740.00119 Control (Japan)/4–149
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Bishop) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)
Subject: NA Comment on NSC 44, “Limited Military Armament for Japan”.1
It seems to me that this paper brings to the front two basic questions:
- 1.
- The problem of anticipating and preparing for a degree of rearmament of Japan; and
- 2.
- The problem of military security of the Japanese islands.
With reference to the first problem, Secretary Royall and General MacArthur are agreed that it would be inadvisable for a long time to come to permit the establishment of Japanese armed forces. You will recall General MacArthur’s remarks to me on this subject when I was out there in February. I am inclined to agree with them. I would add that in considering the question of re-armament of Japan it is important to bear in mind the attitude of the Japanese themselves. It was the Emperor who on the night he ordered Japan to surrender stated in unequivocal terms that Japan would never again have military forces. The idea of a pacifist state perhaps was not widely held in Japan and frankly is contrary to their entire history, but nevertheless it was held in the highest quarters. Those quarters, as we have witnessed during the occupation, go a long way toward determining how the Japanese people think. Accordingly it would be wise before going too far in any planning to determine the attitudes and inclinations of Japan’s leaders. I think it would be taking a grave risk to attempt to sound out Japanese thinking on this delicate subject during the period of the occupation, and without a great deal of exploration I would strongly recommend against it.
There is much that can and should be done, however, under NSC 13/2,2 paragraph 7, “The Japanese Police Establishment” which states:
“The Japanese Police establishment, including the coastal patrol, should be strengthened by the re-enforcing and re-equipping of the present forces, and by expanding the present centrally directed police organization.”
I perceive no real obstacle to the creation of police reserves, located on the outskirts or near by concentrations of population or in other strategic [Page 695] centers, which can be used to control widespread civil disturbance, riot and rebellion.
With regard to the second question which is the JCS recommendation that it would be unwise to postpone “consideration of the problem of Japanese military security until such time as peace treaty negotiations may be undertaken”, I wholeheartedly agree with the JCS. I would suggest, however, that they have misinterpreted paragraph 4 of NSC 13/2, which, I believe, was intended to cover the question of controls to be, or not to be, written into the peace treaty as well as the question whether Japan’s integrity would be guaranteed by internacional agreement or by the United States. I do not believe that paragraph 4 was intended in any way to place any limitation upon the planning by the National Military Establishment for such security arrangements as may be necessary in that part of the world to protect the United States and its interests.
I should, therefore, recommend that if my interpretation of paragraph 4 of NSC 13/2 is correct the NME be advised that there is no limitation on United States planning in this respect. The JCS will, of course, be concerned not only with the present situation, but also with the post-treaty situation. In the latter connection my recommendation would be that the United States should allow the Japanese themselves to decide whether or not they will have military forces in the post-treaty period. I believe that it would be wise until we have evidence to the contrary to plan U.S. security in that part of the world on the assumption that Japan will remain to all intents and purposes a military vacuum. I have been under the assumption that U.S. security in that part of the world as well as the military security of the Japanese islands can be maintained from bases not on the main Japanese islands. You will recall that it is General MacArthur’s concept that the Japanese islands should be militarily neutralized (Russia and other hostile forces kept out) by superior United States air and naval forces based principally in the Ryukyu Islands. We are, of course, well aware that the Navy considers the Ryukyus totally inadequate and believes that the only suitable naval bases are to be found in Japan. This is a difference of view which only military experts can reconcile.
To refer once again to General MacArthur’s views, you will remember that he told me that he thought it was highly probable that if war came the Japanese would be fighting on our side before it was over. I would certainly be in favor of using Japanese manpower in our war effort if that were militarily feasible and agreeable to the Japanese. I can see no objection to the NME’s making secret plans for such contingency.
[Page 696]I believe that the problems raised by NSC 44 can be solved by an understanding within the NME of the proper interpretation of paragraph 4 of NSC 13/2 and by adoption by the NSC of the following:
Discussion
In the light of the evident trend toward world unrest and in view of the fact that it may well become extremely important to our national security for Japan to be capable of providing some degree of military assistance to the United States, at least to the extent of Japan’s own self-defense, it appears desirable that the question of the possible use of Japanese armed forces be carefully explored.
In the light of United States commitments to disarm and demilitarize Japan, of the whole concept of the occupation and of the sensibilities of our Allies and former friends who share in the regime of control of Japan, any consideration of this question must be undertaken only under extremely tight security requirements.
Recommendation
The National Military Establishment should under the most stringent security precautions make plans now for the possible use of limited Japanese armed forces for the defense of Japan in the event of war.
If you approve I shall prepare a draft memorandum from you to the Secretary.3
- See JCS memorandum of March 1, p. 671.↩
- October 7, 1948, Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. vi, p. 859.↩
- Notation at end by Mr. Butterworth: “Please do”.↩