740.00119 Council/5–2148: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
2214. Re mytel 2186, May 20.1 At the resumption of our discussion on the security report Massigli this afternoon informed us of the two notes which the French Government handed to the American Embassy in Paris last night. I assume the text of both of these notes has already been communicated to you. The first is joint note to the British and American Governments on the tripartite talks on Germany which suggests postponement of announcement and application of certain aspects of the German program notably convocation of the constituent assembly. The note which is based on certain erroneous assumptions and conclusions, likewise maintains the French opposition to the election of members to the constituent assembly.2 The second note addressed to the US Govt, a copy of which was handed to the [Page 267] British Foreign Office this afternoon, deals with the necessity of a coordination of political policy and the unity of action in the face of the growing Soviet menace on the part of the British, French and American Governments and promises that the three governments concerned take stock of the present situation through consultation among themselves before determining what measures should now be envisaged, including timing of policy with respect to Germans.3
In the light of these communications, a meeting of the heads of the three delegations was held this afternoon to examine the situation and determine the future course of our work as it seemed to place an entirely new aspect upon our discussions here. Massigli explained that the French note was only an expression of the grave concern felt by the French Government that the allied governments had not given sufficient consideration to the serious implications of the present situation, at the same time that a German policy was being formulated which might have very unfortunate consequences and be regarded by the Soviet Union as a threat which would provoke action. France felt not sufficient attention has been paid to the measures to be taken to counteract such action. The French Government does not wish to follow any course which might be provocative, particularly as in recent days it has learned through the French Ambassador in Washington that for some months to come, in spite of the good will of the US Government, the US, in the event of any emergency, could not bring to the western governments any material support. The French Government is fully committed to the policy of building western Europe but before reaching final decision with respect to Germany it is important to consult and to examine this whole problem at the highest level to see where we are going.
In response to my inquiry why this question is raised now when the situation is not more serious than it was in February or March or middle April, Massigli replied that France had realized since February that the military situation of the western powers was worse than then thought. Particularly during the coming months before the winter sets in, in its opinion, are the most urgently critical [apparent garble]. During this period appearance of provocative action should be avoided. I pointed out that I could not understand why, when the situation for the western powers had been materially strengthened by the European Recovery Program, by the Brussels Pact, by certain conversations regarding its implementation which have recently been held among signatory powers, by the President’s statement of March 17, and by his statement of support of the Brussels Pact, this note should be presented at this late stage and asked whether the situation would ever [Page 268] be ripe for the opinion of the French Government to proceed with the organization of a government in western Germany.
Strang then pointed out that whereas this conference could not, of course, express an opinion upon the French communication nevertheless it raised a question beyond that of merely suggesting that the governments look at the program as a whole and proposed a revision of a program already prepared here. It had been assumed that the recommendations of this conference were to be looked at as a whole and the French Government now has some objections to a part of the program, notably the questions of timing which had been regarded as an essential element. He pointed out that the question of the Ruhr and security depended upon agreements on the establishment of a German Government.
I pointed out that if it were a question of provocation the establishment of the Ruhr authority was as provocative to the Soviets as any other phase of the program and that currency reform itself would similarly be resented.
Massigli replied the French Government did not wish to bargain but to weigh the advantages and risks, particularly as the German policy was full of risks in itself and the risk from the Soviet Union seemed clearer and clearer each day.
Both Strang and I declared that any failure to proceed now would have extremely adverse effects as it would be interpreted by the Soviet Union as a weakness to be exploited and by Germany as a weakness which made it unreasonable for her to rely upon the western powers. The risks of doing nothing were substantially greater than those involved in carrying out this program.
Although Massigli urged that we continue to consider the recommendations to be submitted to the governments, both Strang and I felt that it was necessary that we should seek instructions before agreeing to this procedure and have suspended talks at least until Monday although the press will receive impression that work will continue.
In view of the foregoing, it is our unanimous opinion that while the French position may have been inspired by real apprehensions, they are probably seizing this occasion to force a postponement of the establishment of the provisional government in Germany on the one hand, and are also on the other hand probably using this as an opportunity to trade for armament from US, to obtain ministerial meeting and further concessions in regard to permanent limitations in regard to steel production and one or two other items.
It is the unanimous judgement of General Clay, Ambassador Murphy, Mr. Reber and myself that our position should be as follows:
First, that we should persuade the British to join us in informing the French, when we meet again, that we are prepared to finish the work of the discussions on the clear understanding that if the French [Page 269] continue to oppose the time schedule for the establishment of the provisional government, we, that is the British and ourselves, will proceed, notwithstanding, in the bizonal area to follow the US–UK previously agreed program for the immediate establishment of a provisional government, and that we would express reservations as to the Ruhr and security considerations qua Germany pending clarification of the French position. We make this recommendation, because we are of the opinion that if we agree, without qualification, to the Ruhr paper and to the security document, we will have lost our trading position with the French. Moreover, any results of this conference which do not cover adequately, political developments in Germany, will give them a purely punitive character which would be disastrous to our policy in Germany. Finally, after all the publicity which has gone out, postponement of the establishment of a provisional government in the bizonal area, if not in western Germany as a whole, would be seized upon by the Soviet as an evidence of grave weakness on our part and would have adverse effects upon the morale of the Germans and on our prestige in western Europe.
It is also almost certain that in view of the publicity which has occurred, a failure to go ahead now in Germany would make almost impossible the task of German rehabilitation, so that it could participate in European recovery.
Second, we further recommend that through Washington and Paris we attempt, by the arts of persuasion, to convince the French that they should agree to the time schedule.
Finally, we suggest that if the British are not prepared to follow this course of action with us, the present talks be recessed until the whole situation can be reappraised.
We recognize that these recommendations are tough medicine, but we doubt that any milder treatment will produce the result which presumably we seek. The moment calls for vigorous though not provocative action.4
Sent Department as 2214, repeated Paris (personal for the Ambassador’s Eyes Only) 224; USPolAd (personal for Murphy) 138.
- Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 258.↩
- The text of the French Foreign Ministry note of May 20 under reference here was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 2724, May 21, from Paris, not printed (740.00119 Council/5–2148). The note gave expression to a grave French apprehension that the proposed Western measures to rebuild the German political organization could cause a dangerous Soviet reaction. Telegram 2723, May 21, from Paris, not printed, reported that when he handed the note to Ambassador Caffery, Foreign Minister Bidault indicated French trepidation over the Western military weakness in Germany in the face of possible Soviet military aggression. The French felt that the Soviet Union might retaliate against the establishment of a government in West Germany by driving the Western powers out of Berlin (740.00119 Control (Germany)/5–2148).↩
- The translated text of the French Foreign Ministry note of May 20 summarized here was transmitted to the Department in telegram 2720, May 21, from Paris, not printed (740.00119 Council/5–2148).↩
- In telegram 2730, May 22, from Paris, not printed, Ambassador Caffery concurred in the position set forth here (840.00/5–2248).↩