893.00B/6–1549: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 15—8:14 a. m.]
1288. Reference Shanghai telegram 1917, May 31 to Dept. We heartily concur with Shanghai observation that Communist activities in China are far from Soviet Punch and Judy show. That Soviets themselves realize this is indicated by Moscow telegram 971, April 19 to Dept which reported belief that China problem is at top of Politburo agenda, that Molotov32 is primarily now concerned with China and that best talent, maximum energy is now being concentrated to steer Chinese developments along channels desired by Kremlin. We do not doubt that Soviets have courage and self-confidence to attempt this. They were not in least daunted by historic Polish hatred of all things Russian or by virile nationalism of Germany or by Balkan cockpit.
However, we would like to reaffirm our belief that top Chinese Communists are showing every evidence of trying to work closely with Soviet leaders. All hints of Soviet–CCP friction come from Soviet side. For any country to dovetail its foreign and domestic policies with those of USSR is one of thorniest tasks in field of international relations. USSR is hard taskmaster. But it seems to us that Chinese Communists have so far acquitted themselves exceedingly well. Maybe they will prove constitutionally incapable of being real Communists in Eastern European sense of word: perhaps they actually are rather naive immature Marxians, as some Cominform elements seem to believe; possibly their social, economic, racial characteristics will prove stronger than their hero worship of Soviet Union and devotion to world revolution. There are many good reasons to support those hypotheses which only time will prove. But at this stage Chinese Communists certainly deserve from Kremlin rating “excellent” for their recent successes and current endeavors.
Sent Department 1288, repeated Canton 537, Shanghai 699, Moscow 42.
- V. M. Molotov, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.↩