144. Memorandum From Secretary of State Acheson and the Director for Mutual Security (Harriman) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)1

SUBJECT

  • Sixth Progress Report on NSC 104/2, “U.S. Policies and Programs in the Economic Field which may Affect the War Potential of the Soviet Bloc”2

REFERENCES

A.
NSC 104/2
B.
Memorandum for NSC from Executive Secretary, “Assignment of Responsibilities for Economic Defense”, dated November 7, 1951,3 transmitting Memorandum by the President on this subject
C.
Memorandum for NSC from Executive Secretary, “Assignment of Responsibilities for Economic Defense”, dated January 25, 19524 transmitting Memorandum of Agreement between the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act

In accordance with the President’s directive on the assignment of responsibilities for economic defense under NSC 104/2 and the memorandum of agreement between the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act, there is submitted herewith the sixth progress report on NSC 104/2.5 It is requested that this be circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

Dean Acheson
6

Appendix II7

RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE FOR ECONOMIC DEFENSE

There are two principal tasks of the intelligence and research underlying the operations and policy formulation of economic defense. [Page 397] One is the task of appraising the overall relative economic capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Soviet bloc and the West in terms of economic defense measures and programs; this is a long range problem of large dimensions. The other task is that of keeping close and continuous touch with current East-West trade patterns and practices and economic developments within the Soviet bloc and the West; this is essential to provide the basic facts on specific relative vulnerabilities for purposes of current economic defense operations and negotiations.

The drafts prepared in connection with the proposed National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 59 represent a systematic attempt to appraise the relative overall vulnerabilities of the Free World and the Soviet bloc. It is clear, however, that the materials available for any accurate appraisal of specific Soviet bloc vulnerabilities are still meager. Furthermore, the analysis of such materials is still in a very early stage of development, and much more work is needed in this important area. Meanwhile, the demands for basic trade analysis and other data needed for day-to-day operations continue to be insistent and continue on the increase. The problem is to plan the work for both the short-run or current operating and policy needs and the broader, longer run needs so as to achieve the maximum benefit for the East-West trade program.

The progress made in recent months in the fields of shipping and foreign trade intelligence for economic defense backstopping is summarized below.

There has been a notable increase in attention given to shipping intelligence, and a number of papers on this subject have been prepared; considerable work remains to be done, however. Included in this effort has been the joint development with the British of an agreed intelligence estimate of the facts concerning trade with Communist China, including the volume of trade and the number and capacity of vessels engaged in the trade.

A second area in which progress has been made in the past several months is the preparation of commodity studies of strategic items entering into East-West trade. In connection with the work of the OIT technical task groups, (see Title II Activities in body of report) CIA and the Department of State prepared, and Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) agencies have to some extent reviewed, commodity analyses of a number of International List II and III items. A few of these studies, on lead, pyrites, electrical machinery, marine boilers and tires and tubes, represented comprehensive analyses. An intensive study of rubber has also been in progress. A great many others, although not comprehensive, represented very considerable efforts in the utilization of available data. The work was extensive and, though not exhaustive because of the time element and competing priorities, represents an important step forward. It is hoped that by the end of 1953 comprehensive analyses will be available on the requirements, production, and [Page 398] trade of the Soviet bloc in each of the major items considered to be of important strategic value to the bloc, particularly those items subject to less-than-embargo control.

The companion project to the commodity studies was initiated early in 1952, and is a series of country-by-country studies analyzing the trade relations between the principal Western European countries and the important Soviet bloc countries with which they trade. Work on these analyses has only begun. The analyses are needed in policy planning on “decreasing reliance” and in implementing the Battle Act, and are aimed at affording policy officers a better factual background in gauging the bargaining positions of the individual countries trading with the Soviet bloc. The analyses would also serve to uncover prospective difficulties before they have come to a head. Given more time, it is sometimes possible to avoid the shipment of strategic goods by a Western country without prejudicing its economic and political position. This intelligence need in the trade field was stressed in the fourth progress report on NSC 104/2.8

To date, two comprehensive bilateral trade studies have been prepared, and three others are in process. These studies involve considerable expenditure of man-hours, but the results justify more work in this field.

In addition to the above analyses, The Department of Commerce has been pursuing two projects in the compilation of trade statistics, in accordance with interdepartmental arrangements made early in 1952. One is the compilation, from published and supplementary trade material, of the trade of each of the significant Free World countries with the Soviet bloc, by country and commodity. Useful reference tables have been issued quarterly on many of these countries and, on others, less frequently. The second part of the project is the collation of classified data which the individual COCOM countries submit monthly on their exports (or licenses granted for export) to the Soviet bloc of items included in the International Lists. The Department of Commerce summaries provide data from which the trends and pattern of this trade can be more readily discerned in certain cases and from which answers to specific commodity or country problems can be developed with much less effort than was formerly required in dealing with the individual monthly reports. This work, which marks an important initial step in the development of the needed statistical base, is being reviewed in an interagency committee.

The Intelligence Working Group (IWG) established under EDAC–IAC sponsorship was quite active in the second half of 1952. [Page 399] The IWG has provided closer working relationships between the intelligence agencies, on one hand, and the policy and operating sections, on the other, with the latter able to indicate directly their needs and to assist in providing necessary background for the work they initiate. Although there is inevitably room for considerable improvement in the treatment of specific problems, the IWG is improving intelligence support of economic defense policy and operations. One of its most significant current projects is the establishment of a unit which will collate the extensive data now being received on Soviet bloc procurement efforts, particularly those efforts which involve evasions of Western economic security controls. The details of the project are not yet fully worked out, but it has been approved in principle.

In conclusion, there should be mentioned the general problem of disseminating National Intelligence to foreign Governments and international bodies. One difficulty which has impeded United States negotiations on economic defense matters could be eliminated by establishing a better procedure so that our negotiators might use the material contained in intelligence documents to maximum advantage. Such use of intelligence is inhibited by the pervasive difficulty of ensuring that security is maintained in the course of using such material. This problem should be explored to determine whether amendments to pertinent NSC directives and other regulations would be desirable.

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, OCB Files, NSC 104, Memoranda 1952–53, Box 61. Secret; Security Information. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates that it was delivered to Lay at the NSC on January 19 by security messenger.
  2. NSC 104/2 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. I, pp. 10591064.
  3. See footnote 4, Document 116.
  4. Ibid.
  5. The 24-page progress report and Appendix 1, Replies from COCOM Countries on Prior Commitments Issue, are attached but not printed.
  6. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. The signature block for the Director of Mutual Security is blank.
  7. Secret; Security Information.
  8. Not printed. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, OCB Files, NSC 104, Memoranda 1952–53, Box 61)