Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East: China, Volume VII

893.00/11–248: Telegram

The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State

Peiping, November 2, 1948—3 p. m.
[Received November 4—12:46 a. m.]

420. ReContel 419, November 2. On October 28 prominent old-time leader, Shansi general, and one person unidentified (believe he used alias) but apparently of some importance in Manchuria group in confidential discussion described continuance fighting against Communists under present Nationalist leadership as hopeless and proposed that it was only by third party leadership that struggle could be carried on. Position of group as developed in discussion (unidentified person doing most of the talking) was substantially as follows:

(1) Negotiations with Communists have [so] far been fruitless because Communists were demanding too much (Vice President Li Tsung-jen informed me Nanking October 9 that talks last summer between Hong Kong group and Communists broke down for same reason);

(2) Nationalist Government had lost popular support of nation and Generalissimo particularly would have to go;

(3) Only by restoration of authority to local leaders and development of people’s strength in place of present policies whereby local leaders are mistrusted and local authority given ruling groups southern henchman could situation be rectified;

(4) Use of local leaders who would administer in main autonomously military, political and economic affairs in respective areas [and] be associated for general purposes would regain popular confidence and support and win back into anti-Communist fold various groups (particularly in Manchuria now alienated from Communists).

It was apparent that interested groups comprised not political third party but military grouping. Quoted Shansi general several days before had obliquely identified following leaders as possible: Li Chi-shen, Li Tsung-jen, Pai Chung-hsi,²⁷ Fu Tso-yi, Ma Hung-kuei, Yen Hsi-shan. Unidentified person in first meeting 2 days previously had stated that little time remained for US come to aid of those still able and willing fight Communists for situation was such that latter could hardly wait any longer.

Debacle Manchuria was unknown at time conversation. Terrific cost to Nationalist military establishment of maintaining Manchuria air lift for months followed by tremendous loss troops, material with commitment last reserves to North China accompanied by financial and economic crisis has developed national crisis of such formidable proportions that even bravest group would be reluctant come forward on basis proposition they continue fight. More successful Communists, [the] farther they will advance politically from bargaining position adopted 1946. It is to be expected that at given point some Chinese group will call for cessation hostilities as has old Ma Chan-shan subordinate²⁸ (Mukden’s 614, November 1²⁹) and endeavor negotiate peace with Communists. There are now current Peiping rumors of “declaration of independence” by Fu and of his undertaking separate peace negotiations with Communists. These are hardly to be credited but that some group will come forward at latest when North China is lost and call for peace with voice too loud to be disregarded by Generalissimo seems certain even by indications seen thus far. That Communists occupy superior bargaining position in peace negotiations cannot be gainsaid, their power cannot be denied but [if?] US exercises political flexibility [it is] still in position influence future developments. It would now seem conclusively established that Generalissimo who as sole dictator has primary responsibility for military, political and economic bankruptcy his Government can neither be rehabilitated by political aid nor kept in power with any amount of munitions: there no longer exists in China any major force willing to fight on part of troops under Nanking direct control.

I do not believe Nationalist group possesses still enough military and economic force to enable splinter third party to confront Communists on equal basis at this state. President Franklin Ho of Nanking University in conversation October 31 analyzing political situation pointed out neither military nor liberal academic group was now in position take up power and opined (see Contel 376, October 21) Generalissimo in his stubbornness would not voluntarily relinquish that power. (That Generalissimo is encouraged by his belief greater aid will flow to him as American election result is hardly to be doubted.) Unifications and strengthening of remaining anti-Communist elements in Nationalist camp for final political phase of battle against Communists can hardly be expected to be strengthened by any prescient action from side Generalissimo.

Dominance Communists in any bargaining must be accepted as inescapable. Nevertheless, Communists are confronted now as never before with problems:

(1) Political administration;

(2) Economic rehabilitation and

(3) Party policies. In that milieu US by exerting its influence adroitly in favor present anti-Chiang, anti-Communist middle-of-roaders can save something from wreckage. That influence would have to be exercised now along non-military lines. Main military phase is practically over. But US by adjusting its policies to rise of Communist power by working through contacts with sympathetic support of those Chinese who are themselves striving to save something from wreck can still play dominant role in China. Consequence of aloofness and political boycott, I submit, would probably be fostering of Soviet advance under conditions of political vacuum and social bitterness thus created.

Sent Department 420, repeated Nanking 623 and Tientsin.

clubb

27. Commander in Chief of Central China Bandit Suppression Headquarters.
28. Gen. Su Ping-wen.
29. Repeated to the Department as telegram No. 468, not printed.