501.BC Indonesia/12–548: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 1
us urgent
1068. Gocus 471. Re final paragraph Gocus 470.2 Hatta told me 4th Republic has taken 40,000 prisoners in putting down recent Communist uprising. Sukarno stated armed resistance practically wiped out. Said Communist spirit may rise, however, if situation goes badly with Republic and if Chinese Communist move advances. Said circulars already being distributed in Republic by agitators, “Comrades, have courage since headway being made by brethren in China.” With direct conversations broken down and early setting up of interim government without Republic almost certain, deterioration within Republic seems inevitable. If discouragement too great it is conceivable prisoners might be released and revive movement in which other unhappy forces such as those led by Tan Malaka might join. Already bad economic situation in Republic will further decline. With military and Masjumi groups realizing they have influenced Hatta’s present decision, their boldness may increase.
As recent messages reveal, I have indicated informally to Netherlands representatives that I feel my people would be much concerned over another police action. I have given them broad hints our public would react against military pressure on nationalist aspirants in Indonesia and such popular reaction could conceivably affect American financial aid. I have at no time presumed commit Department or agencies of government on this point. Furthermore, I have not encouraged Republic hold out on any position with promise of American support or reward. Even when authorized by Department’s 411 of September [Page 524] 9 to ConGen and USDel jointly, I did not use authority therein to full extent, preferring indirect approach as revealed in Gocus 384.3 In conversations on USDel plan and in connection with direct talks between Netherlands and Republic officials, I have refrained consistently from arguing merits of proposals from either side. I have said I welcomed any working out of compromises between two parties prior negotiations within GOC, but must preserve position of objectivity as good officer. When Embassy Hague or Department has transmitted Netherlands request for support, I have been left by Department largely to act on my own judgment and have taken position of letting Republic know informally points on which Stikker and others were particularly concerned and on which they sought concessions.
At present period deadlock I felt I should not deviate from foregoing practice. I think it would be improper accept suggestions made by Helb in penultimate paragraph Usgoc 2114 toward endeavoring influence opinion of political parties in Republic. I agree strongly with opinion of Department officers, expressed in ultimate paragraph, that Dutch themselves are in best position to strengthen Hatta’s leadership and should appreciate disastrous consequences of his collapse. Sukarno and Hatta spoke to me strongly of desire that Netherlands permit them have direct contact with Bandungers in belief assembled Indonesian groups can genuinely help in working out peaceful solution for all Indonesia. This morning Prime Minister Eastern Indonesia expressed to me hope Netherlands would now relax and permit contact. He further hoped GOC would request Netherlands permission to act as intermediary between federal states and other two parties as well as between Netherlands and Republic in last effort achieve peaceful over-all settlement. He stated definitely his state would refrain entry interim government without promise no police action against Republic. I cannot judge how far he and Pasundun Prime Minister could maintain such positions acting alone. They would of course be encouraged in such positions if GOC or US sought delay inauguration interim government.
In view undertakings given Department by Netherlands in past that setting up of government for Bandung group would not be concluded without full opportunity for prior consummation of political agreement between Netherlands and Republic, it seems to me we have ground now to protest against prospective action toward this end in immediate future. In my opinion, Hatta has indicated such extensive willingness to yield to Netherlands position through his aide-mémoire that we should now counsel Netherlands to endeavor further reach [Page 525] compromise within December on two stumbling blocks of military matters and authority of HRC. My feeling at this point is we should make serious effort have Netherlands postpone setting up interim government. I think this position warranted by fact Netherlands representatives came to Batavia with absolutely fixed positions on certain points; have not gone through full-fledged negotiations on these and other points; have pressured Hatta in absence advisors; and have not yet utilized services of GOC officially in trying to achieve settlement.
Three GOC members talked only briefly at airport this morning of prospects. We realize difficulties of getting Netherlands delegation negotiate on USDel plan now in any manner that would assure early success or deter Netherlands Government from pursuing prospective plan of interim government. We shall, however, meet shortly to see what we can suggest. In meantime, Supomo and other Republic advisors in Batavia have promised give me their ideas on possible compromise between Republic and Netherlands.
In light above, I recommend following action:
- (1)
- Representations should be made by Department by end Tuesday, Hague time, before Cabinet acts on report of returning Ministers and further commits itself.
- (2)
- There is now definite breakdown of direct talks. No indication of any present disposition on part of Netherlands to negotiate either within GOC or in any other way. If representations are to succeed they must be strong. I suggest aide-mémoire be employed as set forth in Usgoc 2125 with modifications to bring it to date and to make as forceful as possible in view present crisis. Possible objections to delivery of aide-mémoire, spelled out in Usgoc 189,6 no longer exists. (A) USDel plan submitted November 10 as GOC working paper; (B) there has already been definite clash on substantive issues and there is little reason to think there will be any further negotiations unless present Netherlands attitude is modified; and (C) there is no longer any possibility of prejudicing outcome Stikker-Hatta conversations which are now concluded.
- (3)
- As minimum covelbance [compliance] with Department position in aide-mémoire, we should expect cooperative attitude on part of Netherlands to be expressed in willingness (a) to postpone inauguration interim government; and (b) to participate actively in bona fide negotiations immediately whether by way of resumption of direct talks or of negotiations within GOC as may be mutually agreeable to parties.
- (4)
- GOC is committed make telegraphic report to SC on results direct conversations. Nature telegraphic report will be in part determined by written statements to be made by parties (Gocus 470). Netherlands statement may reflect action taken by Department on recommendation above. Anticipate strong pressure in GOC from [Page 526] Critchley for unequivocal statement that all approaches toward resumption negotiations have now broken down with no prospects whatsoever of success in future. Also expect him press strongly for recommendation that SC consider substantive points dispute prior SC’s Xmas recess and possibly also press for submission texts Critchley-Dubois plan and USDel plan to SC. Bequest Department’s guidance this matter soonest as report should be telegraphed from Batavia by December 10 at latest.
Brought British Consul General Batavia to date. He is anxious to help overcome deadlock and hopes his people will be given opportunity cooperate. Signed Cochran.