Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

111. Memorandum From Robert P. Joyce of the Policy Planning Staff to the Under Secretary of State (Bruce)¹

Washington, May 22, 1952.

SUBJECT

• Magnitude of CIA Operations

It occurred to me that you might be interested in some sort of recapitulation of the points brought out in the meeting in your office yesterday afternoon in connection with today’s meeting of the PSB. There are one or two new elements in the situation that came out of the regular Wednesday meeting of the 10/2 Consultants yesterday afternoon. (I did not attend this meeting myself but my representative, William A. McFadden, reported to me this morning.) The two new elements are:

1. Assistant Director of CIA for OPC, Colonel Johnston, stated that if the PSB tomorrow (today) generally bought the CIA “Packet”,² OPC would consider that it had finally obtained a charter which would permit it to expand in a large way and start creating on a world-wide basis an impressive covert apparatus necessary to accomplish the requirements laid upon OPC of CIA. Colonel Johnston indicated that favorable action today by the PSB would have CIA budgetary significance as well. The implication of this is that the CIA could move forward to obtain the vast amount specified in the “Packet”.

2. General Balmer of the Joint Strategic Plans Division advised at the meeting yesterday that the JCS had finally approved the OPC “war plan”³ and would communicate such approval with its comments within about one week.

In connection with paragraph one above, there is quoted an excerpt from a memorandum presented to the Senior Staff of the NSC on June 8, 1951 by Frank G. Wisner:⁴

“Unless the decision is made now to provide the resources and apparatus capable of undertaking covert operations of this magnitude, the United States will not be in a position to conduct such covert activities as national policy may require. Therefore, failure to reach a decision at this time is in effect a decision not to proceed with the build-up required to implement current national policy as expressed in NSC 68 and other applicable NSC directives”.

I think you might desire to keep in mind the following considerations at the PSB meeting this afternoon:

a. Paragraph 5 of NSC 10/2 of June 18, 1948⁵ states: “As used in this directive ‘covert operations’ are understood to be all activities (except as noted herein) which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly states or groups but which are so planned and executed that the United States Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and if uncovered the United States Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.…” The question might reasonably be asked General Smith if present plans to create a very large “covert apparatus” can possibly meet the requirements of the foregoing provisions of NSC 10/2. Will not large CIA bases on a world-wide scale soon be recognized for what they are? Will it not be impossible under these circumstances for this Government plausibly to disclaim any responsibility?

b. Although NSC 10/2 authorizes OPC “in coordination with the JCS to plan and prepare for the conduct of such operations in wartime”, will not in fact the establishment of large bases for training guerrilla warriors and for staging air drops behind the lines in case of war, etc., have important political repercussions in peacetime?

c. If the CIA proceeds to establish such large and necessarily at least semi-overt bases throughout the world, all in the line of preparations for a hot war, will not the impression be created in the Kremlin that this Government is busily preparing to attack the Soviet Union? Will not the Russians point to these large and populous bases as evidence to support their thesis that the United States intends to unleash a global war against the motherland of the workers? Will not our allies in the West react unfavorably and themselves be fearful that the United States is in fact preparing perhaps not to bring about a war but at least engaging in provocative action which might inspire reaction from the East leading to increasing danger of war?

d. Does General Smith himself think that he can create a huge “covert apparatus” on a world-wide basis which has any chance whatever of maintaining its covert nature?

e. How effective does General Smith consider the retardation plan would be in case of a hot war? Does problematical assistance to the military effort in case of a hot war over-balance the moral and psychological factors referred to in the previous paragraphs?

f. By generally approving of the “Packet” does the Department of State endorse in a blanket fashion JCS and CIA plans for preparing for a hot war?

g. Is it a fact, as we understood General Smith to believe a year ago, that CIA planning for a hot war de-emphasizes and limits the effectiveness of CIA as an intelligence agency and an agency designed to operate covertly in the field of political warfare for the ultimate objective of achieving cold war objectives thus lessening the chances of and perhaps preventing the outbreak of all-out warfare?

I believe that these questions trouble us here in the State Department. You may care to recommend that some of these considerations should be studied by the 10/5 Panel before it recommends to the PSB that the CIA “Packet” should at this time be generally approved.

Robert P. Joyce

1. Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files: NSC 10 Series, 1952. Top Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Joyce. Copy 1 of 6. A handwritten note on memorandum reads “Copies 3, 4 and 5, sent to, seen by & returned by, Nitze, Sargeant and Armstrong—destroyed on 9.11.53.” All elipses in the original.
2. See footnote 7, Document 107.
3. Document 61.
4. Not found.
5. For NSC 10/2, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 292.