apparatus needed for the cold war is
similar to that needed to support the military effort in a hot war.
However, there are numerous important differences in detail and in
timing. For example, it is clearly desirable from the standpoint of
either cold war or hot war to develop the potential of resistance
groups in Eastern Europe. How much of this potential to develop,
when to release it, and how much to hold in reserve are problems
which can be and are argued differently by the military and by the
political experts. Again CIA must
seek politico-military guidance at the NSC level to determine where and how to build and
utilize its covert assets.
14. Another area requiring such guidance pertains to the question of
concealing U.S. participation in covert activities which cannot
remain completely covert. The training of indigenous personnel for
resistance and guerrilla activity, the mounting of guerrilla
operations, all become more difficult to cover as the size of the
effort increases and the time for field operations approaches. [3 lines not declassified] Somewhere in the
process it becomes pointless to attempt to deceive the enemy on U.S.
participation, just as it would have been naive for the U.S.S.R. to expect the U.S. to believe
it had no part in supporting and directing the Greek Communist
guerrilla operations. Only continuing guidance from the National
Security Council level can insure sound decisions in this field.
15. Finally, it is urged that these matters call for immediate
resolution by the National Security Council. It requires
approximately eighteen months to build the base from which all-out
covert operations can be launched. The building of the U.S. covert
base and apparatus is not proceeding at the required pace and cannot
until the specific determination and guidance discussed above have
been issued by the National Security Council.
Conclusions and
Recommendations
16. The above discussion leads to the following conclusions which are
stated in the form of recommendations to the National Security
Council:
- a.
- That in view of the magnitude issue as well as the
guidance needed to give proper direction to stepped up
covert operations, the National Security Council initiate a
comprehensive review of the covert operations
situation.
- b.
- That this review contain a restatement or redetermination
as appropriate of the several responsibilities and
authorities involved in U.S. covert operations.
- c.
- That if the above review results in a reaffirmation of the
decision to place covert operational responsibility within
the Central Intelligence Agency—the Central Intelligence
Agency should be provided necessary support from other
agencies of the government to insure the successful
discharge of this responsibility including the following
specific assurances:
- (1)
- Adequate provisions for joint planning with the
Armed Forces for covert activities and operations in
support of wartime military operations, spelling out
a clear delineation of authorities, duties and
responsibilities.
- (2)
- Specific guidance for dealing with the military in
fields where the same covert apparatus is being
developed to engage in high priority cold war
missions as well as to be available to the military
in the event of overt war.
- (3)
- More specific provision for insuring that the
foreign policy and political considerations which
are involved in covert operations are brought to
bear on determinations of politico-military
significance.
- (4)
- Specific provisions to insure that the type and
quantities of personnel, administrative and
logistical support required of other governmental
departments and agencies for the prosecution of the
covert effort will be forthcoming as
necessary.
- d.
- That where guidance for covert operations is of concern to
more than one Department, this guidance be coordinated and
issued to the Central Intelligence Agency (and to other
participating agencies) by the new Psychological Strategy
Board.
