Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

209. National Security Council Report¹

Washington, March 2, 1955.

NSC 5509

STATUS OF UNITED STATES PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1954

[Omitted here are Parts 1–6.]

Part 7—The Foreign Intelligence Program

(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and Concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee)

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

Note: Paragraph 10a of USSR 162/2² sets forth the primary missions of the US intelligence system in support of basic national security requirements. This report presents a statement and evaluation of capabilities to carry out these objectives as of December 31, 1954. Section I of the report is addressed primarily to the first of these three objectives (warning of aggression) and Section II to the other two, (capabilities and intentions of foreign countries). Section III deals with problems of collection related to all three objectives. Problems of covert collection are considered in Section IV.

I. Warning of Aggression

“Collecting and analyzing indications of hostile intentions that would give maximum prior warning of possible aggression or subversion in any area of the world.” NSC 162/2, para. 10a(1)

1. National Intelligence Objectives. Pursuant to NSCID #4³ the IAC on December 14, 1954, approved a new statement of “Priority National Intelligence Objectives” (DCID 4/4)⁴ which was prepared in the light of NSC 162/2. This basic revision of priority national intelligence objectives, which will be reviewed semi-annually, provides improved guidance to research and collection throughout the intelligence community and focuses attention upon those intelligence area of greatest security concern.

2. Watch Committee of the IAC. For the purpose of supporting the mission of the IAC Watch Committee “to provide earliest possible warning to the United States Government of hostile action by the USSR, or its allies, which endangers the security of the United States” there has now been established, under the direction of the committee, an Indications Center. This center is staffed by representatives of the intelligence agencies who, in coordination with their parent agencies, analyze information from all sources and select and collate indications of Soviet/Communist hostile action or intentions affecting U.S. national security for the consideration of the Watch Committee. This function is in counterdistinction to the warning provided through radar, spotters, and filter centers. For further support of the mission of the Watch Committee, there was issued on November 30, 1954, NAC 5438, “Transmittal of Information to the IAC Watch Committee,”⁵ which authorizes and directs appropriate departments and agencies of the Government to make fully available to the IAC Watch Committee all information and intelligence pertinent to its mission and functions.

3. Evaluation of U.S. Warning Capabilites. On September 14, 1954, the IAC approved SNIE 11–8–54, “Probable Warning of Soviet Attack on the U.S. Through Mid-1957,”⁶ which estimates the amount of advance warning to be expected in the event of various types of attack which might be initiated by the USSR. It concludes that the U.S. could expect possibly as much as six months and not less than 30 days warning of Soviet preparations for a full-scale ground, sea, and air attack in the event of prior mobilization. It also concludes, however, that particularly by 1957 only a few hours or in some cases no specific warning, other than that provided by early warning radar, could be relied upon in event of various types and scales of surprise attack. A periodic review and revision of this estimate is contemplated.

Our advance warning largely depends on sifting a large quantity of material to discover those indications of enemy activity which suggest that measures are being taken to implement a decision to attack. The enemy’s choice of the type of attack greatly affects our advance warning capability. We are largely dependent on radar and forward observation stations for early warning of air attack, in the event that our intelligence fails to discover indications of preparations therefor and if the USSR should risk launching such an attack without prior mobilization. We lack adequate penetrations of the Soviet Bloc that can be relied on to provide warning in the event that the enemy is willing to risk a surprise attack without extensive mobilization. Reports of troop movements and logistical activity are usually reported too late or are too inconclusive to give adequate early warning in such an event. We are exploiting all available sources of information and constantly striving to develop new and improved means of detection of attack.

As stated in SNIE 11–8–54, “The warning process is … affected by the whole context of events in which it operates, including psychological factors and even pure chance. It cannot be regarded as a mechanical process which it is possible for intelligence to set up once and for all and which thereafter operates automatically.”

II. Estimating the Capabilities and Intentions of Foreign Countries

“Accurately evaluating the capabilities of foreign countries, friendly and neutral as well as enemy, to undertake military, political, economic, and subversive courses of action affecting U.S. security.” NSC 162/2, para. 10a(2)

“Forecasting potential foreign developments having a bearing on U.S. national security.” NSC 162/2, para. 10a(3)

1. National Intelligence Objectives. DCID 4/3⁷ and 4/4 set up, respectively, comprehensive objectives for all countries and areas, and priority objectives for specific countries and subjects. DCID 4/4 particularly delineates more precisely than has been done heretofore the specific aspects of capabilities and intentions of certain countries that deserve priority attention.

