868.20/12–748: Telegram
The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Secretary of State
Amag 1657. In replying to instructions contained in War 80149, Director JUSMAPG December 8 is sending to Washington by special courier JUSMAPG estimate needs Greek armed forces for fiscal year 1950.
Revised budget, totalling about $199 million, gave approximately $10 million to Greek Navy, $25 million to Air Force and $164 million to Army. Navy figure represents no change in size and strength proposed in Plan “A”. Money-saving accrues from overall reduction in imported rations from 3900 to 3600 calories daily per man. Air figure represents no reduction in size and strength proposed in Plan “A”. Money-saving accrues from overall saving in imported rations and discovery of apparently adequate surplus stock of equipment available at disposal prices. Army figure represents reduction by end fiscal year 1950 of 50,000 men, achieved by initiating disbandment NDC on November 1, 1949 and completing it by January 1, 1950. Cash saving accrues principally from saving made from this reduction; by overall saving through reduction in imported rations; by reduction program for replacing British weapons and vehicles and by cutting ammunition to somewhere near figure Greeks themselves would cut it if they were buying with their own money.
In Amag 1652,1 I gave my reasons for not approving JUSMAPG’s approach to solution of problem and staggering estimates in support plans “A” and “B” which were based upon JUSMAPG’s understanding problems set forth in War 92306. I can, however, now go a long way in approving JUSMAPG’s latest estimate in reply War 80149. I endorse its estimates for both Navy and Air Force as minimum figures. I approve reduction ration of Greek forces. Proposed daily Greek ration is 3600 imported calories, augmented by locally-purchased fats, jams, tomato paste and fresh fruits. This is reduction from what they have enjoyed past year from US but is as great as US provides for its own soldiers and far greater than ration Greek Army once had. I approve elimination costly changeover from British to American weapons and vehicles. I approve curtailing ammunition imports. During Grammos campaign I watched Greek artillerymen using expensive ammunition irresponsibly, send repeated volleys against rocky slopes of mountain ridges, knowing only that area was [Page 211] not occupied by GNA (Greek National Army) much in manner of American children setting off firecrackers on July 4. Most of all, I approve elimination of inefficient NDC with consequent reduction of GNA.
With all these cuts, Greek national forces in fiscal year 1950 will be infinitely better fed, clothed and transported than their enemy. Greek Army numerically will have heavy superiority over rosiest estimates of strength of their enemy. Greek forces will have dominating superiority of fire power, and absolute control of air and sea.
Should Department desire to reduce JUSMAPG’s $199 million estimate to approximately $150 million, I believe this should be accomplished by reducing Greek Army budget. A smaller budget means a smaller army with reduction preferably starting this fiscal year. I further believe this can be brought about beginning about April first, without substantial loss of real strength of Army.
Whereas Director JUSMAPG proposes starting reduction of Army at end 1949 summer campaign, considering summer period for operations and victory, I would propose starting reductions at end of winter 1948–49. In fighting guerrillas I believe winter should be our greatest ally. We can be closer to victory at end of winter than at end of summer. Advancing winter drives guerrillas deeper into valleys in search food and shelter. If GNA can keep them constantly on the move, it will eventually wear them down to surrendering or standing and fighting. A fight has meant, and should mean, GNA victory. Since broad plan of keeping guerrillas on move contemplates starting this month a sweep in southern Greece and moving northward, we should find at end of this winter that main force of Army is occupied in containing and attacking guerrilla pockets along northern frontiers. Granted that if aid and refuge from northern neighbors continues, these pockets can never be completely eliminated. I believe nonetheless with the rear swept clear of large bands, we will have won our basic military objective in Greece. This I consider to be elimination of all fixed positions of heavy guerrilla concentrations and consequent reduction of guerrilla menace to such proportions as we feel should be within ability of Greeks themselves to control. If, at this point, Greek leadership and initiative are incapable of coping with situation, then we should prepare ourselves to get out at first opportunity or to stay indefinitely for purpose of nursing along a nation that does not show the will to recover.
World-wide demands on US production and capital and real position today of Greece in US fundamental strategy, also indicate desirability [Page 212] reducing Army at end of winter 1949 as above outlined. By cutting away as much dead wood as is possible, the solid core that remains, equipped with weapons provided by our estimates, with training JUSMAPG plans this winter, should form the most capable army Greece has had in recent years. Of course, its effectiveness will depend upon its spirit and leadership. These we cannot give. They must come from with[in] itself. Without them neither large nor small army will do the job, and small one will be less burden than large one.
Therefore, in summary, for the reasons I have stated I support recommendations of Director JUSMAPG based upon budget of maximum of $200 million for fiscal year 1950. Should it be desirable, however, to cut this figure, I recommend cutting NDC portion of GNA budget at an earlier date than that suggested by Director JUSMAPG. Should a further saving beyond this point be necessary, I recommend it be done in rations.
Recent Athens press reports, in commenting upon military and refugee needs, are unanimous in crying that Greece must appeal to her allies. Not one suggests that Greece, before appealing to her allies, should see what she herself could do for finding a solution. Until Greek political and press circles change their approach, they are failing to face up to the problem. Until they face up to it, more help can only be considered as priming the pump for further requests, and such requests only as an excuse for putting off until tomorrow the job that should be done today. I have growing feeling that only way to change this rhythm is to shock Greek political and press circles into cold realities of life. I suggest re Gama 13362 that when budget for Greek program is presented to Congress consideration be given to inclusion statement that Greece is not essential to US security and therefore aid is not requested because of our military need. I believe our position vis-à-vis the Greeks would be greatly strengthened if Greek aid program is presented to Congress in its true perspective as a part of our political peacetime objectives through helping a nation that is helping itself fight the inroads of Communism. In Greece I am taking steps to place release of Greek Army funds under control of Greek Ministry of Finance, to strengthen press censorship of military matters and as previously reported to develop psychological campaign, sponsored by strong government if we can bring such into being, directed towards revitalizing the nation’s strength through self-help rather than sustaining it artificially through foreign grants.