Office of the Historian

740.00119 Control (Germany)/10–348: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Paris

confidential
us urgent
niact
Washington, October 3, 1948—11 p. m.

3893. For Bohlen from Lovett and Kennan.

1.
In the summary from Moscow of conclusions Molotov’s 12 page note of Oct 3,1 assume you have spotted big fishhook in paragraph number 3 relating to August 30 directive to military governors. It is obvious they propose Berlin be dealt with under directive of August 30 while retaining for themselves the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement.
2.
Furthermore, with respect Article 107 we note particularly that language relates to action “taken or authorized as a result of that war by the governments having responsibility for such action”. The action of which we complain (the illegal blockade) has clearly not been taken or authorized as result of that war.
3.
As to Council Foreign Ministers meeting Soviets are well aware and amply forewarned none of us could participate while blockade in existence. Only by withdrawal of surface transport restrictions will one important part of threat to peace be removed, thus permitting consideration by CFM. The threat to peace emanates solely from their [Page 1211] acts, therefore they can remove threat by their own actions. Their astonishingly transparent answer leaves us mildly nauseated as result of eleventh hour double talk. They appear to be really worried.2 [Lovett and Kennan.]
Lovett
  1. Supra.↩

  2. In an undated memorandum to Jessup, Reinhardt, the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, had outlined the essence and intent of the Soviet note as follows:

    • “1. To undercut the presentation of our case before the Security Council by representing the Soviet position in the Berlin question as a wholly reasonable one, by denying the existence of any serious obstacles to a settlement other than the bad faith and sinister purposes of the Western Powers, thereby denying the existence of a threat to the peace, and by refusing to acknowledge the competence of the Security Council to deal with the question.
    • “2. To obtain recognition of the August 30 directive in its Soviet interpretation as an international commitment binding upon the Western Powers and thus to advance the Soviet position with the purpose of creating an improved base from which to conduct any further negotiations.
    • “3. To force consideration of the Berlin question in the Council of Foreign Ministers and thereby tie any discussion of the Berlin Problem to a consideration of German problems in general.

    “Far from indicating any Soviet tendency to withdraw from its past demands, the terms of the note are even less acceptable than those of previous Soviet communications on the subject. To accept them would be to surrender completely what has been since the beginning the basic tenet of our approach to the problem, namely, our refusal under the duress of the Berlin blockade to discuss any German questions other than those immediately concerned with the removal of the blockade itself.” (501.BC/10–2848)

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