2. National Intelligence Estimates. Since the last report (NSC 5430, Part 8),⁸ several major estimates have been produced dealing with Soviet Bloc capabilities and probable courses of action. Included in this group were three basic annual reviews: “Soviet Capabilities and Probably Courses of Action Through Mid-1959,”⁹ “Communist Courses of Action in Asia Through 1957,”¹⁰ and “Probable Developments in the European Satellites Through Mid-1956.”¹¹ In addition, three estimates were produced directly or indirectly in support of the NSC Study of “Net Capabilities of the USSR to Inflict Direct Injury Upon the Continental U.S. and Key U.S. Installations Overseas”:¹² “Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attacks on the U.S. and Key Overseas Installations Through 1 July 1957,”¹³ “Probable Warning of Soviet Attack on the U.S. as of Mid-1957,” and “Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field.”¹⁴ Seventeen estimates were produced on countries outside the Soviet Bloc. Much emphasis was given to the Far East, particularly to Indochina. Of the 24 NIE’s published during the six-month period, 16 were related to specific NSC papers or policy decisions.

Continuing evaluation is taking place on means for improving the quality of National Intelligence Estimates. The entire production of 1953 and the first six months of 1954 have been reviewed in order to identify and correct intelligence deficiencies. In addition, there is now before the IAC a special detailed “post-mortem” of NIE 11–6–54, “Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field.”

3. Basic Intelligence. The initial world coverage of the National Intelligence Survey is essentially 45% completed, including 2400 individual sections, mainly on JCS high priority areas. Present production is slightly below the scheduled rate of approximately 8 equivalent NIS per year. The over-all quality is being improved by better collection in support of the program

4. Military Intelligence

a. General. At the present time, military intelligence is generally adequate to provide broad measurements of the military, logistic, industrial, and governmental control strengths of the USSR, Communist China, and the Satellites. However, significant detailed information available is fragmentary and it is essential to develop means to overcome present deficiencies in the collection field in order adequately to support U.S. military plans, programs, and operations.

Limited gains were made during the past six months in the following fields: analysis of performance characteristics of new types of Soviet aircraft; data on the development of Soviet nuclear weapons, information on modifications of Soviet tactical doctrine in nuclear warfare; technical methods and devices for intelligence collection; Chinese Communist ground force dispositions; and knowledge of Soviet warship construction.

Nevertheless, military intelligence on the USSR and, to a lesser extent on Communist China and the Satellites, is inadequate in many critical fields. There is a serious lack of specific and detailed information on the following: the development, production, and deployment of guided missiles; other unconventional weapons; newly developed or modified conventional weapons; delivery systems, logistical capabilities and support; some components of the air defense system; and scientific and technical strengths as they affect military capabilities. Our knowledge continues to be inadequate on the movements and dispositions of Soviet Bloc forces, particularly in the USSR. The cessation of hostilities in Indochina has resulted in a reduction of military intelligence on the Viet Minh.

Our knowledge of Soviet atomic energy progress is referred to in paragraph 7b below. With respect to information on: (1) specific allocations by the USSR of available nuclear materials to types of weapons in the small, medium and large yield categories; (2) specific allocations of nuclear weapons and warheads to various delivery systems; and (3) actual disposition of nuclear weapons and warheads, our requirements continue to be unfulfilled.

b. Target Materials Production. Approximately 80% of the minimal requirements for air target materials, in the Air Objective Folder Program (OAFP), in support of joint war plans are complete. The remaining 20% of the minimal requirements are scheduled for completion by the end of CY 1955. Other air target materials, desired by the Services for development of the optimum opportunities for air action, are approximately 50% satisfied. Production to satisfy the remainder of these requirements continues to the maximum extent practicable and consonant with priority emphasis on highest and earliest readiness in support of joint war plans.¹⁵

5. Political Intelligence

a. The Soviet Bloc and Communist China. Political intelligence on the Soviet Orbit is built mainly upon the careful screening and evaluation of overt materials from the Soviet and Chinese Communist press, radio, and other information media. The flow of current material, plus the accumulated body of evaluated data and the development of a group of experienced analysts, make possible a reasonably accurate interpretation of political developments in the Soviet/Communist world.

