Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume III

CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 179: CFMP Series

Paper Prepared by the Office of German and Austrian Affairs¹

secret

[Washington,] May 15, 1949.

CFMP D–3a

U.S. Position at the Council of Foreign Ministers

Basic Premise:

The Western German program to which the United States Government is formally committed is in a final stage of implementation. It is accepted that the Western German program will be fulfilled, and that any four power agreement would be based on that program. If the CFM were to result in apparent agreement which later was not carried out due to Soviet obstruction and bad faith, it would be necessary to return to the Western German arrangements. Accordingly it is necessary that the U.S. position consistently throughout the CFM should be so devised as not to jeopardize nor detract in any way from the Western German program. Any agreement on all Germany acceptable to the U.S. will be so closely related to the Western German arrangements that in the event the all German program breaks down as a result of Soviet action, the program for Western Germany would continue in full effect.

Timing:

The Bonn constitution has been given a final reading by the Parliamentary Council on May 8 and has been formally submitted to the Military Governors for approval. Such approval will probably be given by May 15, at which time the Occupation Statute (already released) will be formally communicated to the Germans. The constitution thereupon will be referred to the states for ratification which will probably take place by vote of the state parliaments. Under such circumstances, ratification by the required ⅔ majority be effected between two and three weeks, namely sometime between June 1 and June 15. General elections under the constitution of the first federal government would be held presumably within four to six weeks thereafter. Elections are likely to fall thus between July 1 and July 15.

Extension of Constitution to All of Germany:

The constitution will presumably be ratified by the Western German states at the time of or shortly after the commencement of the CFM, and the electoral preparations will begin at once thereafter.

If the Eastern German states are to ratify the constitution before their participation, it would be necessary to postpone the election schedule in Western Germany. In fact, if general elections were to be held throughout Germany at the same time, it would also be necessary to postpone the Western German election schedule, in so far as an interim period of preparation in the Eastern zone would be required for the establishment and free operation there of political parties such as the SPD at present unauthorized under the Soviets.

Extension of the constitution to the Eastern zone can only be envisaged with the participation of Germans in the Eastern states who are as politically free as the population in the Western zones. The Eastern Germans, by majority decision must voluntarily signify their desire to join the Federal Republic. In order that this may occur, all democratic parties authorized anywhere in Germany (in particular the Social Democratic Party) must be free to engage in political activity. For the purpose of eliminating interference by Soviet occupation forces and the Communist police, there must be a system of initial supervision, preferably directed by officials of the Federal Republic perhaps with assistance of a quadripartite commission of elections and political activity.

In practice this may mean that there will be some delay in bringing the Eastern states into the Federal Republic. New free elections under the above-mentioned conditions for new state governments would be necessary before the latter can signify their desire to accede to the Basic Law. The Eastern states would then hold free general elections to choose their representatives to the Lower House of the Federal Republic (representatives to the upper chamber would be chosen by the new state governments).

From the Western standpoint, it would be desirable that the above procedure follow its course; namely, that the Federal Republic be set up in the Western zones and the Eastern states hold new elections for their governments, signify their desire to accede and then hold general elections for their representatives to the Parliament.

It is recognized that a certain element of inequity could be claimed to attach itself to the above procedure. Consequently, the Western governments might consider offering a concession, provided this were acceptable to the leaders of the Federal Republic when established. It could be stated that after new and free Eastern state governments had been elected under supervision and had expressed their desire to accede to the Basic Law, new general elections for the Federal Lower House could be held throughout all the states in Germany (possibly likewise under supervision). (This, of course, would take place some time after the first general elections had been held in the Western zones and the Federal Republic had been set up.) The new Parliament, with added Eastern zone representation, would thus be free to consider any amendments to the Basic Law deemed necessary to adapt the government to all of Germany.

In advocating Soviet acceptance of the principles of Basic Law, the Western governments can always point to the fact that this law is provisional in character and adaptable by free German decision to the needs of a united country.

