Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VII, Part 2

711.00/7–2149

The Chargé in Japan (Huston) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Tokyo, July 21, 1949.
[Received August 1.]

My Dear Mr. Secretary: I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of June 27, 1949,¹ with which you enclosed two copies of the Department’s Policy Statement on Japan dated May 1, 1949, one for the use of the Chief of this Mission and one for General MacArthur.

In accordance with your request, I personally handed a copy of the Statement to General MacArthur on July 16, at which time he read it in my presence and then initiated a conversation on certain of its contents, as witnessed by the attached memorandum of my conversation with him. You may be interested in noting the General’s opinion that this document constitutes a very good statement of United States policy on Japan, despite the fact that he disagrees on certain points, notably the question of the purgees, and that he resents somewhat the Department’s view that there may be increasing Japanese resentment against the Occupation.

I hope you will note especially General MacArthur’s opinion that the United States should again take the lead in proposing the early conclusion of a treaty of peace with Japan. He has been particularly sensitive to anything that might contribute to the popular impression that the United States does not want a treaty. He not only believes that we should endeavor to obtain a treaty without delay, but feels that such an effort would have a good chance of success at the present time, the question with respect to Japan’s security being resolved by international recognition of its neutrality, for which he would be willing to accept the pledge of the Soviet Government.

In response to your request for comments and recommendations, my first comment is that it is a pleasure to note the improvements contained in this Policy Statement as compared with the previous one. It shows a close awareness of all the major issues, and will be particularly useful to us here in keeping the Department’s viewpoints before us. I should like in the following paragraphs to single out a few points for special comment.

On page 5 it is stated that: “It is our objective to promote conditions conducive to friendly relations between Japan and Korea, and accordingly to encourage the early return to Korea of the bulk of the 600,000 Koreans now resident in Japan, whose presence there is causing serious problems.” This Mission heartily concurs in that objective, and I hope that, after obtaining general approval by this Headquarters in the not distant future to a study we have completed on the status of Koreans in Japan, we shall be in a position to seek action in the direction of the return to Korea of substantial numbers of the Koreans now here. The subject has recently been brought again to our attention by an initiative from the Prime Minister resulting from Korean participation in current violence and illegal activity.

The reference on page 7 to the complementary economies of Japan and China and the consequent desirability of trade between these two countries has the full support of this Mission. We here look upon this matter as having special importance. Our efforts in this direction have not been as successful as we may have hoped, and the obstacles obviously are very great, but we shall continue trying to influence Headquarters toward a fuller acceptance of this policy.

We are also especially interested just now in the question raised on page 10 with respect to the desirability of permitting, in the field of foreign relations, a steady return to the Japanese Government of at least certain segments of its sovereignty in world affairs during the pre-treaty period. We have this question under active study now with a view to submitting concrete recommendations for General Headquarters’ approval. In conformity with the Department’s views, we not only believe that the resumption of Japan’s membership in the Universal Postal Union and in the International Telecommunication Union is desirable, but feel it would likewise be a matter of policy to advocate adherence by Japan (and to assist Japan in making its adherence effective) to other international conventions and agreements, including the International Whaling Convention, the International Labor Organization, the International Trade Organization, the Fur-Sealing Convention, which is understood to be in process of preliminary discussion, conventions on patents and copyrights, and such others as the Department may find it desirable. Perhaps the Department already has under study a determination of those international conventions and agreements which are susceptible of adherence by Japan. We are now actively endeavoring to secure Headquarters approval for a program envisaging early Japanese trade and consular representation in the United States and other countries.

On page 14 the Policy Statement raises the question of the desirability of attempting to bring about a peace treaty, even though it must be with the realization that a general peace conference would be likely to fail, it being important that the public should know the reasons for any failure and that the way should be prepared for considering the desirability of bringing about a bilateral agreement between the United States and Japan, with a number of friendly powers following suit. As already noted, General MacArthur’s views strongly support this idea, and we here in the Mission, who naturally have devoted considerable thought to the general problem of a peace settlement, feel rather definitely that the time has come for taking some such steps as those outlined in the Statement.

I shall show this Statement to Mr. Sebald upon his return to Tokyo on July 23, and it is not unlikely that he may wish to send you additional comments and suggestions at that time.

A receipt for the two copies of the Policy Statement, which also indicates the disposition made of the two copies dated June 21, 1948, is being returned separately.