Recent defections of fairly high level Soviet officials have served to confirm important aspects of existing intelligence analysis. Similarly, the observed course of events over the past year has borne out in most substantial particulars the intelligence estimates of probable post-Stalin developments in the USSR.

Our capability for assessing specific short-term intentions of the USSR and Communist China is inherently limited by the closed character of the Soviet and Communist Chinese decision-making systems. Although the Soviet/Communist regimes cannot mask their general international aims and attitudes, only a very high level penetration of these governments would make possible fully assured assessments of particular Soviet/Communist plans and intended actions.

b. The Free World. As a part of a long term look at the prospects in the cold war, special emphasis has been placed during the past six months on the situation in the underdeveloped areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America; Communist capabilities in the Free World; and attitudes and reactions in the Free World and in the Soviet Bloc to nuclear weapons developments.

The revolution which overthrew a Communist regime in Guatemala and the disclosure of the Tudeh¹⁶ ring in the Iranian army have made available to U.S. intelligence a new body of material on Communist tactics of infiltration and control. Analysis of these materials is expected to provide an improved understanding of Communist subversive capabilities in underdeveloped countries.

6. Economic Intelligence

a. General. Economic intelligence, like political intelligence, is essentially the product of collation and analysis of data from primarily overt sources. Economic intelligence on the Soviet Bloc has improved as a result of additional systematic analysis of the Soviet potential industries. Experimentation is under way on new economic research techniques for the evaluation of Soviet capabilities for supporting specialized weapons programs. Among the major unsolved problems are Soviet defense expenditures and Soviet agricultural growth capabilities.

b. Communist China. Economic research effort and the flow of intelligence materials on Communist China have increased, resulting in a better appreciation of Chinese Communist productive capabilities and of Sino-Soviet economic relationships. The output of certain basic industries, such as electric power, and iron and steel, is reasonably well established. Further information and research are required to determine agricultural and handicraft output, chemical and munitions output, transportation capabilities, and over-all per capita consumption.

c. Economic Defense. In addition to a continuing review of major commodity problems for East-West trade controls, intelligence support for economic defense includes an assessment of possible long-run economic developments within the Soviet Bloc as they relate to economic defense policies. Intelligence support for enforcement of economic defense measures has been maintained in spite of diminishing information on trade transactions. Intelligence on shipping engaged in Soviet Bloc trade continues to be good, and there has been some improvement in cargo information. Continued joint conferences with the UK have produced substantial agreement on intelligence concerning Free World trade with Communist China, although significant differences still exist as to the type and quantity of cargoes reaching Communist China from or via Hong Kong and other trans-shipment points. Moreover, information on unrecorded shipments remains inadequate.

d. Free World. Economic intelligence production on the Free World has concentrated on analysis of (a) improved economic conditions in Western Europe; (b) the unfavorable outlook for Japanese foreign trade; and (c) the problem of economic development in underdeveloped areas. The results of this effort have been satisfactory.

e. Coordination. The Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC) has taken a more active part in guiding economic intelligence production and has continued its surveys to uncover economic research and collection deficiencies. In September, the EIC coordinated a draft DCID 15/1,¹⁷ later approved by the IAC, which delineates IAC agency responsibilities for production and coordination of foreign economic intelligence related to national security.

7. Scientific and Technical Intelligence

a. General. Through intensified collection and research our understanding of Soviet basic scientific capabilities, including the quality and quantity of their scientific manpower, has improved. In specific fields of science and technology, however, vast gaps in our knowledge still exist. Substantial improvement will require successful application of new collection techniques and improved analytical processes now under development.

b. Atomic Energy. The most significant advances in atomic energy intelligence have resulted from the extensive Soviet nuclear weapons test program and the return of German technical personnel from the USSR. Data from the weapons test program and related information received during the past six months have made more clear the current status of Soviet nuclear development and indicate that several nuclear weapon types are probably being stockpiled. These same data and information furnish guidelines for estimating the future course of Soviet nuclear developments. Interrogation of German returnees has confirmed previous reports of the activities of German scientists in the Soviet atomic program and has provided information that raises somewhat the level of confidence in the estimates of Soviet U-235 production given in NIE 11–3–54.¹⁸ The apportionment between weapons types of the Soviet fissionable material stockpile, although susceptible of estimate by indirect methods of varying reliability, cannot yet be confirmed by direct evidence.

