Attachment13
SUMMARY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SINCE WORLD WAR II (with particular respect to
the problems posed by NSC 59/1 and
127/1)
World War II
1. Approximately six months after U.S. entry into World War II, the
OWI (Office of War Information)
was established by Executive Order in June 1942.14 The OWI was responsible for domestic and overt foreign
information programs and answered directly to the President. Policy
guidance was provided by the Committee on War Information, chaired
by the Director of OWI, with
representation which included the departments of State, War, and
Navy.
2. Subsequently, in 1943, the OSS
(Office of Strategic Services) was established and made responsible,
among other functions, for the conduct of covert information and
propaganda activities abroad, answering to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
3. There was no psychological warfare organization for the services
as a whole, although there was created within SHAEF a special
psychological warfare staff division on a level with G–2. In theaters of military operations,
each commander set up his own psychological warfare organization and
coordinated psychological warfare with his combat operations.
Post-World War II
4. Following the end of the war, the OSS was dissolved and certain overt activities of the
OWI, including the VOA facilities, were transferred to the
Department of State. At the same time the CIA took over the intelligence and covert psychological
warfare activities of the OSS. The
military services retained their psychological warfare units on a
greatly reduced scale, though they conducted significant activities
in this area through the reorientation program necessitated by the
occupation of Germany and Japan. This was the status of organization
within the Government in early 1947 when the exigencies of the
current cold war posed increased challenges and demands on U.S.
activities in this field.
[Page 630]
5. At the end of 1947, by interdepartmental agreement, the State
Department was charged with the responsibility for current peacetime
propaganda activities (NSC 4 Dec. 9,
1947).15 To
provide for closer policy coordination and integration of facilities
and programs, an Interdepartmental Coordinating Staff (ICS) was established under the
direction of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.
Representatives of State, Army, Navy, Air Force and CIA participated on this joint staff.
The organization was to develop psychological objectives for cold
war programs and to coordinate the activities of the operating
agencies.
6. This agreement accordingly placed responsibility upon the
Secretary of State for peacetime psychological operations during the
cold war; the question of wartime conduct of psychological warfare
was not covered by this early agreement but was left for further
study. Early in 1949, interdepartmental agreement was reached on the
establishment in the State Department of a planning organization to
develop plans for interim arrangements for foreign and domestic
information programs and overt psychological operations abroad
during the initial stages of war (NSC 43, March 9, 1949).16 The director of this planning staff was appointed
by the Secretary of State in consultation with directly interested
agencies. The staff was composed of State and military personnel,
with liaison representatives from CIA and NSRB. Policy
consultants to the director of the staff were designated by the
Secretary of State and Defense, the Director of CIA and the Chairman of the NSRB. The functions and personnel of
this staff overlapped to a considerable degree with the
Interdepartmental Coordinating Staff (ICS). This condition and subsequent experience led to a
review of existing arrangements (see NSC 43/1, Aug. 2, 1949).17
NSC 59/1
7. As a result, in March 1950 revised basic principles for handling
psychological warfare planning and operations were adopted and put
into effect. (NSC 59/1, March 9,
1950). The principle that propaganda in both peace and war is a
continuing mechanism of national policy directed toward the
achievement of national aims was reaffirmed. Under NSC 59/1, the Secretary of State was
charged with responsibility for:
[Page 631]
- a.
- The formulation of policy and plans for the National
Foreign Information program during peacetime.
- b.
- The formulation of national psychological warfare policy
in time of national emergency or threat of war and during
the initial stages of war.
- c.
- The coordination of policy and plans for these activities
with other appropriate agencies. The policy and planning for
periods of emergency and the initial stages of war were to
be coordinated with the joint war plans of the Department of
Defense, and where such plans had a direct impact on war
plans, they were to be subject to JCS concurrence.
