Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

69. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Sargeant) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)¹

Washington, May 24, 1951.

Program Planning for Psychological Warfare

The National Security Council has directed that in any actual theater of war the Department of Defense will be responsible for psychological activities. However, as it is agreed that the State Department’s program of International Information and Educational Exchange will be called on to assist the military the following steps have been taken:

1. An emergency plan has been prepared which covers the necessary general directives for providing propaganda activities in the country attacked and in adjacent countries, not only for the United States forces which might be involved but for the government under attack. While this plan is general, it was drawn with two special countries in view—Iran and Yugoslavia.

2. A stockpile of necessary basic supplies, including paper, ink, mimeograph, and necessary sound equipment is being prepared.

3. A basic stockpile of propaganda output in the form of research materials on various subjects that will probably need to be covered in an emergency as well as some semi-prepared press releases, pamphlets, leaflets and other similar forms of propaganda is being prepared.

Further, an informal meeting has been held with the British to provide for the beginning of active policy and operations liaison.

In a situation short of actual warfare the State Department is responsible for overt propaganda activities. Through the National Psychological Strategy Board we are in constant liaison with other agencies in the field. As an acknowledged agency of the United States Government we do not engage in activities which will seriously embarrass the government.

However, recognizing the seriousness of the international situation we began to prepare almost two years ago for a vigorous Psychological Offensive. The Offensive has the dual purpose of (1) strengthening the alliance of free nations, and (2) weakening the Soviet Union and its satellites. We distinguish between the short term objective in psychological warfare of persuading the enemy to make a false move and the longer term objective in our psychological offensive of both encouraging our friends and discouraging our enemies.

In preparation for our special program we prepared a plan known as the Campaign of Truth, which contains the following devices to concentrate our efforts on our specialized objectives:

1. A system of country priorities in which we analyzed propaganda strategy on a global basis.

2. Country papers which aimed our efforts more precisely by stating:

a. Those propaganda themes or objectives which in each country would best contribute to our overall objectives.

b. Target group priorities in which we chose those social classes in each country which it was most expedient for us to reach; and

c. Media priorities by which we determined what devices are most effective in each country for reaching our target groups.

3. Special Propaganda Plans—Special plans spelling out in great detail the psychological vulnerability of the peoples and the appeals useful in reaching them, have been prepared for Russia, China, Indo-China and the Eastern European satellites and South Asia. Others are in process.

4. Guidances—There are four types of guidances used to assure that our operators use the most effective messages:

a. The country paper or basic guidance for each area.

b. The overnight guidance which covers day to day events.

c. The weekly guidance which takes care of events of continuing concern; and

d. Special guidances which cover either special propaganda problems or special events which lend themselves to propaganda exploitation.

Among the State Department activities which might be pointed to as vigorous implementation of the propaganda responsibility of the State Department, I include the following:

(1) Radio—We have two radio stations—RIAS in Berlin and Red-White-Red in Vienna beaming a strong signal and a hard-hitting message into the Eastern European areas constantly. The Radio Division is now constructing studios in Munich in addition to increasing the strength of its transmitters and from there will beam still a third program into Russia and Eastern Europe soon. The next step calls for a fourth program to be beamed out of Salonika to the Near East. The Ring Plan which calls for encircling Russia and her satellites with the most powerful radio transmitters ever built, and Project Vagabond, in which radio transmitters are mounted on ships, are examples of the new planning of IBD.² A further effort to get our message into the crucial areas, has already resulted in contracting for radio receivers to be distributed in Korea, Indo-China, Greece, Iran and Turkey. The 1952 budget provides for further increase of this program. Further, IBD has begun to broadcast in many minority languages of China and Russia, as for example, Ukrainian, Georgian, Lithuanian, Amoy, Mandarin, Cantonese and Swatow dialect, as well as Urdu and Hindi to South Asia, and is actively working toward programs in Central Asian dialects in the very near future.

(2) Press—The major changes under the Campaign of Truth in the press program are that regional and local production in not only standard languages but important dialects is being stressed and that a great deal of material which is either tied to the local interests of the people or is anti-Soviet in character is being produced under the imprint of private groups. This is one way in which we have been able to aid organizations interested in furthering the same objectives we have.

(3) Motion Pictures—The new developments in the motion picture program are ever-increasing emphasis on production in the field, particularly in priority countries and the speeding up of the production of a newsreel so that it can become a fast medium for propaganda messages.

(4) Exchange of Persons—Priority emphasis worldwide has been given to labor leaders and journalists, as labor is a most important target group for us in almost every priority country and opinion leaders are also a first priority group. The trend has been away from academic exchanges toward political exchanges.

(5) Libraries and Institutes—In addition to more careful selection of types of books and languages in the translation program the whole concept of the library has been sharpened into that of an Information Center which specializes in books, magazines and exhibits which contribute directly to our basic purposes of strengthening ourselves and weakening the enemy.

In policy formulation USIE plays an active role in the Department. Mr. Barrett participates in Mr. Webb’s meetings. Representatives of the Policy Staff are members of working groups on special problems, as for example, the CFM meetings in Paris, the Forced Labor issue, the NATO information program for which we have the responsibility in the United States Government. A special Poly Implementation Staff makes news for us to exploit. We help to determine the content of various intelligence reports sent out to the missions, and we receive propaganda guidance reports from our missions at regular intervals, some daily.

Although the planning for our program began quite some time ago it should be noted that little could be done to really effect significant improvement until last October when additional funds were granted by the Congress. The Campaign of Truth is dependent on having adequate resources.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, P Files: Lot 52 D 432, Office of Assistant Secretary Edward Barrett, 1950–51, Box 5. Restricted. The unsigned original appears to be a draft. There is no indication whether it was sent to Webb. It bears the handwritten note, “Hand-carried to Wilber’s office this PM.”
2. International Broadcasting Division.