Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

139. Paper Prepared by the Psychological Strategy Board¹

PSB D–31

Washington, November 26, 1952.

A STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR A NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAM WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO COLD WAR OPERATIONS UNDER NSC 10/5²

1. Almost all governmental policies and actions have psychological content in that they bear on the minds and wills of other peoples. An attempt to formulate a national psychological strategy covering every intention and action having psychological impact in this sense would encompass every aspect of governmental activity. This would be an effort of unmanageable proportions. In order to formulate a national psychological strategy that will usefully subserve the national policy it is necessary to divide the task into separate aspects of manageable proportions. When we ask, “What can usefully be said about ways and means of bringing about a retraction of Soviet power and influence?” we have selected one such aspect and have stated it in such a way that we can perhaps deal with it. The following does not attempt to deal with the problems involved in the distribution of resources between cold war operations and preparations in support of overt war.

2. NSC 10/5, paragraph 1, approved “the intensification of covert operations designed in general order of emphasis to:

a. Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power, including the relationships between the USSR, its satellites and Communist China; and when and where appropriate in the light of U.S. and Soviet capabilities and the risk of war, contribute to the retraction and reduction of Soviet power and influence to limits which no longer constitute a threat to U.S. security.

b. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the peoples and nations of the free world, and increase their capacity and will to resist Soviet domination.

c. Develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guerrilla operations in strategic areas to the maximum practicable extent consistent with 1-a above.2026.…”

3. NSC 10/5, paragraph 2, directed “the Psychological Strategy Board to assure that its strategic concept for a national psychological program includes provision for covert operations designed to achieve the objectives in paragraph 1 above.”

4. It is the object of this paper to outline a strategic concept for a national psychological program with particular reference to cold war operations under NSC 10/5. These operations are primarily covert in character, but we believe a paper addressed to such operations will provide a concept valuable to overt psychological operations under NSC 59/1 as well, especially those which are concerned with bringing about the retraction of Soviet power and influence.

5. The general objective of psychological operations in the cold war can be subsumed under the general heading of contributing to the “retraction and reduction of Soviet power and influence” whether by operations designed to weaken Soviet power in the Communist orbit or by operations designed to weaken Soviet influence by strengthening the free world.

6. Our national strategy, as defined in NSC 20/4,³ paragraph 20, is to “endeavor to achieve our general objectives by methods short of war.” This national strategy calls for efforts to “encourage and promote the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present perimeter areas around traditional Russian boundaries …; to eradicate the myth by which people remote from Soviet military influence are held in a position of subservience to Moscow …; (and) to create situations which will compel the Soviet government to recognize the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present concepts…”

7. In the absence of open hostilities, the cold war can be expected to continue in one form or another as long as the Soviet Union, which is to say, the Bolshevik Party, adheres to the aims and methods which it has pursued ever since its accession to power, within as well as outside the Party. Recognition of this—particularly public recognition—is necessary for understanding and support of continuity of effort. The overthrow of the Party by war or successful revolution appears to be the only certain means of forcing such changes. One is excluded, and the other so far beyond our current capabilities as to be presently unfeasible.

8. We are unable at present to propose a strategic concept which outlines a program designed to bring about a final solution of the cold war because (a) we do not have and cannot clearly foresee the time when we will have the capabilities, and (b), because without adequate capabilities the risks involved are clearly disproportionate to the probabilities of success. The time required to develop the necessary capabilities is so great that the nature of an acceptable solution cannot be determined with sufficient accuracy to serve as a guide. As our capabilities increase, flexibility and opportunism in the light of events appear presently more desirable than commitment to too specific a goal.

9. We should continue to develop our capabilities for assisting revolution and continue to re-appraise the situation. This will require both the development of further capabilities for the exploitation of existing techniques and a major program for the development of new techniques and approaches. It is possible that the cumulative effect of retraction of Soviet power and influence, together with future events and the inherent problems with which the Soviet government and the Bolshevik Party are faced may eventually bring about sufficient change in their aims and methods to provide an acceptable solution. Efforts to develop our capabilities and to bring about such a retraction as opposed to a program for a definitive solution may be regarded as the interim strategic concept for a national psychological program.

10. Within the limits imposed by the terms of our national strategy and the present level of our covert capabilities it is possible to advance certain general criteria for operations under 10/5, to test broad fields of possible covert action against these criteria, and from a combination of the two to give more precise form to the psychological operations which should be prosecuted in accordance with the interim strategic concept, and to provide an indication of priorities. Overt propaganda should give appropriate support in accordance with priorities as may be determined.