8. In accordance with NSC 59/1, a
revised central planning and coordinating mechanism based on the
consolidation of the former Staffs was established to deal with
these responsibilities. The ICS
became the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff (IFIS). The director was appointed by
the Secretary of State and was in fact the Assistant Secretary of
State for Public Affairs. The group of consultants was retained.
This combined mechanism became the Interdepartmental Foreign
Information Organization (IFIO).18
9. Again there was avoided coming fully to grips with the issue of
jurisdictional responsibility for psychological warfare policy and
direction during war, because of the fundamental differences between
State and the military services on the question. Agreement had been
reached only for planning through the initial stages of war, but
even this concept was left without precise definition. This
arrangement proved unsatisfactory and the cause of friction from
many aspects.
10. The IFIS joint staff was charged
with planning for emergency and wartime psychological operations and
completed a study shortly after the outbreak of war in Korea on the
assignment of psychological warfare responsibilities for the initial
stages of war (defined as D plus 90) and for the subsequent stages
of war. This study was transmitted to the departments for adoption
in July 1950.19 It provided
that:
- a.
- During the initial stages of war, the Secretary of State
would:
- (1)
- Formulate psychological warfare policy and issue
policy guidance directives to operating
agencies.
- (2)
- Coordinate these functions with agencies executing
psychological warfare functions.
- (3)
- Prepare detailed plans and programs for
implementation of policies.
- (4)
- In areas other than theaters of military
operations, execute overt psychological warfare
programs, provide for coordination with covert
psychological warfare and coordinate U.S.
psychological warfare policies and operations with
our allies.
- b.
- To handle psychological warfare during the subsequent
stages of war, there should be established an independent
agency:
- (1)
- Authorized to issue directives to operating
agencies.
- (2)
- Providing for representation of the operating
agencies.
- (3)
- Authorized to provide coordination with our
allies.
- (4)
- Having direct access to the President, but
recognizing the authority of the State Department in
areas other than theaters of military operations,
the Department of Defense having authority in such
theaters.
11. Furthermore, for the initial stages of war, an interdepartmental
board was to be established within the State Department to act as
the “executive agent” of the Secretary of State in formulating
policy plans for, and coordination of, the world-wide conduct of
psychological warfare.
12. The transition from the peacetime organization to the initial
stages of war organization was to take place on D-Day, or earlier at
the discretion of the President. The IFIO would be designated the Interim Psychological
Warfare Board and strengthened; as executive agent for the Secretary
of State, it would issue directives.
13. These recommendations led to further controversy. In the fall of
1950 Secretary of Defense Johnson advocated the immediate establishment of the
Interim Psychological Warfare Board in the Executive Office of the
President and immediate consideration of the question of composition
and urgency of a National Psychological Warfare Board. He proposed
that the latter Board would be independent of existing departments
and have full-time public members in the majority. On the other
hand, the Department of State was not willing to accept
establishment of the Interim Board as an executive agent for the
Secretary of State at that time. The issue was posed as to whether
or not such an interim board would impair the Secretary of State’s
responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs. Accordingly, an
impasse developed.
14. Meanwhile, in August 1950, in the light of the Korean
developments, State strengthened the IFIO organization. The interdepartmental consultants
group was expanded and renamed the National Psychological Strategy
Board. It was headed by the Assistant Secretary of State for Public
Affairs and was composed of representatives of the Secretary of
Defense, the JCS, the Director of
CIA and the Army as Executive
Agent of the JCS for the conduct of
psychological warfare in Korea.
[Page 633]
15. Attempting to break the organizational deadlock, State proposed
in December 1950 a new concept, emphasizing continuing psychological
effort, (rather than phased operations) for both peace and war. The
conclusion was that the same organization should be responsible for
formulation of policy and programs in both peace and war. It was
proposed to place responsibility for all phases in the Secretary of
State with an interdepartmental coordinating agent to advise the
Secretary on policy and to coordinate planning operations. This
proposal was rejected by Defense.
16. A new memorandum of agreement and disagreement was then worked
out interdepartmentally. It set forth the issue somewhat as follows.
