Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

IO Files: US/A/M(Chr)/88

Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the Second Part of the Third Session of the General Assembly,¹ New York, April 13, 1949, 9:15 a. m.

New York, April 13, 1949, 9:15 a.m.

secret

[Here follow a list of persons (44) present, discussion of the terms of reference of the Delegation’s Committee on Public Opinion Policy, and consideration of the question of voting in the Security Council.]

Mr. Dulles² stated that he thought the Soviet Delegation might find this question of voting in the Security Council an appropriate platform from which to launch an attack on the Atlantic Pact. He thought there was very good likelihood that the usual Soviet polemics on the need for strengthening the authority of the United Nations by giving their kind of reality to the principle of unanimity would lead easily to the argument that world peace and security could be accomplished only on a basis of universality, which they would contend was threatened by the Pact. The Delegation ought to be prepared for this eventuality and be ready to answer charges which set the Pact in opposition to the United Nations.

Ambassador Austin³ said that this question had been considered during the drafting of the United States speech to be delivered in the Plenary meeting. He had suggested taking the line that the repeated exercise of the veto was an obstacle to the orderly development of international cooperation and made it necessary to find other means under the Charter, such as the Atlantic Pact, to safeguard security. This was what he proposed to say, but he would very much like to have the Delegation’s advice as to whether it was the proper approach.

Mr. Cohen⁴ said he for one would prefer that the Delegation take the initiative in explaining and justifying the Pact instead of waiting for the Soviets to denounce it. He thought the approach suggested by Ambassador Austin would help to interpret the Pact to the world and to make explicit the authorization for this kind of defensive arrangement which was implicit in the Charter. He thought it would be desirable, however, to go further and explain the Pact as an illustration of the way in which the United States met its obligations under the Charter rather than as a limitation of its obligations. Ambassador Austin said he was grateful for these suggestions and was, of course, always strongly influenced by Mr. Cohen’s advice.

Mr. Dulles inquired whether the proposed reference to the Atlantic Pact reflected the Department’s thinking. Mr. Ross⁵ reported that a telegram had been sent some weeks ago to the Department suggesting that the United States take the initiative, but the Department had thought that such action would be ill-advised at that time. Ambassador Austin also recalled the Department’s unwillingness to take the initiative at that time, but said he believed that a new situation had subsequently arisen. He was usually of the opinion that the best defense was a strong attack. He said he had heard indirectly through Cardinal Spellman⁶ that President Truman thought it necessary to get out and do something in relation to the Pact. If it were felt that the reference to the Pact which he proposed to insert in the speech was not in accord with the Department’s views, then the Department might be consulted by telephone.

Ambassador Jessup⁷ said that he was not clear whether a definite policy decision had been taken to go on the offensive as regards the Atlantic Pact, or whether it was felt that the Delegation should wait until the Soviets had raised the matter. He wondered, however, whether it might not be better to try to keep the issue out of the General Assembly unless the Russians acted. Mr. Popper⁸ said it was true that reference to the Pact had not been contemplated when the Department framed its position, but since the Soviets had already referred to it indirectly, it would probably be considered natural for the United States to make a passing reference to it also. He added that the text had been sent to Washington and it was now up to the Department to decide. Except for this brief allusion to the Pact, the text of the speech was based squarely on the Department’s draft.⁹

Mr. Wainhouse¹⁰ confirmed that the Department’s recommendation was that the Delegation not take the initiative on the issue. He explained that the position paper on the Pact (US/A/1272)¹¹ was primarily designed to meet a situation which would arise if the Soviets requested that an Item on the Pact be added to the Agenda or raised the question in general debate.

Mr. McKeever¹² said that in his opinion, since the Russians had already made several oblique criticisms of the Pact, complete silence on the part of the United States would be misunderstood by other Delegates. He believed that the proposed statement did not transgress any policy decisions. The only suggestion he had to make was that it might be well to review again the reference to the Security Council, which appeared, no doubt inadvertently, to belittle the Council.

Mrs. Roosevelt¹³ said she quite agreed that something ought to be said on the broader aspects of the question. Because of the political division of the world, the full strength of the United Nations could not be brought to bear in solving many important questions. The United Nations was especially handicapped in dealing with internal aggression of the kind that had taken place in Czechoslovakia. Because of abuses of the veto, the Western nations were obliged to fall back on the device of a regional pact. The Pact was carefully related to the United Nations Charter and the clear implication was that when the differences between East and West were settled, permitting the United Nations to function to full effect, the device would become unnecessary. She did not know whether this had been said, but thought it was a strong point which would help many people to understand the United States position.

Ambassador Austin explained that he had intended to refer to the Pact only in its bearing upon the discussion of the veto and not to make a full exposition of it unless forced to do so by the Soviets. Mrs. Roosevelt said that in her opinion the whole question would have to be met eventually and that if the Delegation were going to allude to the Pact, it should be ready to discuss it in its broader aspects. In reply to a question, Mr. James Hyde¹⁴ said that in his opinion the proposed statement was consistent with the published utterances of the Department on the Pact’s relationship to the questions under consideration.

Mr. Raynor¹⁵ stated that the Department’s recommendation not to take the initiative was based largely on the conviction of other partners in the Pact that it would be unwise to raise the question if it could be avoided. The Department felt that since this was a joint enterprise, no important action with respect to it should be taken except in cooperation with all the members. Mr. Raynor added that in conversations with representatives of Governments participating in the Atlantic Pact, he had found that all of them, with the exception of Canada, were opposed to taking the initiative and preferred to wait until the Soviets opened fire.

Ambassador Austin expressed his gratitude for the interest which the Delegation took in this question and for the valuable advice which had been offered. He said he thought it was now up to him to appraise the situation when the time came to deliver the speech and to decide, in the light of developments, what course to take.¹⁶ [Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

1. Information on the composition of the United States Delegation is included in documentation on organization and arrangements for the conduct of United States relations with the United Nations, pp. 1 ff.
2. John Foster Dulles, Member of the United States Delegation; an acknowledged Republican Party expert on foreign policy.
3. Warren R. Austin, United States Representative at the United Nations; Chairman of the United States Delegation.
4. Benjamin V. Cohen, Member of the United States Delegation; Counselor, Department of State, 1945–1947.
5. John C. Ross, Adviser, United States Delegation; Deputy to the United States Representative at the United Nations.
6. Francis Cardinal Spellman, Roman Catholic Archbishop of New York.
7. Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup, Member of the United States Delegation.
8. David H. Popper, Adviser, United States Delegation; Assistant Chief, Division of United Nations Political Affairs, Department of State.
9. The draft texts are not printed.
10. David W. Wainhouse, Adviser, United States Delegation; Associate Chief, Division of United Nations Political Affairs, Department of State.
11. Ante, p. 72.
12. Porter McKeever, Information Officer, United States Delegation.
13. Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, widow of the President; Member of the United States Delegation.
14. James N. Hyde, Adviser, United States Delegation; Adviser, United States Mission to the United Nations.
15. G. Hayden Raynor, Adviser, United States Delegation; Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of European Affairs, Department of State.
16. During its 192nd to 195th Plenary Meetings, April 13–14, the General Assembly considered the question of voting in the Security Council. In this context, various representatives expressed, in detail, opinions regarding the North Atlantic Treaty and the nature of the East–West conflict. For the record of Ambassador Austin’s address at the 195th Plenary Meeting, April 14, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Second Part, Plenary Meetings, p. 124. Hereafter cited as GA(III/2), Plenary. For full text, see Department of State Bulletin, May 1, 1949, p. 552.