740.00119 Control (Germany)/10–448
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (Bohlen)
| Participants: | The Secretary |
| Ambassador Caffery | |
| Mr. Bohlen | |
| Mr. Ernest Bevin | |
| Mr. Frank Roberts |
The Secretary and Mr. Bevin briefly discussed the Soviet note1 delivered the night before in Washington [Moscow] on the Berlin situation, the full text of which, however, they had not received. They were both in agreement that the Soviet proposals contained in this note were totally unsatisfactory and that neither Government would accept a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers until the blockade was lifted nor would they agree to resume direct discussions on the basis of the August 30 directive2 in view of the interpretation which the recent exchanges with the Soviet Government had placed upon that [Page 1212] directive. The Secretary emphasized that he felt the point of the August 30 directive was the most dangerous point in the Soviet note because there might be certain members of the Security Council who would be prepared to recommend a resumption of discussions on that basis. He said he thought the Soviet proposal was a smart propaganda move obviously designed to influence the discussions in the Security Council. The Secretary added that he thought we should make it plain at some point in the Security Council discussion that we were prepared to hold a CFM immediately provided the blockade was lifted in advance.
Mr. Bevin wondered whether that did not mean that we would go back to a fruitless discussion on the basis of Potsdam as the Soviets proposed. He felt that we could not retreat back to Potsdam and in any way impair what we had done in Western Germany. He completely agreed, however, with the Secretary that the new Soviet note in so far as they had seen it was little more than a repetition of the previous Soviet position.
Mr. Bevin, in reply to an inquiry from the Secretary, stated that he thought that there was some danger in an unwillingness on our part to discuss the question of Germany once the blockade was lifted on the basis of Potsdam; to take that position would be to offer an opportunity for the Soviets to confirm their propaganda that, in effect, we have determined upon a policy of splitting Germany.
The Secretary briefly referred to the difficulties which might be encountered because of the Argentine desire to step down from the presidency for which there was no precedent but told Mr. Bevin that we were attempting to get the Argentines to change their mind and to take the presidency.