895.20/9–1649
The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State
No. 569
Sir: In reference to the Department of the Army’s telegram Warx–92292,1 directing the Chief, KMAG,2 to submit recommendations for additional military assistance to Korea for the fiscal year 1950, I have the honor to enclose, for the Department’s information, copies of the following: (1) Letter from the Chief, KMAG, submitting his recommendations and explanatory comment; (2) my letter to General Roberts concurring in his recommendations.3
Reference to the Department of Army’s message Warx–92292 will show that the Chief, KMAG, was directed to supply his recommendations within the framework of an expenditure of $10,000,000, exclusive of transportation charges.
General Roberts’ recommendations were necessarily prepared within the limits of the $10,000,000 figure. Attention is invited to the concluding sentence of his letter to me expressing the opinion that the “request outlined herein is the absolute minimum with which the Korean Security Forces can be expected to maintain internal quiet and to secure the existing boundaries”. In this connection, I should like to point out that, in the unfortunate event of the outbreak of large-scale hostilities between North and South Korea, the over-all amount of $10,000,000 would obviously be inadequate to keep the security forces of the Republic of Korea in the field for any extended period of time.
[Page 1080]With regard to General Roberts’ recommendations respecting the furnishing of naval vessels to Korea, it is my earnest hope that the $500,000 recommended to be set aside can be used to purchase a number of surplus or second-hand patrol craft, submarine chasers, and high-speed Diesel Picket boats. In other words, I hope that means can be found to spread the use of the $500,000 for the purchase of a number of vessels and not have it limited to the purchase of a single new craft.
With reference to the question of military aircraft for the Republic of Korea, it will be noted that General Roberts has recommended that expenditures be limited to $26,956 for the purchase of seven L–4 aircraft and spare parts. It will be obvious that L-type aircraft cannot be regarded as constituting the basis for the building up of a small but efficient air force. This is keenly felt by the Korean authorities, who have gone so far as to authorize the expenditure of some $200,000 for the purchase of ten AT–6 trainer aircraft. The Korean authorities are desirous of augmenting the L-type aircraft and the AT–6 type aircraft with a few military craft of a higher performance. In this connection, recent and persistent reports from north Korea suggest that the Soviets are supplying the north Koreans with a relatively sizable number of comparatively high-performance military aircraft. At this time our intelligence agencies are making a special effort to obtain a reliable and clear report regarding the present strentgh of the north Korean air arm. Should it be confirmed, as now seems indicated, that the north Koreans are hi possession of military aircraft giving them a greater superiority, it will then be necessary to consider steps looking to the strengthening of the air arm of the Republic of Korea. It is expected that as soon as a reliable picture of the North Korean air force becomes available, a report with our recommendations will be submitted to Washington respecting the desirability of increasing the strength of the Korean air force.
Respectfully yours,