Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume VIII

893.00/11–1449: Telegram

The Consul General at Shanghai (McConaughy) to the Secretary of State

Shanghai, November 14, 1949—2 p. m.
[Received 12:29 p. m.]

4782. Reference recent Contéis regarding Soviet relations with new regime, including especially 4329, October 14 and 4501, October 24.⁵⁷

Past 7 weeks’ fanfare over Chinese Communist–Soviet love, as witnessed Shanghai in exhausting orgy of public demonstrations (celebrating establishment new regime, Soviet recognition, “International Peace Day”, PLA military victories, recent visit Soviet Cultural Delegation and October Revolution⁵⁸) and in press publicity propaganda crescendo which accompanied them, leaves no doubt that, at least from standpoint officially manifested policy and other surf ace signs, Communist China’s advent to nationhood on basis all-out friendship cooperation with Soviet international leadership has been impressively fulfilled. Beneath the display, however, there have been various undertones and indications in disharmony with superficial picture:

1. While Soviet Cultural Delegation’s visit stimulated officially sponsored machinery and programs for propagandizing Sino-Soviet solidarity, weight of evidence indicates that from viewpoint immediate popular feeling, it aggravated rather than improved relations. Sudden unexplained departure of delegation leader, Fadeyev, for Moscow few hours after his arrival Shanghai mystified Chinese circles who suspected it meant Kremlin displeasure over some faux pas made in Peiping (local Russian sources unknown reliability that offense consisted in loud drunken toast “down with Anglo-Saxons” at large Peiping function). Other four or five top delegates seem to have impressed their Shanghai-Chinese hosts fairly favorably, but delegation’s forty-odd lesser personnel (Red Army troupe and other artistic performers, five workers, etc.) were apparently regarded as rather mediocre crude types. Has been widespread criticism of delegation for lavishness of its hotel accommodations and “open house” entertaining therein; for its indulgence in champagne and flashiest local limousines; and for avid purchasing clothes, etc., in Shanghai stores. Occasional cordoning of entire streets used by delegation also aroused some resentment and private comment that “American parades had never required such things”. Our Chinese contacts, who attended festivities, admitted daily decline enthusiasm with growing surfeit of endlessly repetitious toasting and “perfect unselfish love” talk, boringly complicated by language difficulties. Program conspicuously bolstered by strict official directives compelling attendance functions regardless ill-health or advanced age.

Widely stated in Chinese circles that delegates utilized visit to voice strong criticism of Communist-Shanghai efforts. Aside from criticising local political-economic measures as too lax, they reportedly berated local Communists for their hectic overwork to complete neglect of health as wasteful, inefficient and advised normal living, rest, recreation.

Local Russian sources assert delegation left 5 days ahead schedule because bad Chinese reaction. We believe this quite possible as local press play-up prior delegation’s arrival had given impression visit was to be longer. We surmise that any further Soviet group visitations made on similarly ceremonial social level will be gingerly handled by both sides.

2. Considerable feeling has been aroused over officially decreed spectacularity of display portraits Stalin⁵⁹ and Lenin,⁶⁰ especially when given precedence over Chinese leaders. Two Chinese sources report incident where one unit, marching out of race course to join big parade October 8, was forced by crowd onlookers to change sequence of large portraits from Stalin, Mao, Chu,⁶¹ Sun⁶² (order observed by most portrait-bearing units, including official Red Army unit) to Sun, Mao, Chu, Stalin. Reliable American also reports noting overnight switch of portraits displayed Hongkew Park. Ta Kung Pao October 11 published “letter from reader” which referred to “large numbers of people” whose inquiries as to reason necessity display portraits Soviet leaders reveal their “ignorance” of Soviet aid to China. Paper proceeded to “explain” how “People’s revolutionary movement” and new regime owe all to Marxism and Soviet Union led by Lenin, Stalin. Has been other evidence of letters complaint written to local press. Also, local authorities October 15 published in all papers rules for display Sino-Soviet flags and portraits, tone of which suggested authority’s awareness need for calming population’s anxiety (Contel 4397, October 18⁶³). Day after Soviet delegation’s departure, four large portraits Stalin, Mao, Chu, Sun set up in Canidrome were reduced to two—Mao and Sun.