c. Guided Missiles. Preparation of the first NIE on guided missiles revealed critical gaps in our knowledge. While certain new collection techniques and data reduction methods give promise of better information, their development has not yet progressed to the point of providing the information required. A U.S./UK intelligence conference on Soviet guided missiles capabilities, held in London in November, found the independently prepared U.S. and UK estimates to be relatively close.¹⁹

d. Biological Warfare. Following production of SEC 2–54, “Soviet Biological Warfare Capabilities Through 1960”,²⁰ the first community-wide estimate in this field, a joint study of critical deficiencies in biological warfare intelligence and recommended means for their elimination has been undertaken. Coordinated all-source research by IAC member agencies on certain suspected Soviet biological warfare installations has been largely completed. Despite these efforts, positive knowledge of the existence and nature of a Soviet BW program has yet to be established.

8. Intelligence Support for Foreign Information and Psychological Warfare Programs

The survey of USIA’s intelligence needs and assets reported in IAC–D–55/7²¹ was approved by the DCI, USIA, and the Department of State. Pertinent recommendations were approved by the IAC. The survey report defined the types of intelligence and intelligence information required to meet USIA’s essential needs, which are, in the main, also the needs of other agencies with related programs. Arrangements have now been made to insure that USIA, to the maximum extent possible, will receive the pertinent products of the existing intelligence organizations. To strengthen existing facilities, increased funds have been allocated for the expansion and acceleration of production of relevant parts of the NIS program. To meet the specialized needs of USIA, utilizing the intelligence produced by other agencies as required, an intelligence unit has been established with USIA accompanied by the abolition of certain USIA offices. It is expected in the near future that certain intelligence assets of USIA will be made available to the intelligence community.

III. Collection

1. The Foreign Service. Reporting from and collection by the Foreign Service, a primary overt source of intelligence information, continues for the most part to meet expectations.

a. Reporting from behind the Iron Curtain. Reporting remains inadequate in the political and sociological fields, principally because of restrictions on movement and the size of missions. Generally speaking, reporting from and on the USSR from the intelligence point of view has shown some slight gain; in the case of the Satellites, there has been a decline, at least in political reporting. Some improvement in reporting has been hoped for because of the greater cordiality of Soviet Bloc officials in their contacts with Western representatives, but little is yet evident. On the other hand, a decrease in the flow of overtly collected materials is expected as a result of probable retaliatory action by the governments of the USSR and Satellites to recent and pending U.S. travel and access restrictions on Soviet diplomatic personnel.

b. Reporting outside the Bloc. The principal handicap to improved Foreign Service reporting is reduced staff. However, strengthened inter-agency coordination of collection and requirements has contributed to improved reporting, especially in the economic field.

c. Publications Procurement. The continued absence of satisfactory publications procurement from London and the Middle East is having a cumulative effect and for some areas is beginning to impair analysis-in-depth.

d. Map Procurement. Collection of maps from the Soviet Bloc has been limited, by continued security restrictions, to atlases and small-scale maps. There has been a marked decrease in the procurement of maps and map intelligence from Latin America and from Northwest Europe, because of lack of specialized collectors in these areas.

2. Agricultural Reporting. Under recent legislation, agricultural attachés will report directly to the Department of Agriculture. However, by subsequent agreement between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of State, the latter will continue to be responsible for agricultural reporting from the Soviet Bloc.

3. Military Attaché System. The attaché system continues to be a major source of military intelligence. It provides good coverage outside the Soviet Bloc, but the capabilities of attachés in countries within the Bloc continue to be drastically restricted by counter-intelligence measures. In view of these basic restrictions, active consideration is being given to training of military attachés in special observation techniques, including photography and recording. Also, an improved program of collection guidance has been initiated to relate attaché activities more directly to urgent requirements. However, these measures will still leave overt collection capabilities far short of being able to meet military intelligence requirements in Soviet Bloc areas. Substantial improvement in military intelligence collection under present personnel, equipment and operating expense limitations will depend upon improved coordination, guidance, and the development of new collection techniques.