Sincerely yours,

Cloyce K. Huston

[Enclosure]

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chargé in Japan (Huston)

top secret

[Tokyo,] July 16, 1949.

General MacArthur interrupted his reading to refer to the date of issuance on the cover page and to remark that the Statement was a little out of date, mentioning particularly the paragraph on page 7 which states that “we favor the early establishment of a single commercial exchange rate for the yen” and, a little later on, the section regarding reparations. Upon concluding his reading he asked one or two questions regarding the purpose of the Statement and the use made of it and then, upon being informed, said that, generally speaking, it represented a good statement and estimate of American foreign policy with respect to Japan. With most of the Statement, he said, he was in hearty agreement; on some details he would have to disagree. He went on to say that he had to disagree, in particular, with the Department’s position on the question of the two hundred thousand purgees; he had done his level best in various ways to make the Department see the light, and especially to understand his own position, on this subject. In the first place, he said, most of these purgees were military officers, only a few hundred representing industry and other large business interests. In the second place, he continued, the Department simply would not see the fact that he was bound by the FEC policy decision on the purge and could not, and would not, carry out the Department’s wishes for a review of purged cases unless and until that policy decision was changed by the FEC itself. He spoke with some feeling in saying that the Department had been obdurate in not recognizing his point of view.

I drew General MacArthur’s attention particularly to that part of the Policy Statement which indicated that the present United States policy with respect to the timing of a treaty of peace with Japan is now under review, as well as to the statement that inability to agree on voting procedure has been of advantage in permitting the United States “to reassess the merits of the Chinese proposal that voting follow FEC procedure”. The General then declared emphatically that one of the greatest mistakes made by the United States with respect to Japan had been to permit the development, in this country and elsewhere, of the impression that it does not now want a treaty with Japan. “We should have a treaty,” he said, “and as soon as possible; even if we fail, we should make the attempt, for propaganda if for no other reasons.” He then reminded me that he had been disappointed when the American delegation at the recent meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers had rejected the Soviet proposal to discuss the treaty with Japan; our interests would have been much further advanced, he said, if we had at that point indicated our readiness to discuss a treaty.

When I asked the General if he believed a treaty might now be possible and how, in the affirmative case, we could be assured of Japan’s security, he replied that he believed it might be possible to exact a pledge from all the nations concerned, including Soviet Russia, to respect the neutrality of an unarmed Japan. When I expressed concern regarding the amount of reliance which might be placed on such a pledge on the part of the Soviet Union, he remarked that the Soviets might indeed be difficult to deal with, but in his experience he had found that the Soviet Government always endeavored to keep its plighted word. (He interjected here that he was still convinced that the Soviet failure to carry out its repatriation commitments had been the result of physical inability, and not a lack of desire to carry out its agreement.) I indicated my inability to entertain like optimism with respect to Soviet proclivities for keeping agreements on the basis of the postwar record.

General MacArthur then referred to the Policy Statement’s mention of “increasing Japanese resentment against the Occupation” and proceeded to argue that such resentment does not, in fact, exist. The Japanese people are well aware, he said, of what we have done for them; they know that this has been a kind and helpful Occupation; they have seen us bring food into their country, restore the economic life, and manifest in many other ways that we are here to help them and not to punish, that we have given them individual rights and dignity, that this is indeed a most benevolent Occupation. I remarked at this point that, undoubtedly, clear-thinking Japanese knew that all these things were true, that this Occupation was indeed benevolent and good, particularly when compared with any other occupation known to history, but I wondered if among the masses there were not a great many Japanese who reflected less deeply and did in fact harbor resentment. When the General then reiterated his conviction that the Japanese welcomed and appreciated the Occupation and said that they knew our soldiers were here only to help them, I remarked: “But we are foreigners; our soldiers are alien troops. I find it difficult to believe that any people can welcome the presence of foreign troops over so long a period, even under the best of conditions.” I then went on to say that I had been particularly interested in the conflicting views on this subject, not only among foreign representatives, but among Americans as well, particularly among businessmen and representatives of the press, not to mention numerous Americans who resided in Japan before the war and had an intimate knowledge of Japanese ways of living and thinking. General MacArthur replied that the American press has always been antagonistic and that business interests have their own axes to grind, but that impartial observance would bear witness to the generally friendly attitude of the Japanese for the Occupation.

Cloyce K. Huston

1. Not printed.