Control Machinery:

With necessary minor adaptations the Occupation Statute and the Washington Agreement as to Controls² could be applied on a quadripartite basis to all of Germany. So long as the system of controls operates under the majority vote procedure, disagreement between the Western Allies and the Soviets should, on the assumption that following the Atlantic Treaty the French will adhere to a common Western policy respecting Germany, not result in the obstruction of German governmental processes nor failure to take positive action where needed. A further protection for German government operation would reside in the fact that its legislative enactments would come into force automatically if not disapproved by majority vote.

If Germany is to be unified, it is essential that the zonal boundaries be eliminated and that the individual occupying powers cease to maintain separate governmental authority in the former occupation zones. Accordingly it should be left to the Allied Commission to decide by majority vote the nature and extent of its representation in the various German Laender.

The list of reserved powers in an Occupation Statute for quadripartite agreement could be the same, omitting control over foreign trade and exchange and control over internal action affecting the need for external assistance. It is envisaged that U.S. interest in these matters would be covered by a bilateral ECA agreement with Germany. The proposed list of reserved powers would also omit the minor items of “restitution”, “Non-discrimination in trade matters”, and the “prestige” of Allied forces.

A uniform procedure for decision by majority vote should be set down for the quadripartite control machinery. It is recognized that this provision will be contested by the Soviets. For this reason, the provision for unanimity in certain instances under the Washington Agreements should be dropped so that the program as presented will offer no opening wedge on this issue. Thus paragraph 4 of the Washington Agreement as to Controls regarding unanimous approval of amendments to the constitution as well as the first sentence of paragraph 5 of the Occupation Statute would be omitted.

The appeal procedures contained in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Washington Agreement as to Controls would be omitted as involving too complicated a procedure to apply in concert with the Russians. The provision in the Occupation Statute (paragraph 7) for dealing with legislation of the occupation authorities enacted before the effective date of the provisional constitution would also be omitted. The procedure outlined therein is too complicated to work out with the Russians. It is assumed that the German government itself will be able to modify such legislation subject to majority disapproval.

Economic Unity:

It is proposed that the restoration of economic unity be left to a responsible German government. This means that, after a German government is established, it will have to take the necessary steps to re-establish a common currency for the whole of Germany, to bring about a measure of equality in the economic conditions of East and West Germany. It will introduce common ration scales and, in general, bring about an adjustment between the highly controlled and semi-communized Eastern Zone and the relatively free economy Western Zones. It is essential that, if the German government is to do this with any degree of effectiveness and without the risk of serious economic and political repercussions, there must be no interference on the part of the occupation authorities. Consequently, the arrangements with respect to Germany must in effect remove the occupation authorities from operating in the field of economic administration. Furthermore, the arrangement with respect to the future disposition of troops must be such as to avoid the possibility of interference by the troops in the economic administration.

Germany and the European Recovery Program:

It is essential to the success of the European Recovery Program that Germany continue to participate in the program. Since it cannot be expected that the Soviet Union would agree to any specific clause providing for continued German participation in the European Recovery Program, the control machinery to be provided under any new quadripartite agreement on Germany must at least make it possible for Germany to continue to participate in the program if it wishes without such adherence being subject to Soviet veto. This can be done by permitting the German government to enter into international agreements unless such agreements are disapproved by the Allied High Commission. It is believed that the German need for economic assistance is so great that Germany could not afford to withdraw from ERP. For the forthcoming fiscal year, it is expected that close to a billion dollars will be made available in aid to Germany by the US and UK. In Germany’s current circumstances, it is not believed that the kind of government which would be established under a system of free elections would decide to refrain from obtaining the benefits of ERP.

The re-establishment of economic unity by a German government is closely related to the problem of continued American aid. Unless the German government were able to control its resources without interference from the Soviet Government, a substantial part of our aid to Germany might be wasted. Furthermore, we could not consider creating a situation under which complete freedom of trade between the zones were re-established at a time when the USSR was in control of the Eastern Zone. If we did, our aid would tend to be diverted to a substantial measure, together with goods produced in the Western Zones which are now going to other ERP countries. This means that the zones of occupation must be effectively terminated and the way left open for the US to work out with the Germans directly measures which would safeguard against our aid being wasted.

