Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

96. Notes of a Meeting¹

Washington, December 5, 1951.

SUBJECT

• Psychological Strategy Board

PRESENT

• S/P—
• Mr. Nitze
• Mr. Ferguson (part)
• Mr. Savage
• Mr. Koch
• Mr. Marshall
• Miss Fosdick
• Mr. Tufts
• Mr. Stelle
• Mr. Villard
• Mr. Watts
• PSB—Admiral Stevens
• PSB—Mr. Philbin
• C—Mr. Bohlen (part)
• P—Mr. Phillips
• P—Mr. Schwinn
• R—Mr. Trezise
• S—Mr. Compton

Admiral Stevens opened the meeting by saying he was chairman of a small group in PSB charged with “formulating a national strategic concept for psychological action” as called for in the directive establishing the PSB and as envisioned in NSC 59/1 and NSC 10/2 which include both covert and overt propaganda activities.

Mr. Nitze said he thought the covert and overt activities should be kept separate.

Admiral Stevens said that people were worried today because they felt that our foreign policy was “gone at piecemeal—on a hand to mouth basis” with no over-all strategic concept. A strategic concept, he said was a “point of view—a tentative plan of action, always under review but not rigid” and he thought that such a concept or plan should be put down on paper, difficult as it might be to do.

A discussion ensued about the difficulties of getting “everything down” in NSC papers and the danger of parts being lifted out of context to fit particular situations.

Admiral Stevens said that, at present, NSC papers are the only approved guides to national policy and cited the NSC paper on the U.S.S.R. in which the policy of reducing the threat of Soviet power and influence is set forth. How far, he asked, do you have to reduce the power and influence to have meaning. The fomenting of revolution within the U.S.S.R. is to be treated separately because the U.S. is not prepared for such an undertaking and would have no assurance of success, but in order to form an over-all concept it has to be considered.

Admiral Stevens referred to the PSB paper dated 15 November, entitled National Psychological Strategy,² which had been sent to the Department informally the previous week. He said it was only a working draft intended to evince reactions from State and CIA. What he’d like, would be to have Bohlen, Nitze, Joyce and Wisner get together and see if they couldn’t come up with a “central strategic concept.”

Mr. Nitze suggested that perhaps it would be better to start at the narrowest part of the problem, i.e. how to reduce the threat of Soviet power and influence.

Admiral Stevens said that the PSB draft was an attempt to outline the steps necessary to create a central strategic concept and that NSC 10/5³ was a “holding operation” which he defined as “placing the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power.”

Mr. Nitze pointed out that “maximum strain” were meaningless words—that we should get down to the concrete.

Admiral Stevens returned to the PSB draft and said that what State had been asked for was (a) its point of view about creating revolutions in the satellites, (b) what political actions would be undertaken for the holding operation set forth in NSC 10/5, and (c) what could be accomplished by other actions including propaganda controlled by State.

Mr. Nitze again urged that we take a concrete problem such as the retraction and reduction of Soviet power and influence. This is one policy objective of the U.S. Government but not the sum total of U.S. policy—there are a whole hierarchy of objectives. It would be fine if Soviet power would retract but as you get down to accomplishing this you get into many complex problems. Stimulating a revolution in the U.S.S.R. is not now a current practical objective.

Admiral Stevens said a statement to this effect should be put out and approved by the NSC. OPC needs this kind of a statement as part of a central concept.

Mr. Bohlen said there is no single policy but a multiplicity of policies like the multiplicity of dots which make the whole image on a radarscope. He said he wasn’t clear how a central concept would be helpful—we should look at specific areas—Albania, for example. There are many serious complications which flow from creating a revolution in any satellite country.

Mr. Nitze said he felt that we should develop our capabilities in the covert field as far as possible. We should move up in successive first approximations on an area by area, technique by technique basis.

Admiral Stevens agreed with the area by area approach and said that OPC must then come in with what it is capable of doing. He said he realized that a central concept wouldn’t solve all our problems but that we ought to try to put one down on paper.

Mr. Bohlen suggested that it might be possible to take specific areas such as East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc., and assuming that we had certain covert action capabilities, take a look at what the political implications of such actions would be. At the same time we might select certain areas and assuming the existence of favorable political factors have OPC determine what their covert capabilities were. Then the two determinations might be married.

Mr. Nitze said he worried about theoretical situations. Where there existed a clear problem with concrete possibilities of accomplishing something, this approach might be OK, but taking a series of hypothetical situations and trying to see through all the branching implications and reactions would be a negative exercise.

Admiral Stevens said that some of the fringe areas around the U.S.S.R. are vulnerable and we should look carefully to see what can be done. He said OPC was capable of carrying out several simultaneous operations if it seemed desirable to do so.

Mr. Bohlen said that Wisner needs to know the general direction in which we want to proceed so that he can lay out his plans and have his agents prepared. Therefore, we should take a look at individual areas.

Admiral Stevens said it still gets back to a central strategic concept. Put down on paper that we don’t want to create a revolution in the U.S.S.R. as well as some of the “lesser things” we do want to do. It will just be an approximation to be used as guidelines for PSB and OPC.

Mr. Nitze again emphasized the difficulty of setting forth general principles until you get down to specific problems. There is always the danger that people will think that by having broad principles lots of specific problems will be solved.

Admiral Stevens said he still thought that we’d make the biggest advance if State would undertake to respond to the request in the PSB paper.

Mr. Nitze said he thought that joint work with OPC and PSB was called for so that everyone would be clear on the dimensions of the problem and just what was to be accomplished. He suggested that we address ourselves to the specific question of the retraction and reduction of Soviet power and influence. He said he could envisage a paper broken down somewhat as follows:

a. Reduction and retraction of Soviet power to acceptable proportions over a 10-year period.

b. Any thought of revolution in the U.S.S.R. must come at the end of the 10-year period.

c. Reduction of Soviet power in the Satellites in the near term.

d. The development of techniques to accomplish a, b, and c.

This is a first approximation and should be kept under continuing review.

Admiral Stevens said he would like to have a “good” State Department man sit with his committee to coordinate the responses to the PSB paper.

Mr. Nitze replied that taking responses and putting them together wouldn’t work—what was needed was joint work by State, OPC, and PSB.

There followed an inconclusive discussion of the term “psychological strategy”, during which Mr. Nitze pointed out the dangers involved in trying to marry propaganda and covert operations. They should be kept separate and made concrete and definable.

Admiral Stevens returned to the PSB paper and asked if State could put anything on paper which would be helpful—could it, for instance, redraft the three requests made of it?

Mr. Nitze said he considered the framework of the paper wrong. It appeared that the retraction and reduction of Soviet power and influence was the “be all” and “end all” of our policy. If this phase of our policy could be taken as a specific problem and so addressed, he thought we could come up with something useful. He ended the meeting by saying that we would get together with someone from OPC and PSB and try to map out a course of action.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563, Political and Psychological Warfare. Top Secret. Drafted by Phillip H. Watts, Executive Secretary of the Policy Planning Staff.
2. A copy is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 100.4–PSB/5–1551.
3. Document 90.