856d.00/12–1448: Telegram
The Ambassador in Belgium (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
niact
[Received December 14—8:44 p. m.]
2153. After explaining along lines last paragraph your telegram 1622, December 9, gave Spaak text our aide-mémoire to Dutch Government. His reaction was our position had been set forth very clearly, covered subject thoroughly and text was not as strongly phrased as Dutch had represented it to him. From his conversations with Dutch Ambassador, Spaak felt Dutch are being obstinate and he inclined to belief that Dutch military leaders in Indonesia are pressing for military action. Spaak says such military pressure is very dangerous and he fears negotiations may be suddenly disrupted by military measures. In event such action by armed forces were initiated, their only justification would be swift and sweeping successes achieved in very short space of time, say three or four days. Any prolongation would lead exactly to picture set forth your paragraph 11. He quite agrees even military success would probably leave feeling rancor and hate and delay any really lasting solution.
However, should military operations not proceed favorably Spaak very much fears repetition situation such as exists today in Greece with a running sore in Indonesia doing incalculable harm from every point of view.
Spaak says Dutch complain to him that they have never been able obtain from Hatta any clear-cut definition of views, aims or claims. [Page 561] Hatta is represented as shifty and unreliable with all those racial characteristics which Dutch dislike and distrust.
Basic trouble with settlement this whole problem, according to Spaak, lies in lack of real authority membership GOC since its inception coupled with distance and remoteness area from governments taking part in negotiations which make communications slow and instructions frequently outdistanced by events.
He offers suggestion that seriousness present situation requires action by GOC authorities on highest level and proposes meeting Washington earliest between Lovett, himself and Australian of highest rank (he did not actually name Evatt but I think meant him). Spaak believes such ad hoc GOC could summon Hatta and Dutch Foreign Minister and speaking with full force and authority combined nations produce results. He is instructing Silvercruys1 accordingly.
Dutch Ambassador will be apprised by Spaak of his support our note and of serious view Belgians take of whole affair. I feel Dutch Ambassador may very likely be sounded on suggestion Washington meeting. As I am to see Spaak again tomorrow, would urgently request your reaction suggested early high level conference GOC nations at Washington.2
Sent Department 2153; repeated Hague 110.
- Baron Silvercruys, Belgian Ambassador in Washington.↩
- In telegram 1650, December 14, midnight, to Brussels, the Department welcomed the Belgian suggestion and said it was receiving most serious consideration “to end that views this Govt can be communicated earliest possible moment.” Telegram 2157, December 15, midnight, from Brussels, reported that the Netherlands Ambassador was consulting his government. (856d.00/12–1448, 12–1548)↩