893.00/11–248: Telegram

The Consul General at Tientsin (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

315. KMA at Chinwangtao report large numbers disbanded troops and civilians from Manchuria crowding Chinwangtao; some trying to get away by ship, others continuing west by road.

With Communist capture Chinchow and collapse Government troops from Mukden, there is little in path Communist march to Tientsin if they so desire. Government troops Hulutao and Chinhsi should prove no great obstacle and, even if they fight, would occupy only part Communist forces. Government troops now Chinwangtao very defeatist and openly say they do [not?] intend to fight.

In Tangshan–Luanhsien area, there are untried Taiwan trained troops, plus several regiments Youth Corps and communication police doubtful value, In Tientsin area, one division south of city and part another division west; also several thousand garrison troops and 3,000 police with rifles.

Seems significant that although Fu Tso-yi technically in command up to Chinwangtao none of his armies stationed east of Peiping; other troops under his command cannot be relied on at this juncture with deteriorating morale and growing defeatism. Many Chinese here believe Fu plans move own troops west to former base, feeling that with loss Tsinan, Government debacle Manchuria and shortage military supplies (due Generalissimo’s long refusal to aid) he cannot hope to hold Chinwangtao, Tientsin, Peiping area. Fu on horns dilemma. His own troops, on whom alone he can rely, not sufficient hold Tientsin, which has no natural defenses, and Tangshan mines which must be held keep Tientsin utilities operating. Unable hold only seaport through which military aid could arrive, he has choice retiring west to former base where supply would be increasingly difficult and Communist[s] would eventually overcome him, or making a deal with Communists.

Prior Government collapse Manchuria, many Chinese here hoped American military aid, if received in time, would enable Fu equip additional troops and hold out against Communists. Since Manchurian debacle and fall Tsinan, however, many Chinese feel it too late and American military aid now would merely hopelessly prolong war North China and suffering of people. They believe arrival here of American military supplies in any quantity would promptly become known to Communists who would quickly drive to Tientsin to stop it.

Police chief Li Han-yuan, most respected official in Tientsin, resigned 3 days ago in disgust over situation. Mayor Tu Chieh-shih, [Page 535] another able official, expressed opinion to me yesterday that only arrival American troops Tangku or Tientsin could save situation; otherwise he felt situation hopeless.

Number wealthier Chinese officials and families trying leave for south. Interesting fact is that technical personnel (utilities, industries) seem to be making no effort to go; they feel Communists will soon have Shanghai and Nanking and Government will collapse, so they might as well stay here and get used to working under Communists; if they remain, Communist technical problems would be greatly eased.

Universal desire Chinese here is for peace. Bitter over National Government’s military incompetence, corruption, inefficiency, failure provide food and disastrous bungling Government economic policies, they are prepared accept, if not welcome as a measure relief, Communist regime. Immediate consideration that Communist arrival would lift blockade from food producing areas has far greater weight with hungry people than abstract ideological factors.

Sent Nanking 560; repeated Department 315, Shanghai 526 and Peiping.

Smyth