Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

214. Memorandum of Discussion at the 247th Meeting of the National Security Council¹

Washington, May 5, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Discussion at the 247th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 5, 1955

[Omitted here is a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Status of United States Programs for National Security As of December 31, 1954: The Internal Security Program (NSC 5509, Part 8)²

Mr. Coyne introduced his presentation with a brief analysis of the internal security arrangements under the National Security Council, with particular reference to the functions, responsibilities and membership of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS). He thereafter indicated that he would confine his presentation to five major problems relating to internal security. He added that he would pause at the end of his discussion of each of these five problems, to answer any questions.

Mr. Coyne then analyzed the Communist movement in the United States, using charts to illustrate his major points. At the conclusion of this discussion the President inquired, apropos of Mr. Coyne’s statement that publishing activities helped to provide revenues for the Communist Party, USA, what publishing houses were maintained by the Communist Party and what kinds of material they published. Mr. Coyne and others described the publications, and the President then inquired whether such publications were clearly tabbed as Communist in character. Mr. Coyne replied that this was not normally the case, but that it was not difficult to discover their character after a brief reading.

The Vice President inquired as to the character of the firm which published the Matusow book.³ Mr. J. Edgar Hoover explained the backgrounds of Angus Cameron and Albert Kahn, who had published this volume.

At the conclusion of this discussion Mr. Coyne continued with his presentation, dealing successively with the following subjects: (1) Soviet bloc intelligence targets, overt and covert; (2) legal and illegal entry of foreign persons and materials into the United States; (3) the security of critical facilities; and (4) the security of vital information. (A copy of Mr. Coyne’s report is filed with the minutes of the meeting.)⁴

At the conclusion of the presentation the President referred to the account given by Mr. Coyne of the manner in which a Czech courier had brought into Idlewild from Montreal six diplomatic pouches containing 1500 pounds of contents, while managing to avoid either customs or immigration inspection. The President said he could not imagine how an individual with so much material could have avoided some kind of customs inspection. Mr. Coyne replied that the courier in question had simply managed to fool both the customs and immigration officials, and had removed his pouches in an automobile which had been sent for that purpose.

The President said that despite the privileges of diplomatic immunity, would it not be right that if we catch an individual planning to evade our regulations, that individual should lose his diplomatic inviolability?

Mr. Coyne said that he would prefer that members of the State Department answer the President’s question. Secretary Hoover stated that while it would be possible to go after a particular man, it would be extremely difficult to change the system which allowed for the inviolability of the diplomatic pouch. We could declare an individual persona non grata. Mr. Rose,⁵ acting for the Secretary of the Treasury, recalled the circumstances of the case Mr. Coyne had cited, and indicated that the Embassy of Czechoslovakia had firmly denied that its courier had evaded regulations.

The President said he was sure of at least one thing. He would not feel that he was a very good and effective administrator if he could not think up some way to delay such an individual as this Czech courier long enough to discover what were the contents of his baggage and pouches without actually opening them.

Secretary Wilson said that was it not obvious that there was consistent abuse of the pouch privilege by Soviet bloc people. The President replied that of course they consistently abused the privilege, but the difficulty was that the United States in turn was dependent on being able to transmit diplomatic pouches to and from its missions in countries behind the Iron Curtain. Indeed, in one respect at least it needed these pouches more than the Soviet bloc diplomats, because it was necessary in many cases to send food in the pouches.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that he was convinced that there were certain additional steps which the United States could take to reduce Soviet bloc abuse of the pouch privilege, although, he said, many of his people in the Central Intelligence Agency did not agree with this point of view.

The President said that he hated to be a sucker when he knew that the other fellow was fooling and abusing him.

Mr. Coyne assured the President that certain members of the Council, including Admiral Radford, not to mention the members of the two internal security committees, were hard at work to see what additional actions we could take to cope with this problem

Admiral Radford said that he was indeed interested, and had tried to canvass the three Services as to possible reduction of their dependence on pouch material sent to Washington by the Military Attachés. He had not been very successful in persuading them that it was unnecessary to rely so heavily on this pouch material. Nevertheless, he still felt personally that the United States loses more than it gains by its strict adherence to the inviolability of the diplomatic pouch as a means of securing intelligence materials on the Soviet bloc.

The President said that he thought it would be a good idea to contact our Embassies in the Soviet bloc countries and to ascertain from them just how important our own pouches really are. If this importance proved not to be vital, we might contemplate new regulations. In any event, said the President, he admitted that the problem of controlling abuse of the pouch was not as easy as it looked on the surface.

Mr. Dillon Anderson then inquired of the President whether he wished further study and recommendations by the two internal security committees on this subject. The Attorney General, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover and Mr. Coyne pointed out that the two committees were already engaged in restudying the problem.

Governor Stassen, reverting to the problem of illegal entries into the United States from foreign countries, which Mr. Coyne had underlined, inquired whether the time may not be close at hand when everyone in the United States must be compelled to have an identification card. It might, for example, be possible to insist on such identification cards under cover of the requirements for civil defense. The President replied that of course the system of identification cards had been common in many European countries for a good many years, but he believed that an attempt to introduce this system in the United States would raise a great political storm, although it might be possible to get by with a civil defense cover.

The National Security Council:⁶

a. Noted and discussed an oral briefing on the subject by the NSC Representative on Internal Security, based upon Part 8 or NSC 5509.

b. Noted that the internal security committees are preparing a report for Council consideration on the internal security problems created by Soviet bloc use of the diplomatic pouch in relation to U.S. use of the diplomatic pouch in the Soviet bloc countries.

Note: The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Chairmen, IIC and ICIS.

[Omitted here are the remaining agenda items.]

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on May 6.
2. A copy of NSC 5509, Part 8, is in the National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5509 Series.
3. Reference is to Harvey Matusow, False Witness (New York: Cameron and Kahn, 1955).
4. Not found.
5. H. Chapman Rose, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.
6. Paragraphs a–b and the Note that follow constituted NSC Action No. 1390. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action of the National Security Council)