3. Exceptionally well-informed Chinese contacts tell us that “pretty heated issue” is developing over steps being taken to implement “Soviet-backed” principle that urban factory workers (only “4 percent” of Chinese population) should dominate government ahead of peasant masses (“80 percent”). He analyzes Russian angle about as follows:

Moscow’s chief Chinese objectives are (a) maintain economic and strategic controls north peripheral areas, especially Manchuria, and (b) keep Chinese from deviationist laxities, safely in line with Soviet leadership based on proletariat internationalism peace fiction. To best achieve both aims, Russia must win over Chinese urban factory, business and railway workers and maintain them as dictators of China. Peasant masses are too cumbersome, inaccessible and basically bourgeois due home loving for ready convertibility to good Communists interested in Soviet collaboration and accepting idea of subservience to Moscow-led internationalism. If, however, Soviets can help compact, readily organized and influenced Chinese city workers to gain dominant position and can secure their gratitude by such help and by “unselfish international wise comradeship collaboration” in Manchuria’s industries and in China’s general worker spheres, they can thereby acquire natural easily-controlled vehicle for (a) protecting their economic strategic advance through Manchuria, and (b) ensuring China’s non-deviating adherence to “selfless internationalism” which veneers Moscow’s new imperialism. To confirm chain of its authority, Moscow seeks not only to ensure Chinese population’s domination by urban workers (leavened with radical intellectuals) but also, “following European satellite pattern”, to bring about situation (not yet achieved in China) where workers’ representatives (such as Li Li-san and Chen Yun) are concurrently both the top government officials and the delegates to Moscow-bossed Comintern or successor organization. That some such strategy being pushed by Moscow and arousing dissension within Chinese circles is also suggested by such sign[s] as: Frequently reported Soviet interest in strengthening Shanghai labor; Soviet Cultural Delegation’s and Soviet cameramen’s stress on Chinese labor aspects and apparent neglect of countryside; reports that farmers resent being subordinated to workers and exploited for industry’s higher priority; and occasional press items. For example, Ta Kung Pao October 28, in reporting proceedings of South Kiangsu People’s Representatives’ Conference, recorded that “common political program was discussed this morning with special emphasis on why working class should lead people’s democratic dictatorship and why China should lean to side Soviet”.

Also revealing in this connection is stress on need for industrialization of China with Soviet help noted in recent Chinese Communist utterances (such as Liu Shao-chi’s October 5 address at inauguration Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, Peiping) and strenuous official press campaign to popularize Sino-Soviet industrial collaboration, especially in Manchuria.

Chinese suspicious resentment over Soviet role in Manchuria has been increasingly noticeable here in recent months. It has been aroused by Manchurian-Soviet trade pact which many Shanghai circles consider harmful to Shanghai manufacturing industries and foodstuff needs; and by disturbing news from Manchuria (frequently brought by travelers from there and North China) such as reports that General Malinovsky⁶⁴ brought military mission to Harbin about early September (reliably confirmed); that Soviets are taking over much of Manchurian railway operation; that they have failed keep promises regarding delivery machinery, etc., though vaunting their “generosity” in returning worthless portions of equipment they removed in 1945; and that in general they are steadily acquiring control most important industries and resources. Such news has excited widespread and often outspoken complaints (reflected in many letters to newspapers) against trade pact and against USSR’s manifested unwillingness surrender preferred position in Manchuria despite substitution there of friendly Communist for hostile Kmt regime.

