143. Report by the Psychological Strategy Board1
NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1952
[Omitted here is Section I, “Purpose and Framework.”]
II. Summary of Significant Psychological Activities
1. The Board presents below a brief evaluative summary of the status of our national psychological programs as of December 31, 1952, based on the appended Progress Reports of recent significant activities by the departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations.
General Comments
2. U.S. capabilities for psychological action, within the limits of the world power position, are slowly but steadily improving, but they remain inadequate for taking immediately effective psychological action contributing to a retraction of the Kremlin’s power and influence.
[Page 393]3. Progress has been made in planning and coordinating interdepartmental and inter-agency action, in making use of indigenous resources for “gray” or unattributed operations, in building up potentialities for increased “black” or covert activity, and in expanding under existing programs technical facilities for radio broadcasting.
4. Our national psychological effort is at greatest disadvantage in the USSR and Communist China. In these areas, radio broadcasting remains almost the only weapon we are now employing on any significant scale. Even here, Russian jamming presents a very serious problem, although evidence continues to appear that broadcasts are heard by a limited audience on whom they have some effect. In Communist China listening facilities for the masses are severely limited.
5. In the Soviet satellite states of Eastern Europe also, radio broadcasting constitutes the major active element at our disposal. In these countries, too, jamming constitutes an obstacle, although at present a less serious one, perhaps, than in the USSR. In the case of some of the satellites, however, some progress has been made in building up other capabilities for psychological activities.
6. More positive psychological action directed against the Soviet orbit necessarily awaits a greater development of our over-all capabilities, and an accompanying adjustment of our basic national policy. In the present interim position, until a more aggressive strategic concept becomes feasible, psychological planning and programming against the orbit has gone ahead on the basis of doing everything possible to aggravate its internal conflicts in the hope that this will subsequently help to bring about a retraction of Kremlin control and influence.
7. U.S. psychological programs outside the Iron Curtain, where the major portion of the national psychological effort has been applied, have moved with moderate success toward the achievement of our objectives in certain areas. The psychological impact of American aid programs has, despite some difficulties, in most respects been favorable. With regard to the psychological problems arising from the large numbers of American personnel abroad, considerable progress has been made in respect to U.S. troops. Some progress is recorded toward meeting the “neutralist” menace. The US–UN stand against forcible repatriation of Korean prisoners of war has gained general acceptance with good psychological effect. There is closer and more effective cooperation between the various agencies carrying out American psychological programs abroad, and steadily increasing recognition of the role of psychological operations in world affairs.
Related Activities
8. Certain related activities are covered in a specially classified section of this report, Annex C.
[Page 394]Area Summary
9. In Western Europe there have been set-backs, such as the delay in ratification of the European Defense Community accords and the decision of the European member governments to cut their defense contributions under NATO. But the over-all picture contains bright elements as well. The reports of all PSB reporting agencies indicate that, as 1952 ends, communism is on a slow but definitely perceptible decline (with the possible exception of Italy). Furthermore, there is agreement that U.S. psychological programs have made an effective if modest contribution to this decline. Communism remains the major long-term threat, of course; but other forces tending to disrupt free world solidarity, and other forms of anti-Americanism, such as “neutralism,” constitute more immediate problems.
10. In the Middle East the picture is not so bright. Iran is an obvious danger spot and a classic example of the difficulties and potential dangers confronting the continued existence of freedom in countries where extreme nationalism exists as a major problem in itself, and one that is aggravated and complicated by the fact that it can be easily inflamed and exploited by communism. Tension arising from some of the same elements that are found in Iran is growing in Iraq. In both these cases, as in the other Arab countries of the area, it can not be confidently asserted that there has been progress in the psychological field. In North Africa, nationalist ferment presents increasingly complex problems of a psychological character, rendered more acute by the presence of important American air bases within the area.
11. This does not mean, however, that the picture in the Middle East is entirely dark. Favorable effects continue from such psychological initiatives as the Mecca airlift, and the visit of the Fleet to the area. Our economic and military aid programs, and their active psychological exploitation, have produced good results, particularly in Turkey, which represents an encouragingly stable and friendly factor.
12. In South and Southeast Asia, all the problems and potential dangers in the situation are still present; but from the reports emerges the impression that gradually U.S. capabilities for holding our own in the psychological struggle there are being improved. Both on the overt information side and in non-attributable activities significant gains have been registered, particularly in the Philippines, Indo-China, and Thailand. In the Indian sub-Continent too, slow progress continues. Wise exploitation of the psychological possibilities of our aid programs, the agreement to extend military aid to Pakistan, and U.S. acceptance in the UN of the Indian Resolution on Korea—subsequently rejected out of hand by the Soviet bloc—have all had a favorable effect.
13. In the Far East, psychological activities are steadily if slowly expanding. A psychological plan to deal with the problems raised by the [Page 395] presence of U.S. troops in Japan is now being prepared. Better use is being made of Japanese indigenous organizations and other resources in combatting communism. New psychological activities under the Far East Command include moves to build up escape operations in Korea and strengthen and improve the organization responsible for unconventional warfare. A number of psychological programs designed to take advantage of the proximity of U.S. and communist forces in Korea have been undertaken. Efforts to penetrate Red China were being slowly developed, with a significant increase in leaflet dropping, radio broadcasting, and some other activities of a non-attributable nature.
14. In Latin America, likewise, the spread of communism and the growing threat of Peronism have led us to increase our capabilities for combatting these and other anti-American forces. Overt information efforts are combining with TCA aid programs and non-attributable activities on an increasing scale. It is evident from current reports, however, that more will be required before we can take care of the dual Communist-Peronista threat to hemisphere unity.
Special Problems
15. Coordinated efforts of all the departments and agencies concerned had, by the year’s end, been undertaken to minimize the impact of the communist germ warfare charges. Similarly, the Soviet “Hate America” campaign, as well as the so-called Campaign of Peace, seem to be declining in effectiveness outside the Iron Curtain, thanks, in part at least, to persistent and better-coordinated U.S. efforts to counteract them. The long-term implications of these campaigns remain serious, however. There are manifest indications of the effectiveness of the “Hate America” campaign inside the Iron Curtain countries, and the need for more effective counter measures continues great.
16. Major psychological problems continue to be raised by our commercial and immigration policies. The repercussions of our trade and tariff restrictions tend in some countries to diminish the psychological effects of our economic aid programs. The restrictions on immigration and the complications of our visa policy continue to offset some of the best efforts of our psychological operations.
17. Quietly effective use appears to have been made of the psychological possibilities inherent in our development of novel atomic and other weapons.
[Omitted here are Section III, “The Work of PSB,” and the annexes.]
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333, PSB D–35. Top Secret; Security Information. Annex A, Report of the Department of State; Annex B, Report of the Department of Defense; Annex C, Report of the Central Intelligence Agency; and Annex D, Report of the Mutual Security Agency, are not printed. Annex C was specially classified and was not found. A covering note, which reads, “This report was approved by the Board at its Seventeenth Meeting, January 15, 1953,” was signed by Secretary to the Board Charles E. Johnson.↩