11. The general criteria which present covert operations under the interim strategic concept should meet are those of effectiveness, feasibility, acceptable risk, and flexibility.

a. Effectiveness: The importance of the effects which successful operations may be calculated to have in reducing Soviet influence and power or in strengthening the free world against the exertion of Soviet influence and power must be appreciable and must warrant the effort, cost and risk of the operation. In general, priorities should be proportional to anticipated effectiveness.

b. Feasibility: Our capabilities in terms of trained manpower or material, and local or international support, must be adequate to give reasonable promise of success to the operation in the face of such capabilities as the Communists may have to frustrate it.

c. Acceptable risk: The degree to which the undertaking or successful conclusion of the operations may be calculated to provoke military reaction from the Communists must be sufficiently limited as to be an acceptable risk in terms of our national strategy.

d. Flexibility: Operations should be of a type which lend themselves within reasonable limits to adaptation or modification to exploit such opportunities or undertake such objectives as may become possible or advisable subsequent to actual initiation of the operation.

12. There is a wide range of activity currently in process to bring about the retraction of Soviet power and influence which should continue. Many of these activities, although in themselves incapable of producing clear and incontrovertible gains, are of great value in supporting overt policies which can be expected to be effective. Omission from the following discussion of many existing projects, does not imply that they are not considered of value, but rather that the approved projects should continue as presently conceived and planned, insofar as they meet the above criteria.

13. Within the field of cold war covert operations, it is considered that greatest emphasis should be placed upon the following broad fields of activity, not necessarily in order of priority:

a. Weakening of Kremlin control over the internal assets of the Soviet-controlled bloc, and increasingly occupying the Kremlin with problems within this area.

b. Direct action to reduce subversive Soviet influence in those areas of the free world that are most immediately threatened thereby.

c. Covert manipulation of key elements in unstable countries of the free world to increase the stability and utility to the objectives of U.S. foreign policy of those countries.

14. Within these three broad fields of activity, the following categories meet the criteria outlined above and should be given greater emphasis than they are currently receiving. Detailed studies may reveal that effective action within some of these categories is beyond our capabilities. Also, events will undoubtedly indicate the desirability of concentration on other lines of effort. This will require continuous review of interim strategic policy.

a. Disintegration of Communist Parties Outside the Iron Curtain. Communist parties in the free world are principal vehicles for Soviet subversion. They are also much more accessible to us than are those within the Iron Curtain. By a combination of covert and overt action their effectiveness can be appreciably reduced and in some areas totally nullified. Some of the means that can be employed are (a) reduction of financial support, (b) penetration and exposure, (c) instigation of internal conflicts and dissensions among individuals and groups, (d) outlawing of local parties, (e) legal action of all types against individuals and groups, (f) promotion of ideological deviations, (g) creating and intensifying difficulties with local governments and public opinion.

Individual priority studies should be made by CIA of the detailed methods which can be most effectively employed against the CPs in France, Italy, India, Japan, Iran, and Guatemala, and an appraisal of the probable over-all effectiveness of such an effort should be made for each of those countries.

A special study should be made by CIA, similar in scope, directed towards disintegrating the influence of the CP and individual communists on the present Argentine government.

b. Detachment of Albania. Because of Albania’s unique geographical position, its detachment from the Soviet orbit may be feasible. The principal advantage gained would be its psychological effects both in subjugated countries and in areas under intense Soviet pressure, although there would also be useful additional by-products of a military nature, especially as regards the position of Yugoslavia and Greece. It would be a demonstration that a continuing Soviet advance is not inevitable and that a retraction of Soviet power is practically possible. A preliminary estimate indicates that detachment could be accomplished by Albanian personnel and without the overt participation of Western military forces.

A detailed plan should be made [less than 1 line not declassified] covering each step in such action up to its successful completion, including time phasing and all logistic aspects. Estimates should be made of personnel and material requirements, together with plans for meeting them. Detailed appraisal should be made of the probable degree of secrecy that could be maintained throughout [1½ lines not declassified]. The extent to which preliminary disorganizing of the Albanian economy would contribute to the success of the operation should be appraised.

If such studies continue to indicate feasibility, the State Department should investigate the feasibility and effectiveness of obtaining the acquiescence or the active support of Great Britain as well as Yugoslavia, Greece and Italy, together with the practicability of reaching agreements on political objectives which would preclude such future difficulties as efforts at domination by these neighboring countries. The necessity of recognition of such a revolutionary government should be appraised, and the necessity, feasibility and timing of overt economic and logistic assistance, together with its amount and cost.

c. Breeding Suspicion and Dissension Within the Communist System.