Reparation:³

The USSR has consistently declined to submit information on what it has taken from Germany in reparation. According to best estimates from intelligence sources, we believe that plant removals from the Eastern Zone, reparation from current production in the Eastern Zone, and German assets in Eastern Europe taken by the USSR would add up to three to four billion dollars current value. In addition, the Soviets have taken control of most of the leading industrial plants in their zone which are being operated as Soviet-owned enterprises. These plants, the right of the Soviets to which we challenge, are probably worth in the neighborhood of three billion dollars. In addition, the USSR has acquired German territory in East Prussia and has used the labor of a large number of prisoners of war, which might add several billion dollars.

The other countries entitled to reparation from Germany (except Poland, which gets a part of the Soviet share) stand to receive about a billion dollars in reparation. Meanwhile, the US and UK have had to extend more than three billion dollars of financial aid to Germany, the extent of our aid having been increased by the policies of the Soviets in their zone.

Germany will probably, at best, be able to achieve a very precarious; economic balance by the end of the European Recovery Program. To agree to any further reparation would risk jeopardizing German recovery and German economic and political stability, particularly in view of the degree to which the Germans will have to look to the East for trade in the future. In view of what has happened over the past four years, refusal to consider further reparation is certainly not inequitable. It is, therefore, proposed that we take the position that there shall be no reparation beyond completion of the present dismantling program in the Western Zones. We demand that the Soviets, cease taking reparation from current production in their zone and desist from any further dismantling. We also demand that they give up the plants still in Germany which they have taken under control. This demand shall take the form of a proposal that all the occupying powers relinquish any properties except consular and diplomatic property which they have acquired in Germany since the surrender. Since there has been a prohibition against the acquisition of new properties, by foreigners in the Western Zones, this proposal would in practice affect only the USSR. It should be provided that the properties to be surrendered shall be placed under the provisional administration of the Laender, and that their ultimate disposition shall be determined’ by the German Federal Government.

The Ruhr:

The USSR has consistently proposed that a four-power control be established over the Ruhr. The Soviet proposal apparently envisages, detailed control over production, management and distribution, the operation of which would require four-power agreement. The control provided for in the recently concluded Ruhr Control Agreement⁴ is of a radically different character. It provides for an Authority, including Germany and the Benelux countries and the three Western occupying powers, with a weighted system of voting, operating generally on a majority basis. The primary functions of the Authority are to establish minimum quotas for export of coal, coke and steel and to prevent discrimination by the Germans in exports of Ruhr products, the Authority at a later stage to be given powers to prevent excessive economic concentrations in the Ruhr coal and steel industries, to maintain general control over investment and to prevent former Nazis from obtaining positions of authority. The export allocations are subject to review by the OEEC.

If four-power agreement on Germany is to be achieved, some alteration of the present agreement may be required. The USSR could possibly be admitted into an arrangement such as the present one, although this has the disadvantage of allowing the Soviets to stir up trouble and to use the Authority for political purposes. The maintenance of a majority vote system would set limits on these possibilities.

Another possibility is for both the US and the USSR to be excluded from the Authority, confining its membership to Western European countries. This also involves very serious difficulties. While control over Germany is exercised through a quadripartite High Commission, such an arrangement could create problems with respect to the relations between the Commission and the Authority. Either the Authority would have to look to the Commission for enforcement of its orders, in which the USSR and US would be involved in any event, or, alternatively, the Ruhr would have to be carved out of Germany for certain purposes and placed under a specialized body. Futhermore, to exclude the US would mean eliminating the one country which is more or less disinterested, and placing Germany in the hands of her competitors and customers.

We should propose that the USSR be excluded from the Ruhr Authority, which is a matter of direct concern to Western Europe, but that the US remain a member. It should be noted in this connection that the Silesian industrial complex is under exclusive Eastern domination.

