Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

110. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Intelligence and Research (Armstrong) to Secretary of State Acheson¹

Washington, May 9, 1952.

SUBJECT

• Progress Report on NSC 50:² The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence

The subject report represents General Smith’s account of his stewardship of the Central Intelligence Agency since he assumed office in October 1950; I believe that you will want to read it in full.³ It sets forth the considerable accomplishments of CIA during this period, the major problems which remain to be solved and a caveat as to what may be reasonably expected of the U.S. intelligence system, given the efficiency of the Soviet security organization. I would recommend that you compliment General Smith on the report and on the progress it records, which in a very large measure is attributable to his personal leadership.

There are three points to which your attention should be drawn and which may be discussed in connection with the review of this Progress Report:

1. Covert Operations. You will observe that General Smith lays considerable stress on the greatly increased scope of this phase of CIA’s responsibilities (page 3, paragraph 4), pointing out that in the coming year the [2 lines not declassified]. While it would be undesirable to take exception to the preview given by General Smith of increased activities in this field, it would be well to indicate, in connection with this paragraph of the Progress Report, that the Department, for its part, is constantly seeking to evaluate the effects of covert CIA operations in terms of overall U.S. objectives and in the light of changing international conditions.

2. Departmental Information. General Smith states on page 4 that arrangements whereby CIA obtains information on the Department’s planning and policy “are reasonably satisfactory, although there remains room for betterment.” (Similar arrangements with the military services are described as “somewhat less than satisfactory.”) You should know that since the issuance of NSC 50 on July 1, 1949, the Department has made intensive efforts to make available to CIA all information believed to be of concern to it. The Secretariat furnishes to CIA by rapid means a most comprehensive selection of the Department’s telegrams, including telegrams of a policy nature. Similar non-telegraphic materials are furnished through one of my divisions. In addition, a representative of CIA/OPC has access in Mr. Joyce’s office to the complete file of messages comparable to your daily “log”, save only those items deleted by Mr. Joyce. Finally, arrangements have been made whereby certain highly sensitive materials identified as of interest to intelligence, such as the record of your recent conversations with the British Ambassador regarding Indochina, are made available by my office to the Director of Central Intelligence for highly-limited CIA internal distribution. In view of the nature of the planning and policy-making process, and the high degree of security required, it is very doubtful that intelligence will ever be fully satisfied with the state of its information in this regard.

On the other hand, you should be aware that the flow of information described above is by no means reciprocated by CIA. Planning and operational data are made available only as CIA determines that the Department’s interests are affected. Some information of direct concern to the Department is not made available and access to CIA telegrams, which would provide a check on the adequacy of CIA’s practices in this regard, is not permitted.

3. Current Intelligence. The Department has some reservations on the discussion in the report of “current intelligence”, to which General Smith makes brief reference on page 1. The Dulles–Jackson Correa report of January 1949,⁴ on which NSC 50 is based, took exception to the various current intelligence summaries (daily, weekly, and monthly) which were then being published by CIA. The Committee questioned the need for such publications, pointing out that they consisted almost entirely of summaries of departmental telegrams (90 percent State), including both operational and intelligence material. The result, according to the Committee, was “a fragmentary publication which deals with operations as well as intelligence, without necessarily being based on the most significant materials in either category.” The Committee concluded that (a) “in a summary of this type, circulated to the President and the highest officials of the Government, there is an inherent danger that it will be misleading to its consumers”; and (b) it duplicates at considerable expense of manpower and money, summaries circulated by the Department and other agencies.

The production of these summaries has been improved and it is our understanding that the President finds them of great value which, in itself, is reason for a continued effort in their production. The Department, however, still finds many of the same objections that existed in 1949 and itself finds the summaries of little value. In particular, we are concerned that the summaries frequently are the vehicle whereby foreign policy problems, with CIA comment, are brought to the attention of high officials of other agencies and the President, during the period when policy recommendations are being formulated and before the Department is prepared to suggest courses of action. We believe that with due regard for timeliness the provision of certain current intelligence to the President and to the operating agencies of the Government could and should be based on the same principles of contribution and coordination among the agencies as is now effected with respect to National Intelligence Estimates.

Recommendations:

1. That you warmly commend General Smith on this report and on the leadership he has brought to the Intelligence community.

2. That you state, with reference to CIA covert operations, that the Department, for its part, is constantly seeking to evaluate the effects of covert CIA operations in terms of over-all U.S. objectives and in the light of changing international conditions.

3. That, if the question is raised regarding the furnishing to CIA of information from the Department, you invite General Smith to suggest ways in which the existing liaison could be improved, bearing in mind that (a) his principal problem appears to be with the Pentagon and (b) the flow of information from CIA likewise leaves something to be desired.

4. That, if the question is raised regarding current intelligence, you indicate that, while you recognize such publications are necessary and appropriate for the President, you believe they would serve a more useful purpose if the principles of contribution and coordination which apply to National Intelligence were applied insofar as possible to current intelligence.

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 50 Series. Top Secret. Concurred in by G, S/P, and C. Transmitted through the Under Secretary and the Executive Secretariat.
2. For NSC 50, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 384.
3. Document 107.
4. For a summary of the Dulles Report, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 358.