501.BB Korea/12–3047
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Reber)
Mr. Atherton telephoned from Ottawa this afternoon to inform us of developments following his presentation to the Canadian Prime [Page 887] Minister of the U.S. views respecting Canada’s proposed withdrawal from the United Nations Korean Commission.
He confirmed information already received from the Canadian Embassy that Mr. Pearson, Canadian Under Secretary for External Affairs, would bring the formal answer of his government to Washington on January 2 and has asked to be received by the Acting Secretary and by the President upon his arrival.
Mr. Atherton said that Mackenzie King’s present position with respect to non-participation was adamant and that in his present mood the Prime Minister was apparently prepared to take this issue to the country even if it entailed a division in the Cabinet and to fight Canada’s participation in the Korean Commission on the ground that it had already overextended its activities in the United Nations and was being called upon to do more than its share. The Prime Minister apparently goes back in his mind to the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations in 1933 and 1935 when there was much talking with respect to the Far East but little achieved. Mr. Atherton also felt that Mackenzie King had been very largely influenced by his visit to London and by Bevin’s feeling that Canada, under the influence of Lake Success, had not been helpful in the settlement of the Palestine issue about which Bevin apparently feels very bitterly. There seemed also to be a feeling in London that Canada was more inclined to “take orders” from Washington.
Mr. Atherton got the impression that Mackenzie King was making this issue a declaration of independence to show that Canada reached its decisions independently of the United States. Mr. Atherton therefore thought that we should not press the Canadians too hard as he did not see any way in which the Prime Minister’s decision could be reversed without forcing a Cabinet crisis during which Canada’s relations with the United States might become the issue before the Canadian people. Mackenzie King also has reached the end of his career and therefore is less easily influenced by the feelings of his Cabinet.
The Ambassador thought it would be preferable to seek to find some solution which would ease the Prime Minister’s position and not force the issue between Canada and the United States. He suggested as a possibility that we endeavor to persuade Pearson that Canada should not withdraw formally from the Commission but merely not appoint a representative.
I repeated that Canada’s boycott of the Commission would in our opinion have serious consequences with respect to the future of the United Nations. We would regard such action with very real concern and would no doubt have to express our views in this sense to Pearson upon his arrival.