893.00/11–248: Telegram
The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 3—3:16 a. m.]
419. With rout Government forces Manchuria, Nationalist position North China of course immediately imperilled. It has been practically impossible to date obtain reliable information re significance visit Generalissimo for North China politics but outward evidence indicates 1) Generalissimo was forced by events concede indispensability Fu Tso-yi but 2) at same time maintains attitude suspicion with respect North China generals including Fu. Re 1), note lip [Page 533] service rendered Fu (Contel 407, October 2925) and displacement Peiping garrison Chen Chi-cheng,26 who had been uncooperative with Fu, by Li Wen who if not of Fu’s group will nevertheless follow orders. Re 2), however, note Suiyuan elders recently petitioned Generalissimo stipulating particularly need for supply of munitions. Arrival North China of Thirty-first Army is more than balanced by rolling of fighting south right down to Great Wall. Rumored dispatch some time New First Army commander Sun Li-jen to North China with additional troops still unrealized, salvation of major part Nationalist forces remaining Chinhsi and Hulutao improbable. Nationalist thrust toward Shihchiachuang can hardly relieve Taiyuan. Fu can hardly at this late hour weld heterogeneous forces North China into unified command nor is there any sign that past neglect in terms war material is cause of even belated repentance which would bring needed supplies to war lords who are now only Nationalists who will fight (as one Kmt official expressed it). If sum [one?] even granted (as may be gratuitous), inactivity Communist forces [under] Chen-yi and Nieh Jung-chen in Shantung and Suiyuan, respectively, Fu is not in position to stem tide of Communist advance when Shanhaikuan might be breached or Taiyuan fall and Communist forces Hsu Hsiang-chien thus released for attack on Fu’s soft belly via Tatung and Tsining.
Considerable Nationalist military movement is currently in process north Hopeh. Deployment is in several directions and pattern still unclear. Decisive development will naturally in circumstance where Communists hold overall initiative be determined by Communist moves and possibly political events (see following telegram), however, rather than by these deployments which may reflect political and military decisions reached during presence Generalissimo [in] Peiping. Granted continued existence thinking in some quarters to effect that Communists will let Peiping–Tientsin area go until spring, matter of elimination this enclave now seems too simple for them to neglect. It must be concluded probable that 1) Fu’s plans do not contemplate defense Peiping–Tientsin, 2) Communists will move this direction near future, and 3) Nationalist control will thus then be eliminated North China even as in Manchuria.
Sent Department 419; repeated Nanking 662, and Tientsin.