The inherent suspicion and lack of mutual trust and confidence within the communist system and our own experience in exploiting them gives grounds for belief that we would be able to increase this suspicion far beyond what we have hitherto accomplished, to the point of systematic removal or elimination of personnel in important and effective positions. The communist reservoir of able and experienced personnel is not unlimited, and individuals of demonstrated power and effectiveness would be excellent targets. Many techniques are available to apply to these ends, but our access to and knowledge of conditions within the satellites indicate that the best chances of success would be obtained by breeding distrust among satellite personnel and between those individuals and Moscow, although such efforts within the Soviet Union should be included to the maximum of our capabilities. It should be noted that this category involves a narrower objective than broad attempts to disrupt the system by a variety of means other than marking individuals for suspicion and distrust. It has a definite relationship to and should be correlated with the defective program.

[1 paragraph (1½ lines) not declassified]

d. Efforts Directed Towards Disruption of Soviet and European Satellite Economies [less than 1 line not declassified].

The special vulnerabilities of the Soviet economic system are subject to exploitation on a strategic basis. Such exploitation can be used to produce a reduction in economic and military potential and indirectly to bring about the defection of key Communist officials. [2 lines not declassified]

(1) [1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

(2) Covert activities against illegal trade channels still offer possibilities of effecting further appreciable reduction in the volume of imports of strategic commodities into the Soviet orbit, [1 line not declassified].

(3) A wide range of passive economic sabotage activities may be undertaken by Eastern Europeans under present conditions with relative safety. If the incentive of self-interest is added, effectiveness of such a program would be increased [2 lines not declassified].

(4) [1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

e. Covert Political Action to Strengthen Critical Free World Areas Against Developments Which Might be Favorable to Communist Objectives.

Covert action in this category, directed largely toward covert manipulation of key individuals, should be designed to shore up and orient favorably to U.S. interests the governments of areas which are critical to U.S. interests and which are in danger of developing regimes or conditions inimical to U.S. interests. Egypt, Iran, Japan, India and certain Latin American countries should receive priority in this category.⁴ Operations on Formosa and among the Overseas Chinese, directed towards broadening the base of support of the Chinese Nationalist Government would also fall into this category.

[1½ lines not declassified] should make concrete correlated proposals within the foregoing framework.

Recommendations

1. It is recommended that the progressive retraction and reduction of Soviet power and influence in accordance with our capabilities and subject to the limitation of acceptable risk be accepted as the interim strategic concept for a national psychological program with particular reference to cold war operations under NSC 10/5.

2. It is recommended that the responsible agencies place greatest emphasis in these operations on the three broad fields of activity identified in paragraph 13 above. This recommendation is without prejudice to those arrangements now in effect whereby a responsible agency is to make preparations for activities after D-Day in support of approved war plans.

3. It is recommended that the responsible agencies give priority within those broad fields to determining the detailed practicability and desirability of proceeding along the lines indicted under each category described in paragraph 14 above. It is further recommended that where such studies indicate that the foregoing criteria will be met, the indicated actions be given priority in both national and agency programs proportionate to their probable effectiveness.

4. It is also recommended that our covert capabilities continue to be developed with increasing vigor along all lines whose eventual employment may be expected to bring about more drastic reductions in Soviet power and influence.

5. It is also recommended that this interim strategic concept be kept under continuous review, and revised in the light of future developments at least annually and also as additional categories of action appear to meet the specified criteria.

Feasibility of Logistic Support

Acceptance of this concept is without prejudice to later logistic feasibility testing by the Department of Defense of specific courses of action which would require logistic support of that Department.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333, PSB D–31. Top Secret; Security Information. A draft of this paper was sent to Under Secretary of State Bruce, Deputy Secretary of Defense Foster, and Director of Central Intelligence Smith on August 20 by the Director of the PSB, who described the paper as the product of half a year’s work by a high level group under Admiral Stevens. (Ibid.) In analyzing the paper for Bruce in an August 26 memorandum, Nitze stated that the chief virtue of the paper was a negative: “it admits inability … to propose a strategic concept which outlines a program designed to bring about a final solution of the cold war.” (Ibid.) Nitze had made this same point to Stevens in a December 5, 1951, meeting (see Document 96). All ellipses in the original.
2. In accordance with Presidential Directive of 4 April 1951, which establishes the PSB as responsible for the formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the departments and agencies represented for psychological operations of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and programs, and which defines psychological operations as including all activities under NSC 59/1 and 10/2. [Footnote in the original. For the Presidential Directive, see Document 60. For the text of NSC 59/1, see Document 2. For NSC 10/2, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 292. For NSC 10/5, see Document 90.]
3. For NSC 20/4, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. I, Part 2, pp. 662–669.
4. The priority for these countries shall not be at the expense of continuing efforts in Germany, Italy and France. [Footnote in the original.]