Disarmament and Demilitarization:

The proposal of a four-power treaty for the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany would not be included. It is believed that the security arrangements agreed upon by the three powers for Western Germany would be satisfactory for the short term period if extended to apply to all of Germany on a quadripartite basis. Permanent disarmament requirements to be imposed on Germany should properly be left to the definitive peace settlement. The Byrnes proposal⁵ was initiated three years ago to meet specific purposes at that time, particularly to allay security fears and facilitate a general settlement of German problems. It is remotely possible that the Soviets in the CFM may inquire whether the Byrnes treaty offer is still open. The U.S. would be able to answer that while it has not changed its position with regard to security guarantees, it believes that the present disarmament arrangements satisfy immediate requirements and that it would be superfluous to provide for alternative measures, in a separate treaty, such as envisaged in the Byrnes proposal. These should be incorporated in the final peace treaty, which the U.S. agrees should be concluded as soon as possible.

Frontiers:

Boundary questions will certainly arise in the CFM and it will be to the advantage of the Western powers again to reaffirm that they do not regard the Eastern administrative frontier as permanent. Reference should be made to Germany’s needs in the light of its present population problem. It might be stated that although the U.S. recognizes its commitment at Potsdam to support incorporation of the northern part of East Prussia into the Soviet Union, it would welcome a proposal of the Soviet Union to yield its claim to this area in Poland’s favor as compensation for an adjustment along Poland’s western frontier.

All-German Settlement:

Attached is a program which sets forth the requirements for the conclusion of an all-German settlement. It contains points other than those dealt with above. It nevertheless would seem to be inadvisable tactically for the Western governments initially to develop such a program in any detail until after the Soviets had declared their position. The opening proposal of the Western governments should be simply that the Western German arrangements stand and are capable of application to all of Germany. It is to be anticipated that the Western powers will be called upon to explain and justify the terms of the Western German arrangements with which they were forced to proceed due to Soviet obstruction in the Allied Control Authority and the previous CFM meetings. The Western powers should reiterate their position that they are willing to discuss the basis for Soviet participation. Should the Soviets indicate a real desire to enter into an agreement along these lines, it would then be desirable to elaborate the detailed terms of this adaptation of the Western German program to all of Germany.

If the Soviets do not indicate any such willingness, it should be the aim of the Western nations to introduce the major controversial issues of the past meetings such as reparations, and the Eastern frontier question in order to expose clearly to the public that the Soviets have not altered their unacceptable demands on these key issues. If the meeting is to break down without agreement, it is desirable that it do so as a result of the basic controversial issues which are generally understood by world opinion. On this basis the continuation of the Western German program would be accepted as a necessity.

[Annex]

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁶

secret

[Washington,] May 9, 1949.⁷

A Program for Germany

German Government:

1. A provisional federal government for all of Germany shall be established as soon as possible.

2. Such a government shall be elected and organized in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law or provisional constitution drafted by the Parliamentary Council at Bonn.⁸ The German Laender in the Eastern zone, together with Greater Berlin which will become a Land, will be invited to accede to the German federal republic under the provision of Article 23 of the Basic Law. These states will be informed of the conditions under which they may participate in the German federal republic, namely, new and free elections shall be held for Land and local authorities; the Land governments established on the basis of such elections may apply for accession to the German federal republic; upon acceptance, the state governments of the Eastern zone will arrange for free elections for representatives of the federal government.

3. The German federal government will assume responsibility for ensuring free elections under paragraph 2 above. To this end, a system of supervision and inspection shall be established to ensure that all authorized political parties may operate freely and that the elections are held by universal, equal and direct suffrage, and by secret ballot. Complete freedom of press, speech, assembly and communication, and non-discrimination in the use of all media of information for electoral purposes shall be guaranteed. All political parties authorized in any zone as of May 1, 1949 shall be permitted to organize at once and to offer candidates for the local, Land and federal elections under conditions of equal opportunity.