Agreement was reached on the following points:
- a.
- The peace-to-war phasing was eliminated and the need for
organizational and policy continuity recognized. The
responsibility of the JCS in
theaters of military operations and of State in other areas
was reaffirmed.
- b.
- A single official, designated by the President:
- (1)
- Should be responsible for formulation of
psychological policy within the framework of
approved national policy and coordination and
evaluation of the psychological effort; and
- (2)
- Should be authorized to issue policy guidance to
the operating agencies.
- c.
- Representatives at the policy levels, also agencies
executing major portions of the psychological effort, should
advise this official and coordinate operations.
17. There was disagreement as to whether or not the single official
designated by the President should be the Secretary of State or an
independent official responsible to the President. Arguments were
put forth for both propositions, and the matter was referred to the
President for decision in January 1951.
Establishment of the Psychological
Strategy Board.
18. The problem was worked on by the BOB, the NSC Staff, and
a final agreement was negotiated by the agencies concerned. This
resulted in the directive of the President on June 20, 1951,
establishing the Psychological Strategy Board.20 The principle of psychological operations was
recognized. However the designation of a single official as the
focus of responsibility was replaced by the concept of a Board
composed of the Undersecretary of State, the Undersecretary of
Defense, and the Director of CIA. A
director appointed by the President served under the Board, and was
placed in a position to take initiative
[Page 634]
in, and give direction to, government-wide
psychological operations. The Board was directed particularly to:
- a.
- provide more effective plans of psychological operations
within the framework of approved national policies;
- b.
- coordinate psychological operations of all departments and
agencies of government, and
- c.
- evaluate the effectiveness of the national psychological
effort.
19. In the meantime the IFIO have
been continuing to struggle with the formulation of a “national
psychological warfare plan” for general war, to include principles
of operation, delineation of responsibilites and organizational
principles, etc. Since the PSB now
had been given authority for such planning, the IFIO plan along with alternate
departmental versions was, accordingly, referred for further study
and action to the PSB.
NSC 127/1
20. The PSB in due course resubmitted
the plan for conducting psychological operations during general
hostilities to the NSC for approval,
(NSC 127/1). It provided, among
other things:
- a.
- A statement of national objectives which will maintain in
a condition of general hostilities (based on NSC 20/4).21
- b.
- Basic principles of operations.
- c.
- Delineation of responsibilities, including:
- (1)
- PSB responsibility
for formulation and promulgation as guidance of
over-all national psychological objectives, policies
and programs, and for the coordination and
evaluation of the national psychological effort
(para. 7, NSC
127/1).
- (2)
- The JCS to be
responsible, in conformity with national policy and
PSB guidance, for
planning and execution of U.S. psychological
operations in military theaters of operations (para.
8, NSC
127/1).
- (3)
- State in conformity with national policy and
PSB guidance
responsible for the planning and execution of U.S.
overt psychological operations in areas other than
military theaters of operations (para. 9, NSC 127/1).
- (4)
- “In situations in which a military theater of
operations embraces territory of a government which
exercises civil authority and to which a U.S.
diplomatic mission is accredited … the Department of
State shall be responsible for the U.S. information
program directed toward the nations of the country
concerned”. (para. 10, NSC 127/1).
- (5)
- “The Psychological Strategy Board shall insure
through the government agency or agencies
appropriate … any necessary coordination of national
psychological operations, policies, or plans with
the appropriate agencies of other governments”
(para. 14, NSC
127/1).
[Page 635]
21. NSC 127/1 further provides that
plans for the transfer of facilities and personnel from State and
other overt agencies to military control in military theaters of
operations should be coordinated through the organization
established pursuant to NSC 59/1
(the POCC). Originally the PSB draft of 127/1 had provided for
such coordination by the PSB, but
this was changed subsequent to a recommendation by the Bureau of the
Budget. In approving NSC 127/1 the
President made clear that this policy was to serve as a basis for
emergency planning relating to sudden general hostilities and
“directed that the subsidiary plans and measures authorized provide
maximum flexibility whenever the President deems it desirable to
determine the ultimate organization appropriate to protracted
full-scale general hostilities” (NSC
127/1, Note by the Executive Secretary, July 25, 1952).
