895.032/9–1449
The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State
No. 564
Subject: Fourth Session of the “Supreme Peoples Assembly”, Pyongyang, September 8–10, 1949
The Ambassador refers to the Embassy’s telegram No. 1136, September 12, 19491 on the above-cited subject, and has the honor to transmit the following account and assessment of the meeting of the Fourth Session of the “Supreme Peoples Assembly” at Pyongyang, for the information of the Department.
The sessions were held at the Maranbong Conference Hall during three days, from September 8 to 10, 1949. Very few speeches were made, very few laws were presented for approval; and it does not appear that more than a total of eight or nine hours was actually [Page 1077] spent in session. The contrast with the First Session, which began on September 8, 1948, is striking.
At the opening session, in addition to Premier Kim Il Sung, Presidium President Kim Do Bong and Presidium Vice Chairman Kim Hal Hyung, all the Ministers of state and members of the Presidium are reported to have attended. (It is believed, however, that Hu Hun is in Moscow at present.) Among the guests was the Soviet Minister Counselor Tunkin. Ambassador Shtikov was not mentioned. Possibly he is ill or in Russia for consultation.
The chief items of business at the first session, September 8, were the announcement of the agenda, and the speech by Kim Il Sung. The agenda as announced was: (1) Government statement on achievements of the past year of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; (2) Consideration of enforcement of universal compulsory education law; (3) Consideration of income tax law; (4) Consideration of a law against counterfeiting North Korea bank notes.
Kim Il Sung’s speech represented the first, item on the agenda. He spoke for about an hour, describing the achievements of the Korean People’s Democracy in its first year of existence. He made the usual attacks on the United States, the anti-communist South Koreans and the UN Commission, but added no new phrases or ideas. Compared to past speeches his address might be considered mild. A considerable portion of his speech was devoted to claims of great advances in industry, commerce, education and government, and contrary claims for South Korea.
Kim Il Sung ended his address with a four point program, abbreviated as follows:
- 1.
- Consolidate and develop the political and economic base in North Korea as an invincible fortress for securing unification.
- 2.
- Sharpen hate against the enemies of the people; be alert to detect agents coming from the south.
- 3.
- Strengthen the security forces, including their material well being and morale.
- 4.
- Increase the tempo of the struggle under the Democratic Front to unify the country, exposing Syngman Rhee, depriving the People’s enemies of their foothold, thereby realizing peaceful unification.
In his peroration Kim Il Sung claimed the “People’s democratic system” was steadily winning in Europe and in Asia, so that the international situation is favorable to his cause.
The second day, September 9, was devoted chiefly to “debates” on Kim Il Sung’s speech, and Vice Premier Hong Myung Hi’s presentation of the Cabinet’s proposals for enforcement of the laws on universal compulsory education. These “debates” consisted of statements by fifteen “government” and other leaders, in support of Kim Il Sung’s address. A Resolution endorsing the address was then put and adopted unanimously.
[Page 1078]The third day, September 10, was devoted to “debating” and unanimously resolving to adopt (1) the proposed law on compulsory universal education, a law covering children from seven to fifteen, but permitting delay in enforcement, (2) the income tax law; and (3) the law against forging of North Korea bank notes.
Each of the Resolutions was very brief, proposing to adopt a given law, but the law itself was not included in the Resolution. Each Resolution was adopted unanimously.
No mention was made at any time of the prospective September 20 all Korea “elections” to be organized by the “Democratic Front”. The “Democratic Front” was often referred to but not in connection with “elections”. At this date of writing Pyongyang Radio has still failed to mention the September 20 “elections”, which have not been mentioned over the air since July.2 It is assumed, therefore, that the “elections” either have been postponed or shelved indefinitely. Rumors and unverified reports to the former effect have been received at the Embassy since about September 1.
Since the “elections” are not a necessary part of the governmental process, but serve primarily as a propaganda device to support a particular policy decision, two estimates for the reasons behind the projected September 20 elections were that they were to support (1) an invasion of South Korea soon after September 20, or (2) the Russian tactical position at Lake Success, or (3) both. Current U.S. military intelligence estimates do not support (1). It is assumed, therefore, that (2) was the basis for “elections” on September 20. It is now considered possible that the Soviets in reevaluating their prospective position at Lake Success came to the conclusion that new elections to prove the validity of a “government” whose validity they had already proved in 1948 by reference to alleged universal, popular Korean elections might hurt rather than help their case.
It seems possible, therefore, that the “elections” have not merely been postponed but postponed indefinitely. The period from October 11 to October 21 has been declared “Soviet-Korean Friendship Week”, when numerous Soviet artists and intellectuals will be in Pyongyang and numerous Koreans of similar type in Moscow. It seems unlikely that a simultaneous propaganda campaign, for Soviet-Korean friendship, and for universal “elections”, could be conducted successfully. After October 21, there would be no point in “elections” to bolster the Soviet case at Lake Success. “Elections” after October 21 might be helpful only to support claims leading to a campaign to “liberate” South Korea. Current United States military intelligence estimates do not support such an estimate of the situation, although should presently numerous but quite unverified reports of entrance of Chinese [Page 1079] communist forces into North Korea be verified, this estimate might change. Snow flies in Seoul before or about Thanksgiving and is on the ground earlier in Pyongyang. An “election” to give propaganda support to such a campaign would have to be held soon after October 21, if that campaign were not to become a winter battle.
None of these estimates can be considered as more than of the most tentative nature, but the failure of the Fourth Session of the Supreme People’s Assembly, or Pyongyang Radio, since it adjourned, to mention elections gives them some basis of support.
Upon adjournment, the members of the Supreme People’s Assembly are reported to have dispersed to their homes under orders from the Supreme Presidium to inform their constituents of the work done and the information gained at the Session.