Allied High Commission for Germany:

4. At the time the provisional federal government assumes governmental responsibilities for all of Germany, the Allied Control Council shall be dissolved and there shall be established an Allied High Commission for Germany, consisting of four civilian High Commissioners, one appointed by each of the Four Powers with appropriate staffs to function until the peace settlement. At the same time, military government shall be terminated, and in particular, occupation forces shall cease to exercise military government functions. Zonal boundaries for these purposes shall thereby be definitively eliminated.

5. In order to permit the federal government to exercise increased responsibilities over domestic affairs and to reduce the burden of occupation costs, staff personnel of the Allied High Commissioners shall be kept to a minimum.

6. The Allied High Commission will have its seat at the capital of the federal government. The Allied High Commission may dispatch representatives or agents to the various German Laender as may be required.

7. Pending a peace settlement for Germany, the Allied High Commission shall exercise reserved powers to be specified in a four-power Occupation Statute. The federal state and participating Laender shall have, subject only to the limitations of this Statute, full legislative, executive and judicial powers in accordance with the Basic Law and with their respective constitutions.

8. Powers in the following fields shall be specifically reserved, in eluding the right to request and verify information and statistics needed by the Allied High Commission:

(a) disarmament and demilitarization, including related fields of scientific research, prohibitions and restrictions on industry, and civil aviation;

(b) controls in regard to reparations, decartelization, deconcentration, foreign interests in Germany and claims against Germany;

(c) foreign affairs, including international agreements made by or on behalf of Germany;

(d) displaced persons and the admission of refugees;

(e) protection, and security of Allied forces, dependents, employees and representatives, their immunities and satisfaction of occupation costs and their other requirements;

(f) respect for the Basic Law and the Land constitutions;

(g) control of the care and treatment in German prisons of persons charged before or sentenced by the [military?] tribunals of the occupying powers or occupation authorities; over the carrying out of sentences Imposed on them; and over questions of amnesty, pardon or release in relation to them.

The Allied High Commission may act directly in these fields as well as through orders to the German authorities. The Allied High Commission shall transmit orders or requirements to Land authorities so far as possible through the German federal government.

Powers necessary for the exercise of the international control of the Ruhr shall also be reserved in the occupation statute.

9. The right to resume, in whole or in part, the exercise of full authority is reserved to the Allied High Commission if it considers that such action is essential to security or to preserve democratic government in Germany or in pursuance of the international obligations of their governments. Before so doing, the Allied High Commission will formally advise the appropriate German authorities of their decision and of the reasons therefor.

10. All legislative and constitutional measures and international agreements which the federal government wishes to make, shall, before they take effect, be submitted by the federal government to the Allied High Commission. All such measures and agreements shall come into force automatically if not disapproved within [21]⁹ days by majority vote of the Allied High Commission.

11. The federal government and the governments of the Laender shall have the power, after due notification of the Allied High Commission to legislate and act in the reserved fields, except as the Allied High Commission otherwise specifically directs, or as such legislation or action would be inconsistent with decisions taken by the Allied High Commission.

12. The Allied High Commission shall take action by majority vote.

13. Subject only to the requirement of security, the Allied High Commission guarantees that all agencies of the occupation, including the occupation forces, will respect the civil rights of every person to be protected against arbitrary arrest, search or seizure; to be represented by counsel; to be admitted to bail as circumstances warrant; to communicate with relatives; and to have a fair and prompt trial.

14. After 12 months and in any event within 18 months of the effective date of the Occupation Statute, the occupying powers will undertake a review of its provisions in the light of experience with its operation and with a view to extending the jurisdiction of the German authorities in the legislative, executive and judicial fields.

Reduction and Regrouping of Troops:

15. The overall troop strengths, of each of the four occupying powers, shall be reduced to 120,000 or less within 150 days of the conclusion of the CFM.