Establishment of the Operations
Coordinating Board
22. The effort of the Psychological Strategy Board to carry out its
variegated mission was not a happy one. In reviewing its activities
the Jackson Committee22 found that:
“there is no ‘strategic concept for psychological operations’
separate and distinct from a strategic concept for gaining
national aims without war. When PSB has developed, for example, a ‘regional
psychological plan’, it has really formulated a plan for the
achievement of national aims involving the use of
propaganda, diplomacy, economic pressure and military
strength in various combinations. It is this fact which has
caused so much controversy between PSB and the established planning agencies
within the State Department”.
Accordingly, the Jackson Committee recommended abolishment of the
PSB and the establishment of the
OCB as a coordinating body which
would:
- a.
- Aid in coordinating the implementation of detailed
operational plans prepared by responsible departments and
agencies to carry out approved NSC policies.
- b.
- Assure the timely and coordinated carrying out of such
plans.
- c.
- Initiate new proposals for action within the framework of
national security policies in response to opportunity and
other changes in the situation.
- d.
- Assure that each project or action was so executed as to
make its full contribution to the particular “climate of
opinion” which the United States is seeking to achieve in
the war.
[Page 636]
Subsequent Arrangements for X-Day
Planning
23. The Jackson Committee
noted that the POCC, which had
existed as a mechanism through which the State Department could
coordinate the Foreign Information Program, was responsive to a
necessary function, but recommended that the POCC be abolished and its function
made a responsibility of the OCB and
the OCB staff.
24. As a result, in a special memorandum to the NSC by the President, dated September
3, 1953 the functions of the POCC
were transferred to the OCB. The
OCB did not immediately abolish
the POCC, but after the lapse of a
little time discontinued it as a separate coordinating arrangement.
However, the OCB continued an ad hoc
committee on X-Day planning to carry on the work of developing plans
for conducting psychological operations in support of hostilities,
which had been the function of the “X-Day Committee” of the now
defunct POCC.
25. In the fall of 1953 the ad hoc Committee on X-Day planning
reported to the OCB that due to
reorganization measures within the Government subsequent to NSC 127/1, revision of this policy was
necessary in order that the X-Day Committee could go ahead with
their tasks. Reorganization Plan No. 8 had established the USIA.23 Executive
Order No. 10483 had established the OCB, and the functions of the POCC had been transferred to the former. The X-Day
working group felt that 127/1 could be revised easily in order to
take into account these changes within the Government structure.
Accordingly, it was authorized to present proposals for such
revisions to the OCB for transmittal
to the NSC. These proposals did not
long remain “non-controversial” as was originally hoped. On March 22
the X-Day Working Committee presented proposals to the OCB for the revision of NSC 127/1, which in effect reopened
many of the old arguments between the agencies concerning
jurisdiction and the conduct of psychological operations during
wartime. The matter was further complicated by trying to propose
revisions to cover all types of hostilities, in order that “support
planning should anticipate as far as possible every such situation
from limited combat, as in Korea, to general war”. There was no
agreement within the Committee on the following major issues:
- a.
- DOD, USIA and CIA representatives supported
the position that in time of hostilities the Operations
Coordinating Board should be responsible for “the
formulation of national psychological objectives” and “the
coordination of psychological operations and
programs”.
- b.
- The State representative supported the position that the
OCB should be
responsible for “assuring the formulation and coordination
of guidance” and “the coordination of programs” for
psychological operations in time of hostilities. (This would
leave to the OCB to
determine where the organization to provide guidance should
be established, within the OCB or outside, etc.).
- c.