4. Overseas Command. Overseas commands continue to be important sources of information on Communist armed forces and war potential within the limitations noted in II–4 and IV.

5. Aerial Reconnaissance. The trend toward exploiting aerial reconnaissance opportunities continues together with improving capabilities. Reconnaissance operations continue to be performed within the framework of policy considerations of other than an intelligence nature. Research and development are producing promising results in equipment and techniques. Establishment of an Army Photo Interpretation Center has been approved.

6. Exploitation of Defectors. Soviet and Satellite defectors as well as East German scientists who, after working under contract in the USSR, were returned to East Germany and defected to the West, continue to provide valuable intelligence on the Soviet Orbit. The rate of defection remains constant. In the last six months, 10 Satellite and 7 Soviet bonafide defectors were received at the Defector Reception Center, Germany, while 28 German scientists were received by the Returnee Exploitation Group. MVD²² defectors Yuri Rastvorov, Nikolai Khokhlov and an unsurfaced lieutenant colonel, and the Polish Security Official, Josef Swiatlo, although defecting early in 1954, made outstanding contributions to U.S. intelligence and psychological warfare programs during this period. The U.S. also received the intelligence benefits from defectors received by various other friendly Western countries.

7. Domestic Collection. This continues to be productive. The possibility of increased travel by private U.S. individuals within the Soviet Union may expand the collection potential of such sources. Further progress has been made in the coordination of the activities of CIA and the military services in the collection of foreign scientific and technical information from U.S. sources within the framework of NSCID #7.²³

8. Foreign Radio Broadcasts. World-wide radio monitoring coverage continues at approximately the same level as a year ago. However, installations have been improved and the processing of monitored material has been further perfected.

9. Foreign Materials and Equipment. Continuing Soviet efforts to increase the export of Bloc products and more extensive Soviet participation in international trade fairs have facilitated the collection of Soviet and Satellite non-military items. There has been a steady increase in the acquisition of factory markings data on Soviet Bloc equipment. With the exploitation of available military equipment nearly completed, emphasis is now directed toward the exploitation of civilian equipment available through commercial channels.

10. Programs in Electronics

a. Monitoring of Radio Jamming. Monitoring of the reception of U.S. broadcasts to the Soviet Bloc, increased under the authority of NSC 169²⁴ by the use of intercept facilities at U.S. embassies behind the Iron Curtain, contributed significantly to VOA and RFE operations, and was therefore accelerated. In addition, a project to locate and collect data on the Soviet radio jamming system has had significant results.

b. Non-Communications Electronic Intercept (ELINT). ELINT collection activities have assisted materially in gathering information on Soviet equipment and systems, including identification of AI radar in operational use and the establishment of the general nature of Soviet navigational systems. Much remains to be done before a satisfactory integration of the U.S. ELINT effort can be achieved. Meanwhile, liaison with foreign activities in this field, primarily those of the UK, has improved.

11. Travel Folder Program. The 1955 schedule for revision of Travel Folders will reflect the priority selections of the entire U.S. intelligence community. It will involve 29 routes and 39 town briefs in the USSR and country questionnaires for 5 Satellites.

12. Foreign Language Publications. Further progress has been made in the coordination of foreign publications procurement, particularly from Communist China, and a greater and speedier flow of publications from that area is expected in 1955.

IV. Covert Collection of Intelligence Relating to the Soviet Bloc

1. During the last six months, clandestine operating conditions within the Soviet Orbit have been affected by two opposed trends—a tightening of internal security measures in both the Far East and Europe on the one hand, and a relaxation of travel restrictions to and from the Orbit on the other. One has made the maintenance of clandestine mechanisms and assets in Communist countries increasingly difficult; the other has opened up new opportunities to exploit legal travellers; i.e., Communist officials who travel in the West and Western officials, businessmen, and students who travel in the Orbit. This legal-traveller program in 1954 resulted in 335 positive intelligence reports.

2. A greater counterespionage effort and closer cooperation with friendly intelligence services have resulted in a heavier flow of both positive and operational data which will make possible a more concentrated effort directed towards Soviet and Satellite personalities and installations abroad. In this connection, the constantly expanding use of technical surveillance facilities to cover Soviet and Satellite installations abroad has been found increasingly valuable. In addition, some new approaches to denied area operations such as ELINT are being further developed.