16 (a) After the German Federal Government has assumed governmental responsibilities for all of Germany, and when it is considered that the federal government, together with the Land authorities, is capable of ensuring law and order throughout Germany, the occupying forces of the four powers shall, on a date to be determined by the Allied High Commission acting by majority vote, commence regrouping in specifically defined limited areas. These restricted areas shall contain or have access to port facilities, training areas, air fields, and suitable recreation facilities. The following general locations are proposed: U.S.—the general area Frankfurt–Heidelberg–Kaiserslautern–Wiesbaden; U.K.—the general area Dortmund–Cologne–Duisburg; French—the general area Karlsruhe–Stuttgart–Strasbourg; Soviet Union—the general area Stettin (an alternate area might be Frankfurt-am-Oder). For those garrison areas which do not contain port facilities, and which require such facilities within Germany, provision must be made for the stationing of a small complement of service troops at the assigned port. The specific nature of transit rights between the port and the garrison area shall be determined by the Allied High Commission.

16 (b) Upon the completion of the regrouping of troops, which shall take place within an agreed period (180 days is minimum acceptable to the U.S.), the total size of the occupying forces including any troops stationed at a port shall not exceed 60,000 nationals, less women and children in a dependent status, for each nation. The occupation forces will exercise no local governmental functions, but will carry out specific tasks according to the instructions of the Allied High Commission.

16 (c) The US, UK, USSR, and France shall each maintain a token force of not to exceed 1200 at the seat of the provisional federal government. The number of such forces would be included in the respective 60,000 complement.

16 (d) The extent to which Germany shall be obliged to meet requirements and furnish funds for the maintenance of the forces in garrison areas shall be determined from time to time by the Allied High Commission. All unused German currency and all German goods in the possession of the Allied forces, except such as the Allied High Commission decides are necessary for the maintenance of the forces in the garrison areas, shall be turned over to the provisional federal government by the time the withdrawal to garrison areas is completed.

16 (e) Regrouping of the forces shall take place under quadripartite supervision. In the case of the US, UK, and France, provision must be made for these nations to retain the right of free transit and the right to guard military supplies necessary to maintain the forces of occupation in Austria, until such time as an Austrian Treaty is concluded and the withdrawal of troops and military stores as a result thereof is completed. This arrangement will be necessary unless an agreement of some other type is obtained that provides for the supply of the forces of occupation in Austria should they remain in Austria subsequent to an agreement for Germany.

Disarmament and Demilitarization:

17. Responsibility for the enforcement of the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany shall, pending the conclusion of the peace settlement, be vested in the Allied High Commission for Germany. For this purpose a special Military Security Board shall be established under the Allied High Commission, headed by military representatives of the Four Powers, assisted by the necessary expert technical staffs.

18. The Board will carry on appropriate inspections and will by majority vote recommend to the Allied High Commission measures necessary to maintain and enforce the disarmament and demilitarization restrictions. On receipt of such recommendations the Allied High Commission will determine by majority vote what action should be taken.

19. The agreement reached by the US, UK, and France on April 13, 1949 regarding industries in Germany to be prohibited or restricted on security grounds¹⁰ shall be extended, with such modifications as may be necessary, to all of Germany.

20. Upon termination by a peace settlement of the Allied High Commission for Germany, disarmament control shall be maintained in Germany as specified in the final peace settlement.

Reparations:

21. Reparations deliveries in the present Western zones, which shall be determined in accordance with existing agreements among the powers responsible for the occupation of those zones, shall be made at the earliest possible date in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of Part IV of the Potsdam Agreement. No other deliveries on reparations account shall be made from any part of Germany.

22. The Four Powers agree that industrial plants and equipment previously removed from Germany, uncompensated deliveries from German current production prior to the CFM meeting, German foreign assets made available for reparations, and all other assets received as reparation by claimant nations together with such further deliveries as are made under paragraph 21 shall constitute a final settlement of all Allied reparation claims on Germany. The Four Powers will not support additional reparation claims on the part of any other power.

Foreign Property in Germany:

23. The Military Governors in Germany shall be immediately instructed to hasten the examination of claims for the restitution of United Nations property looted by Germany, in accordance with existing Allied agreements, with a view to completing the return of such property by the time the provisional federal government is established.

