501.BC Indonesia/12–548: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 1
us urgent
niact
1057. Gocus 470. Darmasetiawan telephoned 8 p. m. December 4. Hatta disappointed in meeting with ministerial trio, desired see me 10:30 p. m. (Gocus 4692). Trio had just requested GOC representatives meet palace 10 p. m., so I told Darma I would come to Hatta soonest thereafter.
Called to Consul General residence connection with desire Senator Malone visit Jogja fifth. Met Senator for first time. Saw his flight application in appropriate American and Netherlands hands and did not intervene thereon. Did not discuss Indo question with Senator few minutes I saw him and was particularly guarded since he brought up so quickly threat of “cutting money off from you fellows”. I explained it was American.
Herremans, Critchley and I received by Stikker 10 p. m. He said trio departing fifth for Hague. Two colleagues in conference with parliamentarians so could not join him in final talk with us. Stikker said 2 hour conference between trio and Hatta had convinced trio they could not proceed further with conversations. Vital points were two. First Hatta said he could adhere personally and officially and as spokesman for government to his aide-mémoire in principle. For putting agreement based thereon into practice, however, sought gentlemen’s agreement to protocol which would actually restrain high representative of Crown from using troops in Repub territory without concurrence interim government. Reference particularly paragraphs II C and III F aide-mémoire (Gocus 4413). Secondly Hatta not agreeable Spoor suggested joint command for Netherlands and Federal forces. Insisted latter should be under Indo commander responsible directly to Indo Defense Minister. Stikker said that trio’s instruction from Hague were such they could not proceed with conversations in face position now revealed by Hatta. We put question closely to see if any chance Hatta having been misunderstood. Stikker insisted no misunderstanding. Admitted, however, Hatta quite tense [Page 521] meeting alone with trio. I expressed regret Netherlands permitted talks break off in such fashion. I reminded Stikker of our mutual desire get full RepDel to Batavia and here work out difficulties with Bandungers and others around conference table.
Stikker promised give us report after trio had consulted Hague and Cabinet decision taken probably next Wednesday. He said their recommendation would be that provisional government be set up immediately without Repub. Said his group has already drafted amendment to existing special act which expires December 31 and permits setting up interim government. Said this amendment would permit entry Repub into interim government after January 1 without further legislation. Intimated such amendment would be submitted for enactment soonest if approved by Cabinet. Saw no possibility returning Batavia soon. Said parted with Hatta on friendly terms and appreciative of latter’s difficulties with military arid political parties. Stikker said he had urged Netherlands officials Batavia keep military in line and play down Spoor’s press service. He thanked us for our cooperation. We all indicated our regret at failure of negotiations and his departure but our admiration for his efforts. After leaving palace GOC group agreed chairman Herremans should speak to Sassen and Stikker before their departure for Hague. Explanation should be made GOC required telegraph SC Paris before latter’s move from Europe as to outcome these informal talks Indo. We hope have material for Netherlands delegation by eighth or ninth at latest which would permit us base our report on proper documentation.
I was received at 11:30 p. m. by Hatta alone in Repub residence where he was spending night. He told me of his talk with trio recounting break-down points in language similar to Stikker. I asked him when decision had been reached to insist upon gentlemen’s agreement or protocol on authority of HRC on military matters. He said such decision finally taken cabinet meeting forenoon fourth. That is after I had briefly called on him to extend invitation and prior our departure Jogja by plane. I expressed regret that he had felt such step necessary and that conversations had fallen thereon. He said his position with military and political parties required this measure. He was mindful of Renville provision with respect to sovereignty of Crown for interim period but also of other provisions favoring relaxation of sovereignty during that period. He pointed out that Netherlands trio had not taken exception to clauses in his aide-mémoire which would have restricted full exercising of Crown sovereignty in military matters in Java for one month and in Sumatra for two months after consummation agreement. He thought it reasonable that Netherlands should be asked for some concession in this field comparable to what [Page 522] he understood had been gentlemen’s agreement in India whereunder Mountbatten4 pledged not to use troops. (Critchley had talked along same lines and used this example in our first GOC discussion with Stikker.)
In answer my inquiry Hatta said he had seen Prime Ministers Pasundun and eastern Indo after palace conference and prior my visit. Said they undertook not enter provisional government unless Netherlands promised not use force against Repub. Answer my further question, Hatta said he would continue as usual but position weakened by failure achieve agreement. He said Stikker had told him he found Hatta’s letter December 3 quite good. Convinced Stikker would endeavor further to help Repub but doubted there would be any delay in setting up provisional government without Repub. Said his people would of course fear police action incidental thereto.
I saw Hatta off on GOC plane 7 a. m. December 5. He said no new developments since our last conversation. Hope some compromise could be achieved especially since in his aide-mémoire he had been willing defer elections and also leave transfer date of sovereignty conditional. He thought Netherlands too insistent on point of authority HRC that would be really most difficult of implementation if attempted, namely that of using force against an Indo area in face unwillingness of interim government of Indo’s approving. I asked him keep his people steady and GOC would explore future steps. I had asked Hatta preceding evening give me memo prior departure if possible setting forth exactly what he had said and how conversations broke down. At airport he said he would forward formal report by Tuesday plane Committee of Good Offices since unable prepare anything at late hour and desirous doing it carefully.
I spoke with Roem who asked GOC come Kaliurang and seek negotiations basis USDel plan. Senator Malone and Col. Mayer left for Jogja on same plane intending return in time for interview with Beel 4 p. m. today. I merely greeted Senator.
GOC members saw Sassen, Stikker, Neher and Blom depart by air 9 a. m. today. Parliamentarians and other advisors remaining varying periods principally for discussions with Federalists. Herremans made request of Sassen and Stikker for reports soonest that we could incorporate in our telegram to SC before latter’s departure for [from?] Paris contemplated for December 1 [sic] according our information. They agreed endeavor provide this.
[Page 523]On night December 4 received Usgoc 2125 prior GOC group meeting with Stikker. After meeting received Usgoc 2116 and 213.7
In addition to my messages Department has official Netherlands versions as revealed in Usgoc 211 and Usgoc 214,8 latter received December 5, noon. Message follows setting forth further review of situation and prospects. Signed Cochran.
- Repeated in telegrams 608, December 6, 6 p. m., to The Hague, and 694, December 7, 5 p. m., to Paris (for Rusk and Bancroft).↩
- Supra.↩
- Telegram 998, November 10, p. 479.↩
- Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma, former Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, and former Governor General of India.↩
- Telegram 610, December 3, p. 512.↩
- Telegram 609, December 3, not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Telegram 612, December 3, not printed.↩