3. In order to coordinate more effectively intelligence collection with outstanding requirements capabilities, a program designed to give better guidance to the field is being completed. Although an overall increase in the quantity of intelligence is noted, deficiencies in the quality of information and the specific coverage of priority targets still exist.

4. In certain categories, however, the quality of intelligence information obtained on the USSR has improved. Intelligence information of considerable significance has been obtained on Soviet Army tactical doctrine and on modifications thereof for nuclear warfare.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5509 Memoranda, Box 85. Top Secret. NSC 5509, prepared by various U.S. Government agencies for the National Security Council, is described in Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XIX, pp. 58–59 Ellipsis in the original.
2. Superseded by NSC 5501, approved January 7, 1955. The missions of the US intelligence system are reaffirmed in the same words (para. 56). [Footnote in the original. For NSC 162/2, see ibid., 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 577–597. For NSC 5501, “Basic National Security Policy,” January 7, 1955, see ibid., 1955–1957, vol. XIX, pp. 24–39.]
3. See ibid., 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 422.
4. Document 201.
5. See Document 187 and footnote 4 thereto.
6. Not printed. (National Archives, RG 263, Soviet NIE’s, 1950–1955, #68, Box 1)
7. Document 200.
8. NSC 5430, Part 8, “The Foreign Intelligence Program and Related Activities,” dated August 18, 1954, is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5430 Series.
9. Reference is to NIE 11–4–54, September 14, 1954; extracts are in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. VIII, pp. 1235–1238.
10. Reference is to NIE 10–7–54, November 23, 1954; ibid., vol. XIV, pp. 930–944.
11. Reference is to NIE 12–54, August 24, 1954, not printed. (National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 78 D 394, Record Sets of NIE’s SNIE’s)
12. Not found. Soviet capabilities were discussed by the National Security Council on November 4, 1954; see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XIX, p. 25, footnote 5.
13. Reference is to SNIE 11–7A–54, September 14, 1954, not printed. (National Archives, RG 263, Soviet NIE’s, Box 1, # 67)
14. Reference is to NIE 11–6–54, October 5, 1954, not printed. (Ibid., RG 59, INR Historical Files: Lot 78 D 394, Record Sets of NIE’s, SE’s and SNIE’s)
15. The Director of Naval Intelligence notes that the rate of production of air target materials for the highest priority, (all-weather) Navy targets continues to be a matter of concern. The Target Area Analysis Radar (TAAR) is considered to be the most significant piece of target material developed and produced for-all weather, medium to high altitude operations. Between July 1952 and July 1954 the Navy nominated 632 all-weather targets for inclusion in the Air Objectives Folder Program for production of TAAR’s. As of December 1, 1954, TAAR production had not been started for 52%. TAAR production was in process for 22%, and TAAR had been completed for 26%. The TAAR is seldom useful for low-level, all-weather mining but charts can serve adequately where there are steep gradients along the shore. In other cases the capability for conducting these operations is greatly reduced. No intelligence solution appears possible. Low-level, high-speed aircraft missions require special charts for navigation and approach which are not now available. However, such charts are under development. [Footnote in the original.]
16. Iranian Communist Party.
17. Document 191.
18. Not printed. (National Archives, RG 263, Soviet NIE’s, 1950–1955, Box 1)
19. IAC–D–81/6, “Reports of the US/UK Intelligence Conferences on Electronics and Guided Missiles,” January 27, 1955, is not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 85–S00362R, Box 5, Folder 8)
20. Not printed. (Ibid., Transnational Issues Job 79–R00825A, Box 105)
21. Not printed. (Ibid., History Staff, Job 84–00161R, Box 3, Folder 6) It was the basis for Acting Director of Central Intelligence Cabell’s recommendation that the NSC designate CIA to disseminate national intelligence to USIA. His memorandum is in National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSCID’s.
22. Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Soviet foreign intelligence apparatus had been renamed the KGB in 1954.
23. See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 427.
24. NSC 169, “Electro-Magnetic Communications,” October 27, 1953, received final approval by the President on October 22, 1953. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, Serial Master Files of NSC Documents)