24. Pending the conclusion of a German peace settlement, United Nations property in Germany shall be no less favorably treated than German property. The federal government shall be required to ensure its protection and non-discriminatory treatment.

25. AH property, rights and interests in Germany which have been acquired by the governments of any of the occupying powers since May 8, 1945, except property or facilities acquired for the discharge of diplomatic and consular functions, shall be relinquished. Pending the determination by the provisional federal government of the ultimate status of such property, rights and interests, they shall be placed under the provisional administration of the governments of the Laender in which they are located.

The Ruhr:

26. International control of the Ruhr should be exercised by an International Authority with the functions provided for in the agreement signed April 28, 1949. The Authority should be composed of members having voting rights as follows: US, France, UK, and Germany with 3 votes each; Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg with 1 vote each. Decisions of the Authority should be reached by majority vote, except that Germany shall have no vote on questions involving German compliance with the agreement.

Frontiers and Population Problems:

27. Boundary commissions shall be established to study all problems with respect to the frontiers of Germany and to make recommendations for an equitable final settlement of frontier problems, taking into account the needs of the populations directly affected. A review will be undertaken of the Eastern German frontier, including the territory at present under the provisional administration of the Polish Government, and also of the provisional adjustments along Germany’s Western frontier. Although the United States recognizes its commitment at Potsdam to support the incorporation of the northern part of East Prussia into the Soviet Union, it should state that it would welcome a proposal of the Soviet Union to yield its claim in Poland’s favor in order to facilitate a reasonable settlement of the Polish-German frontier problem.

The Peace Settlement:

28. The four Allied powers shall proceed with steps toward a definitive peace settlement, establishing finally Allied requirements on Germany and opening the way for the eventual admission of Germany into the United Nations. The CFM shall direct the deputies for Germany to prepare an initial draft of the peace treaty, after appropriate consultation with the other Allied authorities, and after due consideration of the views of the German Federal Government. The draft treaty will be submitted to a general peace conference.

1. Attached to the source text was a memorandum by Bradley Patterson which explained that it was a revision of CFMP which had been circulated at a meeting in Secretary Acheson’s office May 10. The revisions had been made after conferences with the Secretary and following receipt of comments from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The text of CFMP D–3 and a memorandum of the meeting in the Secretary’s office are in file 740.00119 Council/5–1049. Apparently CFMP D–3 was the third draft on the United States position at the Council of Foreign Ministers since two other papers prepared in the Office of German and Austrian Affairs, dated April 23 and 25, bear similar titles. Copies of these two papers are in file 740.00119 Council/4–2249 and 2549.
2. Under reference here is the Tripartite Control Agreement, signed by the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States at Washington, April 8, 1949. For the text of this agreement, see p. 181.
3. For documentation on the United States policy regarding reparation from Germany, see pp. 546 ff.
4. For the text of the draft Agreement for the Establishment of an International Authority for the Ruhr, December 1948, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. ii, p. 581; for the final text, signed at London on April 28, 1949, see 3 UST 5212.
5. The reference here is to the Draft Treaty on the Disarmament and Demilitarization of Germany proposed on April 30, 1946 by Secretry of State Byrnes at the Second Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris. For the text of this draft proposal, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. ii, p. 190.
6. Two earlier drafts of this part of the paper have been identified in addition to that contained in CFMP D–3. The earlier, dated April 29 and prepared in the Office of German and Austrian Affairs, was entitled “A US Program for Germany for Presentation in a CFM.” The later draft, dated May 3, is apparently a redraft of the earlier one and bears the title “CFM Program for Germany.” Neither of these drafts is printed, but copies of them are in the CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 140: Jessup–Malik Conversations.
7. The source text bears the date May 9, 1949, but this is probably in error since the revision of CFMP D–3 occurred May 10 and CFMP D–3a is dated May 15.
8. For documentation relating to the consideration of the Basic Law by the Bonn Parliamentary Council, see pp. 187 ff.
9. Brackets in source text.
10. Not printed; for the text of this agreement, see Germany 1947–1949, pp. 366–371.