501.BC Indonesia/12–1448: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 1
651. Usgoc 239. Counselor Brit Emb called Dept Dec 13 to express his govt’s view crucial military points on which Neth-Repub talks broke down. He stated Shepherd having reported Repub conviction that Dutch should accept same arrangements in force interim period India had been instructed point out to Repub that throughout interim period command over all armed forces India had been vested in Brit Crown and that no protocol had been signed respecting limitations on use such forces by Crown Repr. His govt considered Neth on firm ground in insisting upon exercise by Neth of supreme command military forces Indo interim period as only basis on which Neth sovereignty could have meaning. His govt also believed Repub must accept merging individual Repub soldiers in units federal army as preservation identity “national army” would likely have same disastrous aftermath Indo as in Burma. His govt considered Dutch would find it politically impossible give way on these two points and trusted US Govt would be disposed influence Repub give in since if deadlock continues Dutch will set up interim govt, which will lead widespread disorders and long period instability of which Communists will take full advantage. Brit Counselor further believed that in case dispute between HRC and interim govt, facts situation would be sufficient safeguard prevent HRC from ordering use force against wishes interim govt, which might well lead chaos and civil war.
Dept officers noted they understood Repub willing accept complete amalgamation TNI in Federal army. Re powers HRC situation Indo radically different from that India. In latter, metropolitan power was already in complete control country at outset interim period and all concessions were being made by it. In Indo, nationalist govt, which already virtually independent for three years, was being called on for major concessions, Dept officers recalled deep-seated Repub fear Neth would use supreme military power to eliminate all non-subservient nationalist elements. Unless Neth could give assurance such power would be used for purely constructive ends with purpose turning over full powers govt soonest to Indos, as Mountbatten had used his power, [Page 560] and not to victimize Repub political and military leaders, Dept officers believed great difficulty would be encountered in persuading Repub accept Neth demands.
Brit Counselor stated he would inform his govt these views. Dept officers said they would communicate Brit views to you.
Dept suggests in your discretion you discuss matter further with Shepherd, perhaps on basis Hatta letter of Dec 13 (Gocus 484) which appears to Dept a most constructive document and one which amply justifies your efforts find basis for resumption negotiation by further trip Jogjakarta. You may also feel free discuss Dept’s Dec 7 Aide-Mémoire to Neth with Shepherd since Brit Emb Wash has been provided copy on confidential basis. Shepherd can also give you substance Brit memorandum to Neth Govt since Brit Emb Wash has given Dept sense thereof on confidential basis.
- Repeated as 625 to The Hague and as 4782 to Paris (for Jessup).↩