This wave of popular anxiety has been countered by increasing stream of news and editorial articles in Communist-controlled local press concerning “sensational” production records, technical advances and bustling activity being achieved by Chinese in Manchurian industries (especially Dairen, Port Arthur) with “unselfish aid Soviet friends”; enlistment of groups of Shanghai-Chinese technicians for service northeast; Soviet training of Manchurian Chinese technicians; Soviet assistance in railway development program; Soviet machinery for northeast; and import-export benefits accruing Shanghai from Soviet-Manchurian trade pact and from trade with Russia and Russian-aided Manchuria. In short, this mass of press material clearly reflects major campaign to prove that Chinese workers are playing glorious role in rebuilding “their” Manchuria and that Soviet role (actual domination industries, railways) is unselfish collaboration for benefit China, including Shanghai. Soviets obviously try spread impression that their Manchurian activities are dedicated to expediting “industrialization of China”—thus playing on vanity of cherished Chinese ambitions and distracting attention from sovereignty infringement aspect.

Indications are that few intelligent Chinese are fooled by all this and that suspicion [of] USSR is growing rather than subsiding. Illustrating this is fact that at lectures by prominent Chinese who have recently returned from Northeast, majority of questions asked have been concerned with and reflected worry over Soviet position in Manchuria.

Another obvious device to combat Chinese distrust USSR and rationalize Soviet interest in Manchuria and in Chinese labor dictatorship has been recent increased propaganda stress on need for Chinese to join proletarian internationalism under “selfless Soviet leadership”. This is particularly evident in recent announcements regarding necessity developing facilities for study internationalism in army ranks and in directives to army and civil bodies for celebration October Revolution—which should be used “as occasion to launch publicity drive on internationalism as expression friendship toward USSR”. A directive to Woosung-Shanghai Garrison stated: “Narrow-minded nationalistic feeling should be removed, portraits of Lenin, Stalin, Mao and Chu are to be hung at gathering places and greatness of Lenin, Stalin should be introduced to members of various army units beforehand”. Such evident seriousness of Communist efforts to convince army of blessings of Soviet-guided internationalism is not surprising when one considers that army is composed mostly peasants who might logically be expected to feel that they, and not factory workers nor USSR, won liberation war and who probably do not take kindly to idea of worker dictatorship.

4. Also signs that Chinese dislikes of new regime’s all-out pro-Soviet policy is being strengthened by deep-seated factors of Chinese tradition background which includes: (a) Chinese popular goodwill toward America, which continues significant here despite violent anti-American propaganda and genuine unpopularity of aspects recent American policy; (b) traditional Chinese recourse to playing one nation against another and consequent anxiety (revealed by many Shanghai-Chinese) for American recognition if for no other reason than to check Soviet power over Chinese; (c) “stubborn bourgeois mentality” of great majority Chinese population, admitted by Communists who realize such situation must largely continue until present adult population replaced by Communist-indoctrinated younger generation.

As to question how far the above discussed forces and trends toward anti-Sovietism exist within upper Communist ranks, our information has been mostly in nature rumors. However, exceptionally well-informed local American states he has it from two independent “savvy foreign” sources in Peiping that weeks preceding establishment new regime October 1 were marked by bitter intra-Communist dispute before all-out pro-Soviet policy was finally adopted.

While too early to appraise true spirit and progress in this area of officially-proclaimed solidarity and collaboration, one gets distinct initial impression of perfunctory show on much of Chinese side and exploratory go-slow caution on Soviet side. Sino-Soviet Friendship Associations set up [in] Shanghai and several other cities have evidently been created and operated more by command than spontaneity and their officers selected for official prestige rather than any interest in Russia (though these associations do appear have thoroughgoing programs which, if intelligently carried out, might exert influence which should not be underestimated). Press has publicized plans for starting Russian-language courses (virtually nonexistent hitherto Shanghai) which seem thus far resulted in establishment three night schools with total 800 enrolled and moves toward teaching some hundreds students at two universities. All classes appear elementary starting from scratch. Is remarked by Chinese contact who attended tongue-tied functions for Soviet Cultural Delegation, progress toward Sino-Soviet friendship is tremendously handicapped by lack any common educational background—and especially by mere inability to talk resulting from China’s long dependence on English language and scarcity of Russian-speaking Chinese. Local Sino-Soviet Friendship Association recently announced itself “sorely in need translators and interpreters in Russian”.

