Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Council/5–2148: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

top secret   us urgent
niact

London, May 21, 1948—9 p. m.

2215. The principal erroneous conclusions and assumptions of fact contained in the French note referred to in my 2214, May 21,¹ are:

(1) It is stated the Germans are reticent about the immediate constitution of a Government in western Germany—eight minister presidents have unanimously requested a constitution.

(2) It is felt there is a resurgence of nationalism. The vote in Hesse was local, to a large extent spurious and has no national significance.

(3) It is alleged the London proposals involve five appeals to the ballot box in less than one year. All five questions involved could be resolved by two elections.

(4) It is claimed there has been no progress in respect of security. French security demands have largely been met by the report on security and Massigli himself declared he derived great satisfaction from US proposals on this subject. (See mytel 2167, May 19.²)

(5) It is assumed the greatest provocation to the Soviet Union would be the announcement of a constituent assembly. The Ruhr proposals, excluding the Soviets from the international authority, which the Soviets have already protested, and currency reform in the western zones, would be equally, if not more resented by the Soviet Union.³

Douglas

1. Supra.
2. Ante, p. 256.
3. In telegram 2216, May 21, from London, not printed, Ambassador Caffery observed that the American Delegation had attempted to meet almost every French demand at the London Conference. Douglas observed further that if the French were seriously apprehensive about provoking the Soviet Union, a meeting on the ministerial level in the current circumstances would be especially provocative. (740.00119 Council/5–2148)