Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

26. Memorandum From [name not declassified] of the Office of Policy Coordination of the Central Intelligence Agency to Thomas A. Parrott of the Office of Policy Coordination¹

Washington, October 10, 1950.

SUBJECT

• Quarterly PW Guidance Report

1. Psychological warfare policy guidance for OPC activities was received from two principal sources during the past quarter. Much of this guidance came from the OPC Consultants, while some was received from the National Psychological Strategy Board (formerly the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Organization, on which OPC functioned in consultant status).

2. From the OPC Consultants, the following guidance was given OPC in matters of Psychological Warfare:

a. At the meeting of 9 August 1950, Mr. Joyce (State) agreed with the opinion that OPC should no longer engage in [less than 1 line not declassified] motion pictures. He stated that this should be treated as an overt matter and that such matters would be handled elsewhere.

b. On the same date, it was agreed that any possible use of propaganda balloons [less than 1 line not declassified] should not be publicized.

c. On 23 August 1950, the consultants agreed that there was no objection on policy grounds to OPC proposals for the use of balloons from time to time [less than 1 line not declassified].

d. At the meeting of 13 September 1950, Admiral Stevens (JSPD) cautioned against any attempt to use Navy vessels as cover for [less than 1 line not declassified] psychological warfare operations. He stated that the Navy could furnish technical advice as to the feasibility of water-borne operations but that no warships would be made available for this purpose.

e. On 20 September 1950 the consultants stated that in planning and executing covert psychological warfare operations OPC should consider decisions of the National Psychological Strategy Board as constituting governing policy.

f. Again on 20 September, Mr. Hulick (OPC) referred to a recent decision of the National Psychological Strategy Board to the effect that balloons other than those of the toy variety would not be used for overt or covert propaganda against Iron Curtain countries without prior specific permission from the Board. Such a medium will be reserved for a particularly important message. It was stated that this policy is by no means irrevocable and that proposals for OPC action in this field would be considered on their merits.

3. Guidance received from the National Psychological Strategy Board:

a. On 14 July 1950, Mr. Barrett (State) announced the formation of an ad hoc coordinating group composed of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and JSPD members, chaired by Mr. Jos. Phillips, State. This group was to coordinate information policy guidance in connection with the Korean situation. OPC made arrangements to have a member present at the ad hoc meetings, and overt guidance discussed therein was turned later into general materials for OPC Area Divisions. Guidance received at meetings for this inter-service group was indirect and irregular, and only used when appropriate to OPC methods and channels.

b. At the same meeting of 14 July, Mr. Wisner (OPC) referred to a decision, approved by the Department of State, to permit the National Committee for Free Europe to use certain material attributing responsibility of the Korean situation to the Soviets.

c. On Tuesday, 15 August 1950, the Board discussed attempts to defeat the admission of Communist China to the Security Council. The Board felt that [less than 1 line not declassified] propaganda identifying Communist China participation in the Korean situation might be extremely effective in certain limited areas. Mr. Phillips (State) referred to a suggestion that we might give circulation to reports or rumors that the Soviets did not actually want to seat the Chinese Communists in the UN. Mr. Barrett (State) saw no objection to this on policy grounds and undertook to review the policy question of limited covert use.

d. On 21 August 1950, Mr. Barrett (State) reported the recommendations of his department on identification of Chinese Communist participation in the Korean war. Such action was approved. (See entry above.)

e. At a special meeting of 13 September 1950, it was decided by the Board that the use of balloons as a propaganda carrying medium against the Iron Curtain countries would not at that time achieve any important advantage; the potential value of balloons was decided to have been sufficiently established to justify the further development and stockpiling of balloons for use in an emergency or in time of war. OPC was given the responsibility of doing so.

f. The [less than 1 line not declassified] was discussed on 18 September 1950, and Gen. Magruder (Defense) expressed the need for handout materials explaining [less than 1 line not declassified] to the public.

g. At the meeting of 25 September 1950, Mr. [name not declassified] (OPC) was asked to comment on the progress of the balloon project, and in doing so Mr.[name not declassified] requested authorization to coordinate with ONR on research, which was agreed to. A uniform reply to private inquiries re government use of balloons was agreed to: “The matter is under continuous study by agencies of the government, but disclosure of results at this time would not be in the public interest.” The Board decided that utilization of large balloons would only be desirable on extraordinary basis to seek to reach large numbers behind the Curtain with important messages. The right of decision to use them was held by the NPSB. The Board further indicated at this time that any use of balloons for propaganda purposes, whether large or small (toy variety) would be a matter falling under its jurisdiction, and that such uses should be for Board decision. In view of the present situation, OPC was admonished to procure balloons for these purposes simultaneously with the fostering of training of personnel, additional research and experimentation. [1½ lines not declassified]

[name not declassified]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Job 80–01795R, Box 3. Top Secret.