This language difficulty would take years for Soviets to overcome and must meanwhile result in virtually all Soviet approaches and propaganda having to be through Chinese translations distributed through press, books, motion pictures and radio. Such translations are already flooding public through vernacular press, bookshops and radios and Soviets seem now working hard on more difficult remaining task of dominating motion picture media.

From limited signs thus far, guess is hazarded that Soviet penetration strategy this area may likely attempt following lines:

(a) Keep Soviet hand in Shanghai much less conspicuous than in Manchuria or even North China.

(b) Go especially slow on developing large bustling conspicuous diplomatic-consulate-military establishments (“such as Nanking AAG with its ubiquitous jeeps”). This connection noteworthy that local Soviet Consulate General has thus far avoided any ceremonious reopening and given general impression of lying low. Understood still nominally closed.

(c) Push cultural, “international ideological” and labor first penetration through intense cultivation and instigation, by carefully-selected inconspicuous experts, of Shanghai press, cultural, scientific, student and labor circles. That the press avenue of approach may play very important part in Soviet setup is suggested among other things by Tass monopoly of foreign press news reaching China, and by opinion well-informed Chinese that Rogov’s transfer Peiping significant and that he has great influence in field of China’s foreign relations. Keen Chinese observer, who long worked with Rogov, describes him as very able, exceptionally slippery, untrustworthy.

(d) Bring in industrial technicians and more trade specialists on “humble comradely” level.

(e) Keep local western democratic communities under close surveillance, shorn of influence and in as much trouble with authorities as possible.

(f) Especially watch and combat trends toward democratic individualism and pro-Americanism which Moscow is said to feel dangerously permeates new regime.

(g) Reform Soviet residents community, whose social prestige and political, cultural dependability is evidently considered inadequate by Soviet authorities. (Soviet Cultural Delegation members were under orders shun contact with local Soviet residents far as possible. Delegation’s visit has, however, markedly spurred colony’s cultural and other activities.)

(h) In general to feel way cautiously, distrust any even Communist Chinese and anxious avoid repetition 1927 anti-Soviet reaction caused by overplay Russian hand.

That the discordant undercurrents and manifestation in current Sino-Soviet relations discussed in this telegram have, of course, been to considerable extent aggravated by Kmt agents and/or exaggerated by Kmt propaganda in no way lessens significance of fact that they exist. Keen local Chinese observer, bitterly contemptuous of Kmt, in describing Chinese anti-Soviet feeling to officer of Consulate General, commented that Kmt “propaganda, while in all other respects failure, has been most effective in fanning popular indignation against USSR”.

Purpose this telegram has been endeavor to produce from available piecemeal indications a rough tentative pattern of some of the locally-observable factors and trends which are impeding—and possibly might ultimately ruin—Pan-Soviet cause in China. No attempt is made here to gauge present significance and potentialities of such factors and trends. They should, of course, be viewed against harsh basic fact that Moscow definitely dominates present Chinese scene with apparent full approval of Chinese Communist Party and with no tangible sign of any likely important setback in near future.

Believe, however, that evidence suffices prove at least that Soviet course in China cannot be plain sailing and that it faces many obstacles and risks which cannot be quickly or easily passed and which offer excellent opportunities for intelligent exploitation by the American side.

Please pass VOA⁶⁵ for background.

Sent Department 4782. Department pass Moscow.

McConaughy

57. Neither printed.
58. November 7, 1917.
59. Josif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.
60. Communist premier, 1917–24.
61. Chu Teh, Commander in Chief of Chinese Communist armies.
62. Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Chinese Republic at Nanking, January 1, 1912, and of the Kuomintang.
63. Not printed.
64. Soviet military commander in Manchuria, 1945–46.
65. Voice of America.