- On the military enclave situation (NSC 127/1, para. 10), Defense, CIA and USIA supported the position
that the military commander should have the responsibility
of coordinating over-all psychological operations, with the
USIA operations
“insofar as practicable” being placed under his direction as
an entity in charge of a designee of the USIA when the former deems it
necessary for support of the military operations.
- d.
- State supported the position that in this situation USIA should operate under the
direction of the State Department Chief of Mission. The area
of disagreement was possibly even broader, however, for the
State Department representative with the X-Day Working Group
reserved State’s rights throughout to reconsider further at
a higher level.
26. The OCB considered this problem,
(primarily at the Board Assistants’ level) for some time and in its
report to the NSC on the subject,
dated July 21, 1954, generally came to the conclusion that the
jurisdictional issues raised concerning final authority over
psychological operations during general war were (a) difficult of
resolution at the present time, and (b) did not perhaps need to be
resolved at the present time.
27. The OCB recommended:
- a.
- That the NSC rescind
NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1 “without prejudice to
the principles of operation and the responsibilities of
departments and agencies to engage in psychological warfare
and psychological warfare planning enunciated therein or
elsewhere.”
- b.
- “That the NSC note that
the OCB serves as the body
for dealing with requirements for interdepartmental
coordination concerning overseas information and
psychological warfare activities in carrying out NSC assignments or upon
specific request by participating departments and
agencies.”
- c.
- “That the NSC note that
the OCB developed, on an
urgent basis, a detailed contingency plan for information
and psychological warfare activities in Indochina and that
the OCB will not develop any
further detailed subsidiary plans of this type for
designated areas unless so directed by the NSC.” (the implication being
that if and when limited, rather than general, war should
occur the OCB could develop
plans and coordinating arrangements for Psywar operations
which would be appropriate in the circumstances).
Current Status
28. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in their views dated 3 August 1954
objected to the recision of NSC 59/1
and 121/1 on the grounds that “although obsolete in certain
organizational respects, (they) contain essential formal statements
of national policy on psychological warfare
[Page 638]
matters. Without a formal statement of
responsibilities of governmental agencies concerned, there can be no
valid basis for psychological warfare planning”. The JCS further recommended that NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1 should be revised or superseded.
29. On August 5, 1954, by NSC Action
No. 1198, further action with respect to NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1
was deferred pending receipt of an expanded study by the Bureau of
the Budget (NSC Action No. 1197)
which was “to include the placing of responsibility within the
executive branch for coordinating economic warfare, psychological
warfare, political warfare, and foreign information activities”.
However, the Bureau of the Budget was not specifically directed to
propose a solution to the organizational and jurisdictional problems
concerning psychological warfare operations during hostilities which
are raised by NSC 127/1 and which
have such a long history, and its projected report does not propose
a solution to this matter.
30. In a letter to the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization dated
February 7, 1955,24
the Executive Officer of the Operations Coordinating Board noted
that the OCB is currently
responsible for the coordination of the transfer of overt
information facilities, personnel, etc., to the theater commander in
a period of general war “and that adequate authority and procedures
exist utilizing the OCB structure to
carry out this responsibility in a limited conflict.” However, he
further commented that in the absence of detailed plans for full
mobilization in time of war, it did not appear to be feasible for
the OCB to develop such plans for
psychological warfare to be applicable in the event of general
war.
31. In a memorandum dated January 11, 1955, subsequently circulated
to the NSC on February 8, 1955, with
a supporting memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed their views of August 3, 1954, and
specifically proposed that any document designed to supersede NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1 should:
- “a. Contain an approved definition of psychological
warfare.
- “b. Contain an approved definition of psychological
operations.
- “c. Adequately define responsibility and authority for the
conduct of psychological warfare under conditions of
declared war or hostilities involving the engagement of U.S.
forces under conditions short of declared war.
- “d. Delineate agency responsibility for use of facilities
within a theater.
- “e. Provide guidance for the orderly transfer of
facilities at the beginning of hostilities.
- “f. Provide for a coordinated psychological warfare effort
by all agencies of government.”
